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China’s unique approach to the market economy during its transitional phase has 
provoked widespread interest among researchers. While the Western literature can 
certainly not be directly applied under Chinese economic conditions, it offers 
important theoretical grounds on which we can build our understanding of different 
behaviour of firms and banks in China.  
 
In the first chapter,we employ a unique set of data on financial information of over 
6,000 firms and study the lending pattern of banks in China at a firm level. We find 
that in addition to common factors such as profitability, size, and credit history, 
state ownership is highly correlated with banks’ lending decision;the evidence is 
consistent with the existence of soft budget constraint. 
 
The debate over whether such lending bias is caused by the supply side (banks) 
leads us to the second chapter. We examine and compare investment behaviour of 
firms under different ownership, with a focus on investment to cash flow 
sensitivity, using financial and accounting data on over 1,700 listed firms in China. 
We find opposite effects of cash flow on firms when sample is split between 
different ownership, with privately owned firms showing a higher sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow. This result enables us to establish that the cause of lending 
bias and soft budget constraint in China is indeed a supply side effect. We also find 
that such sensitivity is positively correlated with firm size and age, but not related 
to Tobin’q, which we interpret as indicating the lack of market value information 
about firms in China. 
 
Institutional development in the sense of enhancement of the effectiveness of the 
market is widely viewed as the core to economic reform in transition economies. As 
privately owned firms generally outperform their state owned counterparts (see 
Estrin et al. 2009), we study the impact of regional institutions on total factor 
productivity (TFP) of firms under different ownership. We find that the quality of 
institutions is highly correlated with firms’ TFP, and that improving institutions to 
facilitate business operations is crucial for firms to achieve higher effectiveness and 
sustainable growth. The results also suggest that urgent reform is needed for the 
state owned sector in China. 
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China’s fast growth and its economic reform in the recent decades have been 
thought provoking. Researchers are particularly interested in comparing Chinese 
firms and their behaviour to their Western counterparts, aiming to study whether 
literature developed on the basis of developed economies can be applied in the 
Chinese context(B. Chen & Feng, 2000; G. C. Chow, 1993; Wang & Yao, 2003; 
Wu, 2000; Zhang & Zou, 1998). 
 
It is particularly of our interest to look into the capital market as well as how firms 
behave differently in the Chinese context compared to their Western counterparts. 
The partial privatization of state owned firms and commercialization of state owned 
banks raises the question of whether the reform was thorough and successful. The 
development of institutions in China also prompts us to examine the institutional 
impact on firm performance. The co-existence of state and privately owned firms as 
well as the massive difference in institutions across regions enables us to test for 
such impact. Our work is able to draw on new data not in the public domain, which 
greatly facilitates our regression analysis. 
 
In a broad sense, the aim of our study is to shed light on the results of recent 
reforms and examine whether such reform has made significant changes in bank 
lending practice as well as more generally to the institutional environment. 
Specifically, we begin with examining banks’ interaction with firms and the 
determinants of bank lending in the first chapter, before moving on to how such 
lending pattern has affected firms within different institutional ownership sectors, 
by testing the difference in investment to cash flow sensitivity, in the chapter that 
follows. We also test for the factors that influence such sensitivity and argue the 
rationale behind it. Finally in chapter three we focus on the institutional differences 
across regions in China and estimate how institutional changes have impacted firm 
performance in term of total factor productivity (TFP). 
 
The thesis therefore contains three chapters, each of which represents a standalone 
study on different aspect of financing, investment and firm performance under the 




It is usually assumed by economic theory that all firms have equal access to capital 
market, and that  in such a perfect capital market, firms’ responses to changes in the 
cost of capital differ only because of difference in investment demand (Modigliani 
& Merton, 1958). Studies of Western developed economies then go on to explain 
the practice in presence of a “financing hierarchy” caused by market imperfections 
and frictions, in which internal funds or cash have a cost advantage over debt or 
equity issuance. In China, the story is slightly more complex. Due to the fact that 
the Chinese capital market is still in its developing stage and quite immature in 
comparison to those of developed economies, firms in China still rely heavily on 
bank financing when the need for external capital arises, and bank loans counts for 
more than 80 per cent of all external finance in China (Tian and Estrin, 2007). 
 
Therefore, banks play very important roles in finance by determining the 
availability and the cost of credit. The availability and cost of credit, in turn, 
determine company capital structure and cost of capital. In addition to their role of 
facilitating capital flows, banks also monitor their debtors, thereby providing 
valuable governance oversight to the entire economy. 
 
With China’s ever so rapid market progress, the development and growth of firms 
within various industries has become the focus to consider. The sustainability of 
economic development, and bank financing is crucial to this, as the availability of 
loans can enable and nurture growth. Since the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
launched its open door economic policy in 1978, the Government has embarked on 
a series of banking sector reform programs. 
 
Prior to 1979, the banking system in China was very centralized and did little to 
promote the growth of firms in terms of provision of essential credit. The primary 
duty of banks weas to allocate investment through budget grants (Ma, 1997). To 
reform the banking system, the Chinese government first introduced the two tier 
structure with People’s Bank of China acting as the policy bank and with four 
specialized banks (Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China, and Construction Bank of China) under its direct 
control. Such transformation was completed by 1994. The most important reform at 
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this stage was replacing credit allocation with interest-baring loans to limit the soft 
budget problems. 
 
Since the establishment of the two tier banking system, the reform of the banking 
sector has been focusing on improving the lending practice of the four specialized 
banks by separating commercial and policy lending. Other reforms included 
removing credit plans, reducing government intervention in credit allocation, 
(partial) entry deregulation, (partial) interest rate deregulation, tightening of 
accounting and prudential norms, and financial sector restructuring (Shirai, 2002).  
 
However, such reform has not solved the main problems of soft budget constraints 
or non-performing loans. By late 1990s, the People’s Bank of China launched IPO 
plans for the four specialized banks in attempt to attract foreign investment both in 
terms of assets as well as Western style management.  
 
But government ownership still prevails in both listed companies and banks (Tian 
and Estrin, 2007), and state ownership clearly promotes firms' access to bank 
finance, which can be extremely valuable for firms with a healthy growth prospect 
and future investment plans.  
 
Despite the efforts of the Chinese government to introduce competition and 
enhance governance mechanisms, the banking system is still dominated by state-
owned banks (SOBs) and characterised by a high level of non-performing loans 
(NPLs). As the government owns both the SOBs and state owned firms (SOFs), it is 
usually suggested that, given the paternalistic behaviour of the Chinese 
government, the former are obliged to grant loans to the latter in the form of 
“relationship lending”:that is, lending by SOBs to SOFs is largely due to political 
pressure (from the local and central governments) rather than based on commercial 
considerations (OECD, 2005). Chow and Fung (2000) state that most firms in 
China, like in other transition economies, rely heavily on bank loans because equity 
and bond markets are either not fully developed to a mature stage or not developed 
at alland the cost to enter is high. Banking institutions that emerged from the first 
wave of reforms are still characterized by large financial inefficiencies, lack of 
competition, and extensive government involvement in credit allocation (Miurinand 
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Sommariva, 1993). The state banking system assumes a dual role in the Chinese 
economy, functioning as a financial intermediary as well as a quasi-fiscal 
institution. All of the four major banks are subject to extensive government 
regulations and control and they are required to make policy loans to the state 
owned firms which generally operate under soft budget constraints so that there is 
no risk associated with increased borrowing. In case of failure, they can get a 
bailout by the government (Tam, 1986). Also in order to avoid massive 
unemployment, central and local government officials force the state banks to keep 
lending to the state owned firms, no matter how financially unsound these firms are 
(Blanchard, 1997). When state owned firms fail to generate profits to repay bank 
loans, banks have to increase their lending to support the continuation of all 
affected projects (Tam, 1986; Perotti, 1993). 
 
In addition to the banking sector’s unsatisfactory commercialization progress, the 
state owned enterprise sector is under government policy direction to become more 
privatized and efficient. Some firms have successfully transformed themselves into 
semi-private firms (Jefferson, Rawski and Zhen, 1992; Gelb, Jefferson and Singh, 
1993). The state sector is also often given many advantages in addition to easy 
access to bank finance. Data show that listed firms in China remained to be largely 
state-owned. The proportion of State ownership (the sum of state-owned and legal 
person shares) is in the 40% - 80% range in about 90% of all listed firms (People’s 
Bank of China, 2009), indicating that the state owned firms also have external 
financing options. Despite the ownership being transferred from central government 
to local authorities or local government owned enterprises, the firms remain under 
direct control of the State. 
 
Many listed firms also operate in the protected sectors (energy, raw materials, etc), 
which are largely monopolistic (Shirai, 2002). These sectors benefit greatly from 
specific policies, better tax rates, as well as government subsidies. However, Wei 
and Wang (1997) states that despite the spectacular success of China’s economic 
reform in the past few decades, the slow progress in the state owned sector is a 
major disappointment as well as a significant stumbling block to any further 




More often than not, state owned firms are under-performers compared to privately 
owned ones (Bai, Lu, & Tao, 2006; Jefferson & Su, 2006; X. Xu & Y. Wang, 
1999). China’s dynamic private sector has increasingly been contributing to the 
rapid economic growth in the recent years. It has been producing over half of 
industry value added and around half of China’s trade surplus. The private sector 
has also counted for most employment creation and over one-third of fixed-asset 
investments. Nevertheless, in terms of formal external financing – both direct and 
indirect – its share remains very low. This suggests that in China, the financing 
sources for private enterprises are limited (Molnar and Tanaka, 2007). Privately 
funded companies accounted for only under 20% of total loans by the state owned 
banks in 2011, despite the fact that the non-public sector of the economy has 
become the largest among urban fixed-asset investor accounting for 58.9% of the 
national total and one third of the nation’s export total (ACFIC, 2012).In the 
absence of formal external financing, the Chinese domestic private sector heavily 
relies on financing from retained earnings and borrowing from the informal sector 
(Allen, Qian, & Qian, 2005; Hasan, Wachtel, & Zhou, 2009). 
 
Could it be that the favouritism in lending policy has choked the overall pace of the 
reform? Although some studies on issues related to lending bias in China have been 
published, such as those of Wei and Wang (1997) and Cull and Xu (2003), few 
research papers has been published shedding light on all of the possible 
determinants of bank lending in China. The study by Wei and Wang (1997) finds 
that China’s bank loans favour state owned industrial firms and argues that the 
lending bias diminishes the effectiveness of other measures designed to promote the 
growth of the private sector or to induce state owned firms to restructure. Many 
have argued that the existence of a lending bias is self-evident, and others have 
suggested that the lending bias, if it existed before, has disappeared in recent years. 
In this chapter, we aim to test for whether such effect still remains after years of 
reform. Shirai (2002) and Lu, Thangavelu, and Hu (2001) both carried out studies 
using firm level data from listed firms in China examining the banks’ lending 
behaviour and firms’ corporate financing pattern, and provided a more 
comprehensive picture. Determinants of bank lending are tested in both researches 
and a positive correlation between the state ownership and the accessibility to bank 
loans was found, indicating systematic bias in lending decisions and the presence of 
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soft budget constraints, which is a major cause of NPLs. Lu et al. (2001) point out 
that banks often find it difficult to enforce loan contracts in the event of loan default 
of non-state owned firms, which also increase their preference towards state owned 
firms. Low transaction costs with state owned firms as a result of a long term 
relationship may have also given rise to the lending bias.  
 
To fill the gap in the literature on the relationship between the lending behaviour of 
banks and bank borrowing by manufacturing firms, we investigate the determinants 
of lending by banks in China to firms with state as against private ownerships in 
different industrial sectors. We also examine whether banking sector reforms and 
equity market development have had any significant impact on banks’ lending 
behavior and firms’ corporate financing pattern by comparing the results with 
previous studies. Specifically, we aim to reveal the relationship between bank 
lending and firm ownership and consider selected control variables that are related 
to bank credit management practices, including firm size, profitability, age, past 
credit history, and collateral. 
 
This chapter also provides detailed analysis of various aspects of firms that could 
affect the banks’ lending behaviour. After three decades of reform, state ownership 
still plays a significant role in China’s industrial sector, and arguably, still 
determines to a certain extend a firm’s ability to obtain bank loans. State-owned 
commercial banks still dominate the Chinese banking sector and it is widely 
postulated that the local and central governments influence the loan activities of 
these banks. If such is the case, then political pressure from governments may 
matter more in bank lending than the commercial practices adopted by the banks in 
order to select loans applicants rationally and correctly. This chapter aims to 
investigate from both the demand and supply side of the story and shed more light 
on the rather opaque nature of Chinese bank lending practice. 
 
Based on original data on over 6,000 medium to large size firms in the Hubei 
Province, the main purpose of the research is to investigate the financing patterns of 
Chinese firms and if private firms are discriminated against by state-owned banks 
during the lending process. Data are examined to test whether firms’ characteristics 
such as size and ownership determine their accessibility to bank loans, and if so, to 
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what extent. The results confirm the presence of soft budget constraints leading up 
to the major reform and IPO plans for Chinese state owned banks in 2006. Also the 
fact that some state owned firms prefer bank loans over equity finance, despite 
considerable amount of retained earnings, suggests that banks either provided 
favourable financing conditions which may be due to corruption, or lack of 
borrowers’ incentive to diversify their financing sources. It is concluded that the 
banking sector reforms need to be strengthened and privatized further in order to 
improve their risk management skills and lower lending biases. 
 
In addressing the question of whether lending bias/financial constraints can be 
proven by showing results on the comparison of bank finance level in state owned 
and privately owned firms alone, we extend our research to examine the investment 
behaviour of Chinese firms; notably  their means of financing affect such behaviour 
and implementing their  investment plans. The rationale behind the research interest 
is that, if privately owned firms exhibit high investment sensitivity to internal 
finance in the form of retained earnings or cash flow, in combination with the 
findings in the previous chapter of the low leverage level of privately owned firm, 
we can confirm the presence of bank lending bias in China. Moreover, it 
strengthens the view that such bias is caused by supply side decisions such as 
policy lending. 
 
In fact, the existing literature provides a puzzling picture in terms of what drives 
investment and more specifically, the role of cash flow plays on investment 
decisions and its sensitivity to the level of investment, even for western economies. 
Moreover, there are few studies focusing on investment models in Chinese firms 
but we feel that it is crucial to shed some light on what influences firm investment 
in China due to the unique character of the rapid growth and its institutional 
environment which is very different from most other countries.  
 
China has maintained very high capital accumulation levels and aggregate 
investment ratios(Bai, Hsieh, & Qian, 2006; Song, Liu, & Jiang, 2001). At the same 
time, state-sector fixed investment, which accounts for a dominant share of gross 
fixed investment, has displayed conspicuous cyclical patterns in its annual growth 
rate. We believe that studying emerging market firm behaviour has been proven to 
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be of great importance and can provide policy implications for future economic 
development(Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000), especially by guiding and 
motivating the improvement of  the capital market in China. 
 
To be precise, we aim to thoroughly investigate the role of cash flow on investment 
behaviour of firms and what firm-specific features influences investment to cash 
flow sensitivity. The current literature states that it is unclear in the western context 
whether a high sensitivity of investment to cash flow is a plausible indicator for 
firms being financially constrained. Here we intend to provide a clear view on that 
for China, and in doing so further support the conclusion of the first chapter. In this 
chapter we aim to pin down the factors which influence the firms’ investment 
decision and, by looking at the impact of cash flow on investment from State 
owned firms and privately owned firms separately, we will be able to identify 
whether privately owned firms are in fact more deprived of external financing, 
especially in terms of bank loan, compared to their state owned counterparts. We 
propose therefore to pin down whether the apparent state of “financial constrained-
ness” of privately owned firms in China is caused by factors from the demand side.  
 
There are few studies in existing literature that investigate the cash flow–
investment relationship based on data from the emerging market. In the Chinese 
context, Chen (2004) finds that the trade-off model has limited explanatory power 
in China in the sense that, for example, the effects costs of financial distress 
(earning volatility, bankruptcy costs) are not significant. It may be because the 
Chinese environment still retains some features of a centrally planned economy. 
The state is still the principal stakeholder of firms and the owner of banks as well as 
the beneficiary of tax. If the state does not change its controlling behaviour towards 
corporatized SOEs, those firms are less likely to run into a financial crisis compared 
with their counterparts in private sectors, so the costs of financial distress is likely 
to have much less effect on firms’ capital structure and further influence firms’ 
investment behaviour.  
 
For the analysis, we proceed in three steps. Firstly we test a model in which 
investment is explained by a number of explanatory and control variables for all 
data observations, in order to test for and estimate the relationship between cash 
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flow and investment. We then utilize the fact that privately owned firms appear to 
be more deprived of external financing compared to their state owned counterparts 
as demonstrated in the first chapter, and divide the sample according to ownership 
type. This way investment to cash flow sensitivity can be estimated in two sub 
samples to test for whether such sensitivity is higher for the financially constrained 
group.Finally, based on the results of first two tests, we test for the level of 
significance of correlation between such sensitivity and other firm features. 
 
Institutional development is widely held to be essential to induce businesses to 
improve their economic efficiency.  We aim to examine whether it applies to China. 
Institutions, defined as in formal and informal rules of doing business as well as 
market intermediaries, shape many cost factors, in particular costs of using the 
market, but also the costs of interacting with government authorities, labour 
markets, financial service intermediaries and courts (North, 1990, 2005; Ingram and 
Silverman, 2002, Meyer and Peng, 2005). Moreover, institutions shape the 
opportunities for knowledge creation and sharing, and thus for raising the level of 
technology in use in firms (Lundvall, Johnson, Andersen and Dalum, Mudambi, R. 
2008). By impacting on both the value added created by firms, and the costs they 
incur in the process, they indirectly impact on corporate performance and economic 
growth.  
 
Research on institutions has traditionally focused on cross-national variations. 
However, the cross-national variations are often very large and correlated with 
other aspects of the respective economies (e.g. Easton and Walker, 1997; Bevan, 
Estrin and Meyer, 2004; Berggren and Jordahl, 2005). Therefore, researchers have 
recently began to exploit the intra-country variation in emerging economies such as 
China, Russia and Vietnam to study how institutions affect the strategies and 
performance of foreign investment firms (Meyer and Nguyen, 2005; Du, Lu and 
Tao, 2007) and of local firms (Johnson and McMillan, 2002; Cull and Cu, 2005; 
Hallward-Driemeier, Wallstein and Xu, 2006; Bruno, Bytchkova and Estrin, 2010).  
This approach allows us to conduct a more fine-grained analysis of the impact of 




The concept of firm performance is often the core of many economic studies and 
many theories have been developed on economic efficiency of firms. Pareto (1896) 
defines allocative efficiency as a situation where no one could be made better off 
without someone at least as worse off.  Allocative efficiency is achieved when the 
price of output equals the cost of resources used to produce the goods (price = 
marginal costs). Leibenstein (1975) argues that most empirical studies have 
illustrated results showing that by improving allocative efficiency or Pareto 
efficiency, output can only be increased by a very small fraction.  X-efficiency is 
closely related to and affected by the efficiency of labour and management; in a 
simplifiedframework, X-inefficiency refers to the excess of actual costs over 
minimum cost for a given output (Leibenstein, 1978). In the previous two chapters 
of this PhD thesis, we mostly looked at how to improve firm performance by 
reallocating available resources, for instance, by making available funds more 
accessible to privately owned and more profitable firms rather than firms with state 
ownership but poor profitability. In this chapter, we look into how to improve firm 
performance from another perspective, which is the effectiveness (or technical 
efficiency) of firms, also known as total factor productivity (TFP). 
 
We therefore focus on the impact on total factor productivity (TFP) as measure of 
corporate performance. TFP is the proportion of firms’ output that is not explained 
by the quantity of inputs in a production process (Comin et al., 2006; Mahadevan, 
2004). It thus is a measure of how effectively a firm exploits its inputs of capital, 
labour and materials. Earlier studies have identified TFP as a critical mediating 
variable that influences both corporate performance and economic growth 
(Bosworth and Collins, 2003; Felipe, 1999; Rodrik, 1998). In this study, we 
investigate the impact of institutional development on TFP with the dual aims to 
advance theory and generate policy advice. In particular, we put forward a more 
fine-grained analysis of institutions to analyse the prevailing question, which 
institutions really influence firm behaviour?  
 
The effects of institutions on transaction cost have been observed throughout 
economic history. The need for impersonal contract enforcement surfaced along 
with increasing labour diversification. Innovations of institutions that lowered 
transaction costs consisted of legal changes, instruments, and specific techniques 
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and enforcement characteristics that lowered the costs of engaging in long distance 
exchange. Company laws enable a wide range of organizational forms and complex 
governance structures that limit the problems of agency in hierarchical 
organizations. In capital markets, secure property rights, which entail a polity and 
judicial system, lower the costs of contracting. In the integrated societies of the 21st 
century, specialization increases the number of inter-firm interfaces, and thus 
transactions between economic agents, making institutions particularly critical 
(North, 1990, 2005; Peng and Heath, 1996; Commander and Svejnar, 2007). 
Institutional theory has been developed mainly by two types of work: First, 
longitudinal or historical studies explore in great detail how institutional 
frameworks and businesses evolve over time. Second, cross-sectional work has 
mostly exploited the fact the nation states vary in their institutional make-up, and 
explored how cross-national variations of institutions impact on the strategies of 
foreign investors (Bevan, Estrin and Meyer, 2004;  Globermann& Shapiro, 2003; 
Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik and Peng, 2009; Zhou, Delios and Yang, 2002), and 
entrepreneurial start-ups (Bruno, Bytchkova and Estrin 2008), on business 
performance (Scarpetta, Hemmings, Tressel and Woo, 2002), as well as economic 
variables such as economic growth (North, 1990; Rodrik 1998). However, such an 
approach is relatively crude in that variations across countries tend to be large and 
correlated with many other features of the pertinent countries.  
A new opportunity to advance institutional theory has emerged with the opening up 
of emerging economies that are both large and internally diverse in their 
institutional set-up. Such studies proxy institutions at subnational units of analysis, 
such as provinces and cities. This allows for a more detailed analysis of the role of 
institutions in an economy because national characteristics are held constant in the 
study. In particular, institutional frameworks vary across regions or provinces 
within large transition economies, such as China, Russia and Vietnam, that have a 
federal structure of governance (Hallward-Driemeier, Wallstein and Xu, 2006; 
Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 2002; Li, Yue and Zhao, 2009). In these 
economies, market-oriented reforms have often been rolled out by central 
government authorities, yet their implementation in each province varies 
considerably. While formal changes may be initiated centrally, local 
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implementation often depends on local informal institutions such as traditions and 
attitudes (Meyer and Nguyen, 2005).  
One obstacle to institutional research exploiting intra-country variation has been the 
availability of suitable measures. In this study, we have collected suitable indices 
from a variety of studies and papers (Fan et al, 2007, Du, Lu and Tao, 2007, World 
Bank, 2006) to overcome the limitations of earlier research. 
The varying pace as well as different regional focuses of reforms in China have led 
to considerable variation within China with respect to the actual institutional 
framework at the level of provinces (Bai, Du, Tao and Tong, 2004; Cao, Qian and 
Weinstein, 1999; Fan et al. 2007; Yueh 2010).  For example, the Chinese 
authorities often authorized specific regions to conduct experiments with market 
reforms under special policy and regulations – such as the industrial zone in the 
1990s (Cartier, 2002). Even though the evolving formal institutional framework 
may be fairly similar across China, its implementation varies across provinces, such 
considerable variations could be observed in aspects such as corruption, contract 
enforcement, and intellectual property rights protection (Du et al., 2007). In 
contrast to Russia, China was never a fully centralised country, yet neither has it 
ever been quite decentralised (in terms of New China after 1945). The market 
economy has taken over the planned economy since the 1980s and the short period 
of government centralization in the 1960s/70s left very little impact on the 
country’s economic activities (Hu and Khan, 1997; Chai, 1998; Kambur and Zhang, 
2005). Furthermore, with the combination of loose specification and weak 
implementation of certain policy and regulations, provincial and local authorities in 
China have considerably higher degree of influence over economic activity than, 
for example, local authorities in the UK. This creates ideal conditions to examine 
institutional variations at the province level.  
 
For our empirical analysis, we utilize the fact that some aspects of the institutions 
vary considerably across provinces in China, in order to measure the quality of 
institutions at the level of provinces. Traditionally, many Chinese firms were 
adapted to the state-dominated economy, and were thus operating with relatively 
low efficiency, including most notably overstaffing. Market reforms since the 
1980s have created new opportunities and incentives schemes, that have induced 
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many, but not all, firms to substantially reform their operations, and to improve 
their productivity(Jefferson & Rawski, 1994; J. Y. Lin, Cai, & Li, 1998). In this 
study we aim to shed more light on the question how variations in institutional 
change, in particular their variations across Chinese provinces, affect firm 
performance.  
 
The thesis has contributed to both theoretical and empirical side of the literature. 
The first chapter utilizes original data which was never published and has not been 
used by other researchers. The majority of previous studies have used similar 
datasets available through a number of databases, but these datasets either are 
highly aggregated (city or province level) or comprise of only listed firms which 
are mostly State-owned, large in size, and profitable, which can produce misleading 
results due to sampling limitations. Our data also cover the period of 2003 to 2005, 
leading up to the major introduction of foreign investment and IPO plans for the big 
four national banks in China (Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China, China Construction Bank, and Agricultural Bank of China). Consequently 
the data capture a phase during which the banks are making changes to adapt to 
future policies and management alteration. Secondly, our research has enriched the 
empirical literature of bank financing in Chinas as few researchers have examined 
similar topics due to limitations in data. Thirdly, the study contributes to the 
theoretical side of literature in identifying factors affecting lending behaviour in 
China. Fourthly, the results are highly robust and show a strong correlation between 
firms’ ownership and their level of accessibility to bank loans. This strongly 
suggests the existence of a soft budget constraint, whilst past studies on similar 
topics provided us with ambiguous results. Finally, our study comments on the 
facilitating role of debt on managerial exploitation in Chinese firms, as oppose to 
the governance role it assumes in the Western economy. 
 
The investment chapter offers the following contributions. Due to the overinvesting 
nature of Chinese firms, it is of great research interest to estimate the investment 
function in China at a more disaggregated level. We employed disaggregated firm 
level data in testing for the correlation between internal finance and firms’ 
investment implementation. Our findings extend investment to cash flow sensitivity 
theories to firms in China and further to firms in the emerging market and 
21 
 
developing economy. We also try to pin down the ownership effect on another 
financing-related measure of firms, the investment to cash flow sensitivity and have 
found a significant correlation, indicating the influential role of ownership in China. 
This chapter also complemented the first chapter on bank lending, as it provides a 
rounded argument on the fact that the restriction of external financing to privately 
owned firms is indeed a result of lending bias and not a demand side effect. 
 
The third chapter on institutions contribute in the following aspects. Firstly, we 
provide a more fine-grained understanding of institutional variations by examining 
the impact of institutional quality across regions within the same country. Many 
previous papers have attempted the subject of institutional impact on firm 
performance, mostly based on cross-country datasets. The reason being in most 
cases, the differences in institutions across region within the same country are not 
significant enough for results to be significant. Problems can arise with this 
approach as the variation can be caused not by differences in institutions alone but 
also other country-specific factors. Thus most cross-country studies of institutional 
impact on performance overlook that the causes of difference in firm performance 
could include factors that are country specific other than institutions (e.g. 
population, culture, market size).  By measuring institutions at the provincial level 
across regions in China, we are able to link specific institutions to firms in different 
regions while controlling for other province-level effects, which provide more 
accurate results on the impact of institutional changes on firm level. Few studies 
have provided analysis on data with such a low level of aggregation. Secondly, we 
test for a rich variety of institutional measures, thus providing a more fine-grained 
understanding which institutional arrangements matter for firm effectiveness. Third, 
we investigate how state-ownership, an important institutional arrangement in most 
transition economies, interacts with other characteristics of the firm and its 
institutional environment. Specifically, we found it to have a significant negative 
effect that is moderated by the firm’s age and size but not by other province level 
institutional influences. Lastly, we have constructed a unique firm level dataset that 
incorporates province level institutions that enables investigation of intra-country 




Therefore the thesis offers contributions in extending and applying the Western 
theoretical literature to the Chinese context, and testing these theories with unique 
firm level data set and shedding light on how banks and firms behave differently 





























It is widely believed that, in China, direct state ownership benefits firms in the 
borrowing process when acquiring loans from banks. However, little empirical 
evidence is present in current studies to confirm such an impact and to further 
investigate into the banks’ soft budget constraints and other determinants on firm-
level lending. This chapter studies the lending pattern of banks in China at a firm 
level. It intends to shed some light on the decades’ long debate of whether private 
firms are discriminated against by the banks in the lending process and whether 
they enjoy the same level of accessibility to loans as their state-owned counterparts. 
The chapter also intends to fill the gap in the literature on the relationship between 
the lending behaviour of banks and bank borrowing by firms with various 
ownerships, as well as providing empirical evidence for theoretical predictions in 
the Chinese context. Utilizing data on financial information on over 6,000 firms in 
Hubei province, we find that state ownership is highly correlated with banks’ 
lending decision and as privately owned firms are generally better performers in 
term of profitability in China (Bai, Lu, et al., 2006; Jefferson & Su, 2006; X. Xu & 
Y. Wang, 1999).  Such a finding is consistent with the existence of soft budget 
constraint for banks. We also find that, regardless of ownership status, profitability 
is negatively correlated with firms’ accessibility to loans, indicating what would be 
irrational behaviour on the lender side in a capitalist economy. Credit history 
variable is also found to be negatively correlated to the level of debt, indicating 
banks view past borrowing as an indicator for financial distress as well as a risk on 
loan repayment. In addition, results indicate that firm size, growth rate, and 
collateral level all have positive impact on firms’ likelihood of obtaining bank 
loans. We also find evidence supporting the argument that debt does not reduce 
corporate agency costs, but instead, facilitate the exploitation by managers in state 
owned firms as without the risk of bankruptcy and financial distress, more debt 
simply means more fund for to be exploited and invested to fulfil management’s 
personal agenda. Such results are robust with respect to alternative performance 
measures, lagged time periods and also sample periods. Our empirical results 
confirm that banks’ favouritism towards state owned firms disregarding the 








It is assumed in theory that all firms have equal access to capital market, and that 
firms’ responses to changes in the cost of capital differ only because of difference 
in investment demand in a perfect capital market (Modigliani & Merton, 1958). 
Studies of Western developed economies then argue the presence of a “financing 
hierarchy” caused by market imperfections and friction, in which internal funds 
have a cost advantage over new debt or equity issuance due to the higher costs 
associated with external financing (Modigliani & Merton, 1958). In China, the story 
is slightly more complex. Due to the fact that the Chinese capital market is still in 
its developing stage and quite immature in comparison to those of developed 
economies, firms in China still rely heavily on bank financing when the need for 
external capital arises, and bank loans counts for more than 80 per cent of all 
external finance in China (CBRC Annual Banking Report , 2006). 
 
Therefore, banks in China play very important roles in finance by determining the 
availability and the cost of credit. The availability and cost of credit, in turn, 
determine company capital structure and cost of capital (Modigliani & Merton, 
1958). In addition to their role of facilitating capital flows, banks also monitor their 
debtors, thereby providing valuable governance oversight to the entire economy 
(Jensen, 1986).  
 
With China’s ever so rapid market progress, the development and growth of firms 
within various industries has become the focus of the country’s sustainability of 
economic development, and bank financing is crucial to such development as the 
availability of loans can enable and nurture such growth. Since the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) launched its open door economic policy in 1978, the 




Starting from the late 1970s, the Chinese government began its reform of banks, 
which were all state owned and mostly functioned as the distribution agency of 
capital. The banks then also did not function as effective intermediaries between 
savers and investors. The reform program focused on a two-tier system which 
comprises of a central policy bank with four specialized state owned banks (Bank 
of China, China Construction Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and 
Agricultural Bank of China, collectively known as the Big Four) under direct 
control of government. In 1994, the second wave of reform struck the Big Four 
aiming to further commercialize the banks, separate policy and commercial lending 
activities, and most importantly, manage the nonperforming loans (NPLs). During 
the next few years, the management of the Big Four focused on reducing 
government intervention, removing credit allocation and further regulating and 
tightening accounting practices. By 2001, the banking system in China was 
attempting to adopt Western-styled management and planned to open to foreign 
shareholding within the Big Four by 2006 (Shirai, 2002). To the current date, 
Chinese banks are still arguably characterized by large cash holdings due to the 
heavy deposit nature of their customers and relative low efficiency on lending on 
firm level. 
 
Chow and Fung (2000) state that most firms in China, like in other transition 
economies, rely heavily on bank loans because equity and bond markets are either 
not yet developed or only in the infant stage and the cost to enter is high. Banking 
institutions that emerged from the first wave of reforms are still characterized by 
large financial inefficiencies, lack of competition, and extensive government 
involvement in credit allocation (Miurin and Sommariva, 1993). The state banking 
system assumes a dual role in the Chinese economy, functioning as a financial 
intermediary as well as a quasi-fiscal institution. 
 
However, despite the efforts of the Chinese government to introduce competition 
and enhance governance mechanisms under the banking reform, the banking 
system is still dominated by state ownership and characterized by a high level of 
non-performing loans (NPLs). In 2002, the official figure for NPLs was reported to 
be 25% of total loans, amounting to US$500 billion and equivalent to 40% of 
China’s GDP (CBRC Annual Banking Report, 2006). However, in a subsequent 
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report on the Chinese banking system by Ernst & Young, a figure for NPLs was 
reported six times higher than the official figure. The report was later withdrawn by 
the accounting firm.1 In 2010, the official figure of NPLs stands at just over $177bn 
(CBRC Annual Banking Report, 2010). Perotti(1993) and Brainard (1991) state that 
in transition economies banks are saddled with a large amount of bad loans, which 
reflect their former role as passive channel of subsidies to the state-owned sector. 
These loans are also concentrated, so that very few or even just one bank typically 
hold the bulk of borrowing of individual companies (Estrin et al. 1992). Profit 
maximizing behaviour by banks, while desirable, is not sufficient to establish 
proper lending incentives in absence of a through restructuring of bank balance 
sheets.  
 
As the government owns both the Big Four and state owned firms (SOFs), it is 
usually suggested that, given the paternalistic behaviour of the Chinese 
government, the former are obliged to grant loans to the latter in the form of 
“relationship lending”:that is, lending by banks to SOFs is largely due to political 
pressure (from the local and central governments) rather than based on commercial 
considerations (OECD, 2005). All of the four major banks are subject to extensive 
government regulations and control and they are required to make policy loans to 
the state owned firms which generally operate under soft budget constraints so that 
there is no risk associated with increased borrowing. In case of failure, they can get 
a bailout by the government (Tam, 1986). Also in order to avoid massive 
unemployment, central and local government officials force the state banks to keep 
lending to the state owned firms, no matter how financially unsound these firms are 
(Blanchard, 1997). When state owned firms fail to generate profits to repay bank 
loans, they have to increase their lending to support the continuation of all affected 
projects (Tam, 1986; Perotti, 1993). 
 
In addition to the banking sector’s unsatisfactory commercialization progress, the 
state sector is under government policy direction to become more privatized and 
efficient. Some of them have successfully transformed themselves into semi-private 
firms (Gelb, Jefferson and Singh, 1993). However, Wei  and Wang (1997) states 
                                               
1 Bloomberg, ‘Bank slams ‘distorted’ estimate of bad loans’, South China Morning Post, (12 May 
2006); Agence France-Press, ‘Ernst & Young withdraws ‘erroneous’ bad loan report’, South China 
Morning Post, (15 May 2006).  
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that despite the spectacular success of China’s economic reform in the past few 
decades, the slow progress in the state owned sector is a major disappointment as 
well as a significant stumbling block to any further reforms in other sectors. Studies 
indicate that the shared ownership of banks and the state sector is a major cause for 
slow progress in banking reform and poor performance in the state sector (Wei and 
Wang, 1997). Surprisingly, privately funded companies accounted for only under 
20% of total loans by the state owned banks in 2011, despite the fact that the non-
public sector of the economy has become the largest among urban fixed-asset 
investor accounting for 58.9% of the national total and one third of the nation’s 
export total (ACFIC, 2012). 
 
Could it be that the biased lending policy has choked the overall pace of the 
reform? To fill the gap in the literature on the relationship between the lending 
behaviour of banks and bank borrowing on firm level, this chapter investigates the 
determinants of bank lending in China, and examines whether banking sector 
reforms and equity market development had made any noticeable impact on banks’ 
lending behavior and firms’ corporate financing pattern by comparing the results 
with previous studies. Specifically, we aim to reveal the relationship between bank 
lending and firm ownership and consider selected control variables that are related 
to bank credit management practices, including firm size, profitability, age, past 
credit history, and collateral. 
 
This chapter also provides detailed analysis of various aspects of firms that could 
affect the banks’ lending behaviour. After three decades of reform, state ownership 
still plays a significant role in China’s industrial sector, and arguably, still 
determines to a certain extend a firm’s ability of obtaining bank loans. State-owned 
commercial banks still dominate the Chinese banking sector. It is postulated that 
the local and central governments influence the loan activities of these banks. If 
such is the case, then political pressure from governments appears to matter more in 
bank lending than other commercial practices adopted by the banks in order to 
select loans applicants rationally and correctly. This paper aims to investigate from 
both the demand and supply side of the story and to shed more light on the arguably 




Based on data on over 6,000 medium to large sized firms in the Hubei Province, the 
main purpose of the research is to investigate the financing patterns of Chinese 
firms and whether private firms are discriminated against by State-owned banks 
during the lending process. Data will be examined to test whether firms’ 
characteristics such as size and institutional ownership determine their accessibility 
to bank loans, and if so, to what extent. The results confirm the presence of soft 
budget constraints leading up to the major reform and IPO plan for Chinese state 
owned banks in 2006. Also the fact that some state owned firms prefer bank loans 
over equity finance despite considerable amount of retained earnings suggests that 
banks provide favourable financing conditions which may be due to corruption, or 
lack of borrowers’ incentive to diversify their financing sources. It is concluded that 
the banking sector reforms need to be strengthened and banks privatized further in 
order to improve their risk management skills and reduce lending biases. The 
estimation results also find significant correlation between bank finance and firms’ 
size, growth rate, and collateral level. 
 
The chapter offers the following contribution. Firstly, the study utilizes original 
data which was directly obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics of China 
and therefore more reliable and accurate compared to these obtained from other 
data services in China. The dataset was not published and has not been used by 
other researches. The majority of past studies have used similar datasets available 
through a number of databases, but these either have many missing values and 
errors, or comprise of listed firms only which are mostly State-owned, and largely 
profitable, which can produce misleading results due to sample size limitation. The 
dataset employed by our study also covers the period of 2003 to 2005, leading up to 
the major reform and IPO plans of the big national banks in China. Consequently 
the data would capture a phase during which banks are trying to adapt to changes in 
policies and management. Secondly, few researchers have examined similar 
hypotheses and similar studies in this field mostly lack comprehensibility due to 
limitations of data. Thirdly, the study contributes to the theoretical side of literature 
(in hypothesis development). As the banks in China are largely state-owned, factors 
other than firm profitability will affect the lending decision, and such lending 
behaviour isn’t clearly stated in the relevant theories. Lastly, the results are highly 
robust and show strong correlation between firms’ ownership and their level of 
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accessibility to bank loans, whilst past studies that have examined such lending 
behaviour provided us with ambiguous results. 
 
The main body of this chapter will be divided into the following sections: first we 
go into the previous literature and review the key theoretical arguments and similar 
studies. On this basis, we then develop hypotheses to be tested before moving onto 
methodology section, where the data and estimation strategy will be explained in 





1.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
“The key questions… are, first, what the interests of the political actors are, and 
second, how these interests translate into policies and institutions that further the 
objectives of the political actors.” 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998) 
 
 
Literature on corporate finance and banking has long been focusing on the 
relationship between banks and firms, given how greatly firm performance is 
influenced by bank finance, in forms of credit availability, cost of external finance, 
as well as capital structure(Lin, Zhang  and Zhu, 2009). Also the relatively scarce 
options on external capital market financing and weak corporate governance in 
emerging markets means it is likely that banks play an even more dominating and 
influential role in such markets. According to the China Banking Regulation 
Commission, the big four banks of China still provide more than 80% of all loans to 
Chinese firms (CBRC Annual Banking Report, 2006). At the same time, because of 
the differences between the emerging markets and the developed markets in terms 
of economic and institutional context, it is naive to assume that banks voluntarily 
play as effective monitoring roles in emerging markets as they do in developed 




Government ownership still prevails in both listed companies and banks (Tian and 
Estrin, 2007), and state ownership clearly promotes firms' access to bank finance, 
which can be extremely valuable for firms with a healthy growth prospect and 
future investment plans. However, more often than not, state owned firms are 
under-performers compared to privately owned ones (Bai, Lu, et al., 2006; 
Jefferson & Su, 2006; X. Xu & Y. Wang, 1999). China’s dynamic private sector 
has increasingly been contributing to the rapid economic growth in the recent years. 
It has been producing over half of industry value added and around half of China’s 
trade surplus. The private sector has also counted for most employment creation 
and over one-third of fixed-asset investments. Nevertheless, in terms of formal 
external financing – both direct and indirect – its share remains very low. This 
suggests that in China, the financing sources for private enterprises are limited 
(Molnar and Tanaka, 2007). In the absence of formal external financing, the 
Chinese domestic private sector heavily relies on financing from retained earnings 
and borrowing from the informal sector (Allen, et al., 2005; Hasan, et al., 2009). 
 
Several studies point out that in emerging economies, bank relationships are often 
politically motivated and come at the cost of weak governance (Cull and Xu, 2000, 
Cull and Xu, 2005 and Tian, 2004). Perotti (1993) points out that state owned banks 
in Eastern Europe are showing preferences favouring state owned firms during the 
lending process. He argues that there are several reasons for excessive bank lending 
to state owned firms. Banks may be reluctant in cutting off their former clients 
which are mostly state owned as a result from the past allocating role of Eastern 
European banks before reform. Also even when the state owned firms are partially 
privatized after reform, the state still assumes financial responsibility and retains 
indirect control. Berger et al. (2008) demonstrate that there are interesting 
differences between the relationship between banks with different ownership and 
firms. A plausible corollary is that the state owned firms have closer relationship 
with state owned banks than private sector firms. Bhaumik and Piesse (2008) 
demonstrate that there is significant persistence in lending by banks in India, using 
bank level data, and thereby complement the studyof Banerjee and Duflo (2002) 
which uses contract level data from an individual bank to reseach the same 
conclusion. This line of literature argues that there is significant persistence in the 
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lending behaviour of banks, such that older firms with longer bank relationships 
(i.e. state owned firms) may crowd out newer firms (i.e. privately owned firms). 
 
Could we assume similar situation for the relationship between Chinese state 
owned banks and firms? Lardy (1998) argues that the economic reform in China 
has not sufficiently changed banks’ lending behaviour in terms of the allocation of 
capital. The banks, although operating in a reformed environment, still follow 
government directions through either policy lending guidance or 
corruption/collusion, and are under local government pressure to keep unprofitable 
state owned firms leveraged due to political concerns of unemployment. One reason 
why state owned firms get more access to loans is the presence of information 
asymmetry between corporate managers and investors, as the costs of obtaining 
information can be reduced by the specialised knowledge by banks of the firm. Low 
transaction costs with state owned firms as a result of long-term relationships have 
given rise to the lending bias.  
 
Several studies have examined the capital structure of Chinese firms and the 
determinants of such a structure (for example, Chow and Fung , 2000; Lu, 
Thangavelu, and Hu, 2001; Shirai, 2002; Nagano, 2003; Huang  and Song, 2006) 
but few have looked at the possibility of such structure being the outcome of supply 
side constraints. A handful of studies that have examined the determinants of bank 
financing in China have based their estimation on data of listed firms, most of 
which are state owned and large in size which could produce biased results (Cull 
and Xu, 2000; Heytens and Karacadag, 2001; Shirai, 2002). The study by Wei and 
Wang (1997) have tested for such lending behaviour from an aggregated point of 
view by using city-level data and estimating ownership effect by using the 
percentage of state ownership as a proxy. Additionally, these studies fail to provide 
an explanation regarding why state owned firms face such favourable lending bias 
and what implications it has on banking reform and policies.  
 
Although some studies on issues related to lending bias in China have been 
published, such as those of Wei and Wang (1997) and Cull and Xu (2003), few 
research papers has been published shedding light on all of the possible 
determinants of bank lending in China. The study by Wei and Wang (1997) finds 
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that China’s bank loans favour state owned industrial firms and argues that the 
lending bias diminishes the effectiveness of other measures designed to promote the 
growth of the private sector or to induce state owned firms to restructure. Many 
have argued that the existence of a lending bias is self-evident, and others have 
suggested that the lending bias, if it existed before, has disappeared in recent years. 
In this chapter, we aim to test for whether such effect still remains after years of 
reform. Shirai (2002) and Lu, Thangavelu, and Hu (2001) both carried out studies 
using firm level data from listed firms in China examining the banks’ lending 
behaviour and firms’ corporate financing pattern, and provided a more 
comprehensive picture. Determinants of bank lending are tested in both researches 
and a positive correlation between the state ownership and the accessibility to bank 
loans was found, indicating systematic bias in lending decisions and the presence of 
soft budget constraints, which is a major cause of NPLs. Lu et al. (2001) point out 
that banks often find it difficult to enforce loan contracts in the event of loan default 
of non-state owned firms, which also increase their preference towards state owned 
firms. Low transaction costs with state owned firms as a result of a long term 
relationship may have also given rise to the lending bias.  
 
Similar research was conducted by Huang and Song (2005) and they find that 
neither ownerships in general nor state ownership in particular has a significant 
impact on the capital structure, using 1,200 Chinese listed companies to document 
their capital structure characteristics. As in other countries, the paper argues that 
leverage in Chinese firms increases with firm size and fixed assets, and decreases 
with both profitability and growth opportunity among other factors. 
 
There are some drawbacks to these studies. First, the study by Wei and Wang 
(1997) is an indirect test of the lending bias of SOBs, whilst the study of Cull and 
Xu (2003) focuses only on data only consisting state owned firm information. 
Second, the findings of many studies are useful but somewhat outdated, and do not 
reflect the impact of the reforms on state owned firms and banks after the year 
2000. Third, the scope of these studies is quite limited, and they are unable to 




In China, when firms share the same ownership with the banks, lenders may forego 
their own financial interests to benefit borrowing firms under the direction of the 
government. The government as owner has multiple objectives such as financial 
returns, social welfare and consolidation of political powers (Estrin and Perotin, 
1991). 
 
The Chinese government has also required its banks to provide “policy loans” to 
state owned firms that are making losses in order to keep the state owned sector 
from going into financial distress and/or out of business. When political interests 
interfere with financial ones, which is often the case as state owned firms and banks 
are under the same ownership, the disciplinary function of debt may not operate 
well. Under this circumstance, debt will not reduce managerial agency costs but 
instead expand the resources managed by firm managers and facilitate managerial 
exploitation (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). 
 
However, at times it is also in the banks’ own interest to lend to state owned firms. 
Banks favour state owned firms as they carry state guarantees, which makes them 
less risky borrowers (Shirai, 2002). Nevertheless, by lending extensively to 
unproductive investment projects proposed by inefficient state owned firms under 
the guidance of the government, banks easily accumulated huge amount of NPLs 
and have become increasingly risk averse. On the other hand, under this 
circumstance of directed lending and implicit guarantees of repayment, there is less 
need to monitor firms, and with state ownership there is little incentive to gain 
higher return at the expense of higher risk. Given the lack of accumulated 
experience in risk management and monitoring, banks probably still prefer to lend 
to state owned firms, even though now there is a possibility to charge higher 
interest rate for higher risk. And this risk averse lending behaviour of the banking 
sector encourages private firms to look for alternative financing sources (Molnar 
and Tanaka, 2007). 
 
The Western literature suggests that in developed market economies, debt financing 
should improve corporate governance, and the governance role of debt comes from 
“the threat of bankruptcy, the reduction of free cash flows, and due diligence 
monitoring by creditors” (Jensen, 1986).  Aghion and Bolton (1992) model the shift 
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of control to debt holders when profits are low. Gilson (1990) argues that when 
firms are in financial distress, creditors take over the dominant role in disciplining 
the managers, replacing incumbent managers that were assigned by shareholders. 
Grossman and Hart (1982) and Jensen (1986) argue that debt carves out free cash 
flows and reduces managerial agency costs. Managers are also prone to over-
investment and empire building. McConnell and Servaes (1995) find that leverage 
is positively correlated with firm value when growth opportunities are scarce. 
Furthermore, banks have incentives to collect information and monitor firms to 
ensure the returns to the depositors (diamond, 1984). However, such theories may 
not apply to the Chinese practice as bank and firms could be under the same 
ownership. 
 
Tian and Estrin (2007) use a large sample of public listed companies from China 
and find that an increase in bank loans increases the size of managerial perks and 
free cash flows and decreases corporate efficiency. Managerial perks represent 
disguised income for management teams. Such perks are common and also 
contribute to the majority of income of Chinese managers as the wages are usually 
low. It is a common practice for a firm to pay the communication, transportation 
and entertainment bills for family and friends of the senior management. Debt is 
found to act as a facilitating role on managerial agency costs instead of a 
governance one. They argue that the shared government ownership of lenders and 
borrowers may be the cause of weak corporate governance and further nurtures soft 
budget constraints. Kornai (1998) also argues that soft budget constraints come 
with government ownership.  
 
Nagano (2003) investigates micro-economic variables and examines their impact 
on lending activities in East Asian countries (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand). They find a significant negative relationship between 
firm profitability and corporate debt-to-equity ratio is all sample countries.  
 
Wei and Wang (1997) argue there is a close link between the slow reform of both 
state owned firms and state owned banks. One major reason for the poor 
performance of state owned firms is their soft budget constraint (Kornai, 1992), 
because when state owned firms lose money, they can “lobby for subsidies 
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including subsidized loans, rescheduling for overdue loans or even outright 
transfers from the state banking sector”. On the other hand, profit is not the main 
objective of the state owned banking sector. If political or economic favour can be 
exchanged/purchased by extending loans to loss-making state owned firms, the 
banks would do so. And since very few bankruptcies have occurred since 1986, it 
seems plausible that loss making and soft budget constraints represent a mutually 
supporting, equilibrium, phenomena (Qian, 1993). 
 
The study by Cull and Xu (2003) investigates the factors that determine the source 
of finance for firm level fixed investment, including retained earnings, bank 
finance, and government transfers. Their results shows that despite the insignificant 
correlation between bank loans and profitability at the beginning of the sample 
period, banks increasingly allocated credit to profitable state owned firms as banks 
start to assume bailout responsibilities in place of the government since the early 
1990s. 
 
To test whether there is still a lending bias present in the state owned banks after 
decades of reform, we propose our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Firms with state ownership have easier access to bank loans compared to 
privately owned firms.  
 
From a capital structure point of view, leverage benefits a firm in many ways, one 
of which is tax shield (Heinkel, 1982; Merton, 1977). By paying banks interests on 
debt, firms are able to lower the amount of corporate tax payable. The tax benefits, 
among other factors, influence a firm’s decision on capital structure and encourage 
borrowing. When a firm is profitable, such tax benefits are even greater when debt 
is issued, therefore giving firms incentives to borrow and increase the demand for 
loans (Graham, 2000; Leland, 1994; Miles & Ezzell, 1985; Myers, 1977). On the 
other hand, banks also favour profitable applicants in many ways. Both Stiglitz and 
Weiss  (1981) and Bester  (1985) argue the presence of credit rationing in a capital 
market with imperfect information. Credit rationing occurs when not all applicants 
receive loans due to the limited information held by banks on loan applicants 
(Bester, 1985). Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that the lending banks are 
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concerned about the interest rate of the loan (expected return) and its riskiness 
(probability of return). The profit of the banks on loans is largely based on the 
probability of the loan repayment by the borrowing firm. Thus, in a world of 
imperfect information, high profitability of firms can signal positively to the 
lending body and thus increase the chance of loan issuance. 
 
In the Chinese context, banks identify firms that are most likely to make the full 
repayment aside of the guaranteed return from state owned firms, and one of the 
most direct and efficient ways of doing so is by evaluating a firm’s performance 
based on its profitability and retained earnings in the past. High profitability signals 
high likelihood of interest payment as well as low default risk in the future. 
 
However, it is unclear whether banks in China follow such rationing practice, as it 
has a long standing history of bailing out unprofitable state owned firms in order to 
plump up employment figure and promote general social/economic stability. And 
the lack of a credit rating system and qualified and experienced bank staff means 
that technical credit scoring models are still being relied upon heavily to price 
credit properly and to distinguish desirable borrower from low quality ones. Under 
such practice, judgement is often inaccurate and this explains why many privately 
owned firms resort to informal loans and borrow at a higher interest rate. The state 
owned banks could also only possess knowledge in more state owned sector and 
therefore overlooking potential profitability demonstrated by the privately owned 
firms. 
 
The question of whether state owned banks still participate in the bailout practice 
and lend heavily to unprofitable state owned firms promoted us to develop the 
second hypothesis: 
 
H2: Firms with higher profitability do not enjoy higher accessibility to bank 
loans.  
 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) state that asymmetric information between firms and 
potential suppliers of external finance creates adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems in the credit market in developed market economies. Transaction costs, 
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asymmetric information, and agency problems are all factors that can create a 
financial hierarchy (Gertler, 1988). 
 
But financing constraints impact firms unequally as costs for obtaining external 
finance varies for different firms (Chow and Fung , 2000). Costs of external finance 
is commonly thought to be higher for small firms because they are more 
disadvantaged than their larger counterparts due to several factors: 1) asymmetric 
information problem is even more prominent for small firms as their public 
information is generally not widely available and can exclude small firms from the 
bond and share markets (Oliner & Rudebusch, 1992); 2) the signalling literature 
(Campbell , 1980; Merton , 1985; Hughes , 1986) suggests that the level of the 
firms’ debt will be inversely related to firm quality that can be signalled through 
size; 3) as a results of unavailability of external finance, small firms tend to rely 
more heavily on bank loans than their larger counterparts (Carpenter, Fazzari, and 
Petersen , 1994) or resort to informal loans; 4) when small firms do get bank 
finance they try to establish long term relationships with the bank in order to secure 
a stable supply of future credit (Berger and Udell, 1995; Petersen and Rajan, 1994), 
and these banks can exercise their market power in lending to small firms (Cowling 
et al. 1991; Keasey and Watson, 1993; Binks and Ennew, 1993; Cowling and 
Sudgen, 1995). Chow  and Fung (2000) have used a firm level data of 
manufacturing enterprises in Shanghai during the period of 1989 – 1992 and the 
same conclusion is supported; 5) trade-off theory also predicts an inverse 
relationship between size and probability of bankruptcy, therefore leading to a 
positive relationship between size and supply of loan (Shyam-Sunder & C. Myers, 
1999). 
 
The study by Nagano (2003) finds that the larger the company, the greater the 
effect of so-called scale-effect of liability. Nagano (2003) also suggests a strong 
tendency for banks to allow large firms to have higher liability ratio because of 
their higher assumed credibility. Additionally, Cull and Xu (2002) point out that 
larger firms in China also generally produce a “strategically important product” or 
are within a state-protected industry, which implies advantages to large firms in 




Furthermore, even when bank finance is available, bargaining power of the 
contractual terms and the size of loan are all positively correlated with firm size. 
Firm size is expected to be directly related to the bargaining power and information 
transparency of the borrower and to the level and size of loan, which allows the 
lender to achieve production cost economies. This implies advantages to large firms 
in negotiating loan terns in addition to obtaining external finance. Therefore it is 
also of managers’ incentive to expand the firm, either through growth, merger, or 
acquisition. Larger firms also have the ability to manipulate lenders.  
 
Dennis and Sharpe (2005) included interactive terms of firm size and other 
determinants of bank loans, and finds that as borrower size increases, negotiating 
power with the lender and information transparency increase, while the lender is 
able to spread the fixed costs of loan production across a larger dollar value of the 
loan. They argue that this is caused by the fact that lenders can easily distinguish 
creditworthiness and are able to offer different contracts accordingly. When the 
information of the borrower is opaque, the lender may impose a pooling 
equilibrium on the borrower in order to avoid being selected against if a menu of 
maturity choices were provided. 
 
The literature on asymmetric information, transaction costs, and agency problems 
all suggests that small firms should face tighter liquidity constrains and rely more 
on internal funds to finance their investment projects. Therefore we propose… 
 
H3: Larger firms have easier access to bank loans.  
 
Perotti (1993) finds that banks have certain incentives to fund former debtors due to 
the unique nature of transition economies and the common state ownership prior to 
reform. Despite being less efficient and more risky than private firms, state owned 
firms are still preferred as banks gain the potential repayment of previous debts. 
The study argues that such practice could lead to a lower productivity of investment 
and a greater concentration of risk, causing the expansion of more efficient private 
firms to be delayed and leading to a slower recovery and a greater risk of financial 
crisis. The fact that state owned firms have long established relationship with the 
banks and have enjoyed easy access to bank finance for many years under policy 
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lending, it is easy to assume that firms with good credit history will gain easier 
access to external finance. 
 
However, a mixed effect of stock of debt and bank finance can be expected. Higher 
level of debt in a firm can indicate either good credit history or the probability of 
financial distress2 the firm is under. On the other hand, the lack of experienced bank 
personnel and lending criteria in Chinese banks can also result in insignificant 
correlation between stock of debt and bank finance. Study by Molnar and Tanaka 
(2007) finds that firms with past bank borrowing borrow more from the informal 
sector in China therefore suggesting a negative sign for the coefficient of credit 
history variable. 
 
Therefore we propose H4: 
 
H4: Firms with good credit history do not have easier access to bank loans.  
 
When there is need for investment and expansion, firms are in need of finance. 
Therefore it is apparent why growth prospect of the firm would be influencing the 
banks’ decision on loans. When there is a clear prospect of the investment projects 
in need for finance, banks can assess the NPV of investment based on given 
information and are less reluctant in lending due to signalling effect and 
information transparency. A study by Shirai (2002) has found a significant 
correlation between firms’ growth of assets and banks’ willingness in financing. 
Here we propose hypothesis 5: 
 
H5: Firms with better growth prospect have easier access to bank loans.  
 
Leeth and Scott  (1989) argue that, “collateral or any other type of bond covenant 
will not change a firm’s value if the firm’s investment policy is constant or if 
mechanisms other than covenants induce managers to choose a firm-value 
                                               
2 As there is no substantial domestic corporate bond market and trade credits do not contribute 
greatly to corporate governance, the main measure of financial leverage in Chinese firms is the ratio 
of bank loans to total assets. This ratio indicates the liability of the firm and the probability of 
financial distress (Tian and Estrin, 2007). 
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maximizing production/investment policy”, however they point out that by firms 
pledging collateral, the cost of debt is reduced. A collateral provision by firms will 
entitle lenders to the ownership to a certain asset in the case of default, thus 
reducing cost of debt by eliminating negotiation on how such assets should be 
divided among other lenders or claimants. Secured debt can also reduce agency 
costs by reducing underinvestment problems. 
 
While there is a significant amount of research addressing the effect of collateral on 
credit risk premium on bonds and bank loans, there is little empirical work on 
whether being in the position of possessing high level of collateral correlates 
positively with banks’ lending decisions. Theoretically collateral can play a number 
of roles, such as facilitating signalling, controlling information asymmetry 
problems, mitigating moral hazard problems, and providing respite against default 
and bankruptcy loss (Leeth and Scott, 1989; (Berger & Udell, 1990; Stulz & 
Johnson, 1985; Triantis, 1992). When there is presence of significant information 
asymmetry between borrowers and lenders, collateral can convey valuable 
information to lender. 
 
Besanko and Thakor(1987) and Chan and Thakor(1987) develop models that 
demonstrating that, within a class of borrowers that appear equally risky, a 
borrower’s willingness to provide collateral will be inversely related to the default 
risk on the loan. Collateral thus facilitate firms in obtaining bank finance. The 
theoretical models of Townsend  (1975) and Bester (1985) also predict that 
collateral will be associated with higher quality borrowers. Borrower’s willingness 
to provide collateral is largely based on whether the firm is in possession of such 
collateral, therefore the assets level of firms can signal positively to banks.  
 
Dennis, Nandy, and Sharpe  (2000) also find evidence that collateral is more likely 
to be a requirement in the presence of information asymmetry. The evidence 
suggests that riskier loans are much more likely to be secured due to banks’ risk 
averse behaviour. 
 
Moral hazard occurs when borrowers face incentives to take large risks during the 
life of the loan of when they have bargained in bad faith. Financial theory predicts 
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that securing a loan reduces the probability that borrowers will engage in 
underinvestment, asset substitution, or provide an inadequate supply of effort. Boot, 
Thakor, and Udell (1991) demonstrate that collateral serves to mitigate moral 
hazard in loan contracting, even though the extent of the relation varies. 
 
Myers (1977) demonstrates how the use of collateral eliminates underinvestment in 
profitable projects and reduces the probability of bankruptcy. Igawa and 
Kanatas(1990) followed Myers’ study to test Myers’ theories and found similar 
results. Stulz and Johnson (1985), Smith and Warner (1979) also find that collateral 
prevents a borrower from underinvesting or engaging in costly asset substitution. 
 
Collateral also protects the lender, in our case, the banks, from potential loss by 
granting title to specific assets in the event of default (Leeth & Scott, 1989). Scott  
(1977) points out that because secured claims have priority, collateralized debt can 
limit the degree of loss in the event of bankruptcy. Many more studies have 
confirmed this (Swary and Udell, 1988; Boot, Thakor, and Udell, 1991; Black and 
deMeza, 1992; Berger and Udell , 1990).  
 
However the correlation between the level of collateral or fixed assets and the level 
of liability is not always clear in all empirical studies. In Nagano’s (2003) study of 
East Asian countries, the relationship between corporate debt-to-equity ratio and 
firm’s tangibility is entirely insignificant even in the post crisis period, proving to 
be significantly different from the situation in more developed economies. 
 
Gonas, Highfield, and Mullineaux (2004) find no evidence supporting the 
predictions of certain theoretical models that high-quality firms signal by providing 
collateral. Their results show that banks are less likely to secure loans than 
nonbanks, and that certain loan characteristics also influence the banks’ decision on 
whether loans need to be secured. 
 
In the Chinese context, banks perceive a high level of assets as desirable in terms of 
capital allocation as the firms in possession of such are more likely to be profitable 
with healthy growth, which increases the probability of future repayment and 
protects the banks against default risk. Collateral provision arguably is more 
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important for privately owned firms during the application process for bank 
finance, however, as state owned firms generally have high asset level therefore the 
correlation between collateral and banks’ lending decision is still to be predicted as 
a positive one. Therefore, it is natural we propose our hypothesis 6: 
 
H6: Firms with higher level of assets which can act as collateral have easier 









1.3.1  Data 
The dataset employed in this paper is obtained directly from the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China in the summer of 2007, which includes a wide range of financial 
and accounting data on more than 6,000 unlisted firms in the province of Hubei for 
the period of 2003 to 2005. The variable list also includes information on firm 
characteristics such as location, institutional ownership, year of establishment and 
industry category. The dataset is of great interest to us as it captures the bank’s 
lending behaviour leading up to the third wave of banking reform and IPO plan in 
2006. 
 
The dataset possess the following advantages. This is the first time the data set is 
ever estimated as it is not publicly available, thus contributing greatly to the 
originality of the results and findings. Most studies examining firm capital structure 
or bank finance in China have used data on publicly listed companies on either 
Shenzhen or Shanghai Stock Exchange. These data can produce biased results as 
these listed firms are by nature large, profitable, and mostly owned by the state. 
One study which regressed similar model as ours to test for the determinants of 
lending used similar firm level data (Mok, Yeung and Xu, 2008), but on a much 
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smaller scale, with 800 firms in the manufacturing sector for one year in the 
province of Guangdong. In comparison our data is much larger and more 
comprehensive. The data sample is also more adequate in representing the whole 
population  as Hubei Province has an average level of marketization and economic 
growth (see figure 1.1) whilst Guangdong province is within the economic reform 




Figure 1.1: Neri Index – Provincial Level Marketization 





However, we also encountered difficulties in dealing with this dataset. One of the 
biggest obstacles is that data on firms need to be manually matched for different years 
to construct a three-year panel set, as no firm names or any other types of identification 
of the firm is given out following the rules by the National Bureau of Statistics. 
Unfortunately, the Bureau adopted a new way of categorising ownership in 2004 and 
therefore only 2004 and 2005 can be matched using a unique code constructed by 
merging industry code, year of establishment, ownership code and address code. 2,777 
firms were matched and variables such as growth of assets, flow of debt and flow of 
short loan are available and lagged value of investment, revenue etc. can used in the 
regression.  In the regressions we used both 2,777 matched observations and the total 
observations of 18,873 of three years using year dummy variables. 
 
 
1.3.2 Dependent variable 
 
We adopt three dependent variables in the regression analysis, short term loan, flow of 
debt and total stock of debt, all in natural logarithms. The reason that the value of 
natural logarithms are used here as well as for explanatory variables  rather than the real 
level value is that it is simply a much better fit in terms of R squared and F-Stats, 
because of underlying non-normality of the data. ShortLoan is defined as the flow of 
short term bank loans granted at time t, calculated as the difference in short term debt 
between the two periods 2004 and 2005. Here we use the log value of ShortLoan to 
estimate short term loan rather than using the standard percentage of short term loan to 
total debt. One reason for doing so is to keep all regressions unified in format, and the 
other reason is that it generates similar results to regressions using percentage of short 
term loan to long term debt as dependent variable. DebtFlow is defined as the total flow 
of debt between time t and t-1. TotalDebt is defined as the total stock of debt at time t. 
Outliers of all dependent variables are dropped to ensure robustness and analytical 
power of the regressional results. Unlike the Western economy, China is in 
disequilibrium in terms of the level of debt thus we are able to use those dependent 
variables, including the total stock of debt, as proxies for loans credited by the banks, as 
based on a field survey in Shenzhen, Guangdong Province, in 2005, about 70-80% of 
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total liabilities were bank loans and these bank loans are mostly granted by the big four 
banks in China. Firms in China do not have many other funding alternatives for their 
businesses.   
 
 
1.3.3 Explanatory variables 
 
The first explanatory variable is the dummy variable Ownership, which captures the 
different institutional ownerships each firm belongs to, and it is represented in five 
categories – State-owned, Collectively-owned, Privately-owned, Foreign ventures and 
Shareholding and others. Some people could argue that the profitability of a firm could 
be related to the ownership and therefore it’s inaccurate to have both of them in the 
same equation. However, the relationship between them is not necessarily a linear one, 
but rather a U shaped one, as findings suggest in research by Tian and Estrin (2008). 
LnRoA (return on assets) is used as a measure of firms’ profitability as well as the level 
of retained earnings. For this variable we use lagged value when possible as banks can 
only base their decisions on profitability reported for the previous period. LnRoS (return 
on sales) is also used to test for robustness of the profitability variable. Next is 
LnRevenue, which is a measurement of the firm size. We select Revenue as a 
measurement because, firstly, some past studies have used the level of assets as a proxy, 
however a firm’s assets can be industry related. For example, certain industries might 
require more tangible assets such as machinery etc., while other industries do not, such 
as internet businesses. Another often used measurement is employment. In the case of 
China, most state-owned firms tend to over employ either due to government pressure 
or managers’ personal interest therefore making employment an inaccurate measure. 
Furthermore, firms’ asset growth (LnAssetsGrowth) is used to take into account trends 
of individual activities or business cycles. LnDebt, which represents the debt 
outstanding for firm i, and here we use lagged value (when available) to control for 
endogeneity. LnAssets is also used as one of the explanatory variables in this equation, 
as a proxy for firms’ tangibility as well as the real level of investment, due to the lack of 




A correlation table (table 1.1) is provided to show that there is no serious 
multicollinearity between the explanatory variables. Correlation results generated for 











1.3.4 Control variables 
 
The first control variable adopted in the analysis is LnInvestment to control for the 
prospect of firm investment opportunities, as external finance will be in more need 
when firms have future investment plans. Here LnInvestment is taken as the logarithm 
value of investment at time t. 
 
We also adopt age, LnWorkingCapital and Industry as control variables.  Age is 
calculated by subtracting the year of establishment of a firm from 2008. 
LnWorkingCapital is defined as total assets minus total liabilities. Industry is utilized as 
a dummy variable and is firm specific which controls for industry effect. 
 




Table 1.2. Summary statistics for variables 
Variable        Obs        Mean Std. Dev.      Min        Max
ShortLoan 2777 9465.10 128599.90 -1249785.00 4154399.00
WorkingCapital 2777 44910.47 593565.20 -689899.00 29600000.00
DebtFlow 2777 11582.41 176015.60 -1837179.00 5196641.00
TotalAssets 2777 108726.00 1203604.00 241.00 57900000.00
AssetGrowth 2777 0.5866 5.2027 -0.9999 224.4398
TotalLiabilities 2777 63815.48 626283.70 0.00 28300000.00
Revenue 2777 82749.73 855036.40 0.00 40100000.00
RoA 2777 0.0395 0.1355 -1.7579 2.8172
RoS 2777 0.0082 0.2183 -6.3826 4.5000
Age 2777 14.04 13.38444 3.00 106.00
industry       2777 2.02 0.27 1.00 3.00  
 
 


























In a neoclasscial perfect capital market, firms are all considered as profit 
maximising agents, including the banks. Therefore if banks are to maximise their 
profit, the relationships between the listed factors and different measures of loans 
and debt can be predicted. In table 1.4, + and – indicate the signs of coefficients of 
respective explanatory variables. The presence of both signs simultaneously 
indicates the possibility of both directions according to theoretical prediction.  
 
Here a loan equation for Chinese firms is estimated which captures the 
characteristics of firms evaluate during lending process. The regression model is 
estimated based on the theoretical predictions as well as practice guidelines that are 
generally adopted by banks in lending process3.  
 
lnShortLoan/LnDebtFlow/LnTotalDebt = α + β1lnDEBT + β2lnINVESTMENT + 
β3lnREVENUE + β4lnASSETS + β5lnGASSETS + β6lnWORKINGCAPITAL + 
β7LnROA + β8INDUSTRY + β9OWNERSHIP + μ
                                               
3 Based on internal documents provided by the local management chief in Bank of China, most 
banks consider the level of debt, profitability, industrial sector, level of managerial expertise and the 
quality of investment proposal as main determinants in the lending process. 
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Hypothesis Explanatory variable Independent Variable Predicted sign
being tested being tested
H1 Ownership dummy Short term loan  - for non state
Flow of debt ownership dummies
Stock of debt
H2 Profitability (LnRoA, LnRoS) Short term loan  -
Flow of debt  -
Stock of debt  -
H3 Size (LnRevenue) Short term loan  +
Flow of debt  +
Stock of debt  +
H4 Credit history (LnDebt) Short term loan  -
Flow of debt  -
Stock of debt N/A
H5 Growth (LnAssetsGrowth) Short term loan  +
Flow of debt  +
Stock of debt  +
H6 Collateral (LnAssets) Short term loan  +
Flow of debt  +
Stock of debt  +
 







We estimate the bank lending model in a few ways to test for 1) 
robustness of results and 2) interactive effect of profitability and 
institutional ownership. We have tested all variables both using the data 
set as a matched small panel of 2,777 firm-observations (only one period 
of the panel is used in order to utilize the lagged values) as well as using 
data on three years data on over 6,000 firms as a cross sectional sample 
with over 18,000 observations. 
 
Table 1.5 shows results of estimation using 2,777 observations. Both 
LnROA and LnROS are used to measure profitability of firms. As both 
variables produce similar results and are consistent throughout the data 
analysis exercise, we use LnROA as it generates slightly stronger results 
(LnROSstats is shown for one regression for reference and comparison). 
The variable LnInvestment is taken out of the equation at times to avoid 
serial correlation in estimation due to the short lag period. 
 
The results are strongly significant with R-sq value ranging from 0.2996 
to 0.7894.  
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Table 1.5. Regression results using 2777 observations 
 
 
  LnShortLoan LnShortLoan  LnShort LnDebtFlow  LnTotalDebt 
 
(LnROA) (LnROS) (LnROA and no  (LnROA) (LnROA) 
     LnInvestment)     
      
      Collectively-owned -0.158 -0.162 -0.167 -0.091 -0.103 
 
(-0.99) (-1.02) (-1.04) (-1.30) (-1.37) 
Privately-owned -0.320** -0.321** -0.341** -0.171*** -0.263*** 
 
(-2.39) (-2.41) (-2.56) (-3.22) (-4.61) 
Foreign_Ventures -0.376** -0.383** -0.409** -0.242*** -0.308*** 
 
(-2.31) (-2.35) (-2.53) (-3.40) (-4.06) 
ShareHolding and others -0.231* -0.229* -0.244** -0.084* -0.111** 
 
(-1.87) (-1.86) (-1.98) (-1.79) (-2.20) 
LnROA -0.445 
 








   
  
(-0.96) 
   LnRevenue 0.104** 0.096** 0.106** 0.043* 0.065** 
 
(2.50) (2.22) (2.54) (1.79) (2.46) 
LnDebt -0.685*** -0.683*** -0.684*** -0.734*** 
 
 
(-19.41) (-19.32) (-19.42) (-23.85) 
 LnGAssets 0.869*** 0.869*** 0.879*** 0.916*** 0.895*** 
 
(9.74) (9.74) (9.95) (28.56) (26.22) 
LnAssets 0.606*** 0.613*** 0.622*** 0.740*** 1.027*** 
 
(10.08) (9.98) (10.75) (18.33) (42.25) 
      R2 0.3002 0.2999 0.2996 0.6458 0.7894 
F-Statistic 45.36 44.97 48.31 120.99 1249.78 





Hypothesis H1: The results indicate strong and clear correlation between firms’ 
institutional ownership and all three types of dependent variables on bank finance. 
Here State-ownership is omitted and thus our benchmark. All coefficients for 
ownerships are negative and significant (at either 1% or 5% significance level), with 
the exception of collective ownership, which is arguably a different type of state 
ownership. The results simply indicate that, State-owned firms have high level of 
both flow of bank finance as well as debt stock. This is consistent with our 
hypothetic prediction and illustrates a lending bias favouring state owned firms. 
 
The presence of such lending bias could be caused by several factors. Firstly, due to 
the long standing relationship between state owned banks and state owned firms, it is 
relatively easy for banks to lend to previous borrowers as both the costs of 
transaction and information asymmetry is low. It is expected that State-owned firms 
use established past relationship to gain easy access to loans from State-owned 
banks. 
 
Secondly, the risk associated with lending to private firms are much higher in 
comparison, as when state owned firms are making losses and repayment cannot be 
guaranteed, the government steps in and writes it off or simply order the bank to lend 
more to the struggling firm. There is hardly any default risk involving state owned 
firms as the government will always bail them out financially. 
 
Thirdly, it is common for Chinese government to require banks to provide “policy 
loans” to state owned firms that are not profitable, either due to their own political 
agenda of consolidating political powers, or because personal favours have been 
promised. Banks often face considerable pressure from (local) government to lend on 
a non-commercial basis. Bank managers usually have to comprise with the local 
government as the managers need local support, or they could benefit from some sort 
of personal gain from it. Therefore, collusion and corruption are major causes for 
such lending bias too. It is also of the government’s interest to protect the state 
owned firms as most of them are large in size and over-stuffed. If a large state owned 
firm goes bankrupt, it will cause a heavy burden on local unemployment and thus 
costs for the government. The networks between State owned banks and State owned 
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firms means that it is almost a historical “tradition” to lend more to State-owned 
firms. 
 
Lastly, it is not uncommon that bank managers authorise a loan to privately owned 
firms at a higher interest rate, but register it under policy lending to state owned 
firms to profit from the difference in interest rate. The double counting problem 
means that the lending bias could be exaggerated in our model. 
 
In short, results state that institutional ownership still matters in terms of firms’ 
access to bank loans. A survey conducted by the Fujian government revealed that 
“86 per cent of privately-funded small and medium-sized enterprises in the province 
have difficulty in securing bank loans”. The 48 most financially reputable SMEs in 
Fujian received less than half of the 2.58 billion bank loans that they sought in 2004 
(Jiang, 2005). Zhou (2007) also notes in his study the fall of Nanjie Village in the 
Henan Province. Nanjie was known for adopting the socialist economy and various 
enterprises set up in the region are all state-owned and follow socialist rewarding 
practices such as low wage and allocation of basic resources. To promote the image 
of communism party and the socialist way of living, the banks are under direct or 
indirect instructions from the state to lend heavily to Nanjie in order to support its 
high growth rate. State owned firms in Nanjie village are examples of “high growth, 
low efficiency”, as in 2006 the village became practically bankrupt due to inefficient 
management and corruption. 
 
Although banks seem to grant more loans to State-owned firms, is it necessarily a 
bias? Could it be that the State-owned firms are simply better performers and banks 
see more profitability in lending to them? Thus we generate means on several 
variables to see whether state owned firms perform better than their privately owned 
counterparts. Table 1.6 shows the results, categorised by year, and divided into total, 
State, and Non-state. In this table we can see clearly that the mean return on both 
assets and sales for non-State-owned firms are consistently higher than those of 
State-owned firms, and total stock of debt for non-State-owned firms are consistently 
lower than those of State-owned firms. A big jump of total stock of debt in the year 
2004 can be observed, as discussed previously, it is caused by generous lending 




Such a comparison is still necessary even though we have controlled for profitability 
in the regression models, as the signs of the coefficients can be of different levels of 
significance or even of the opposite directions. 
 
Sun , Tong and Tong (2002) also find that state owned firms in China are generally 
considered poor performers compared to their privately owned counterparts. This is 
generally explained by the government’s lack of transferable residual claims, 
government’s choice of social and political policy goals over profit maximization, 
the government’s employment of staff based on political connections rather than 
ability to perform, or the greater information asymmetries and higher transaction 
costs in the government (Vining and Boardman, 1992; Boardman  et al. 1989; 
Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh, 1994). However, the literature also 
suggests that state ownership is not necessarily less efficient than private ownership 
(Caves and Christensen, 1980; Kay and Thompson, 1986; Wortzel and Wortzel, 
1989; Martin and Parker, 1995; Kole and Mulherin, 1997; and Dewenterand 
Malatesta, 1998). Therefore a lending bias is probably present in the Chinese banks’ 
lending process. 
Table 1.6. Table of debt level and firm profitability 
As seen from the previous results, the coefficient for collectively owned is not 
significant, and coefficients for privately owned, foreign ventures and shareholding 
and others are all significant and the t-stats are similar. So we test for the difference 
of coefficients and the results indicate that, coefficient of state ownership variable is 
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significantly different from coefficients of privately owned, foreign owned and 
shareholding variables, but not significantly different from collectively owned 
variable. In addition, the coefficients of privately owned, foreign owned and 
shareholding variables are not significantly different from each other. Therefore we 
group the five ownership dummies into two - state owned and non-state owned. 
State-owned is composed of state owned and collectively owned in the previously 
defined five ownership categories, and the non-state owned contained the rest. 





Table 1.7. Regression results with redefined ownership dummies 
 
 
  LnShortLoan  LnDebtFlow  LnTotalDebt  LnTotalDebt  
  (2777 observations) (2777 observations) (2777 observations) (total observations) 
     Non-State -0.185** -0.087** -0.141*** -0.075*** 
 
(-2.13) (-2.29) (-3.47) (-4.68) 
LnROA 0.574 -0.348 -0.438* -0.631*** 
 
(0.86) (-1.60) (-1.92) (-7.18) 
LnRevenue 0.098** 0.038 0.059** 0.046*** 
 
(2.44) (1.61) (2.26) (5.13) 




  LnGAsset 0.883*** 0.914*** 0.893*** 
 
 
(10.05) (28.64) (26.36) 
 LnAsset 0.611*** 0.741*** 1.036*** 1.193*** 
 
(10.51) (18.47) (45.11) (128.24) 
     R2 0.3007 0.6449 0.7883 0.7644 
F-Statistic 53.59 139.35 1411.37 6022.33 





Hypothesis H2: We then test the bank lending model for the effect of profitability, 
with LnROA and LnROS as measures. The two measures are tested separately to 
avoid collinearity and LnROA shows better predictive power, therefore we show 
only results on LnROA in most regressions. Results on both measures of 
profitability showed insignificance for the flow of short term loan and become of 
strongly negative significance for both the flow and the stock of debt at 1% 
significance level. This certainly contradicts the usual prediction by Western 
literature as logically banks tend to finance more profitable firms for higher 
probability of return. However it is consistent with our hypotheses due to the 
unique nature of the Chinese banking sector. 
 
There could be several explanations for this. First of all, the government’s reform 
policy changed drastically, arguably for the better, in 2003 when Wen Jiabao took 
over the premiership from Zhu Rongji. Zhu’s policy focused on recapitalizing 
return for operational restructuring but no privatization. The banks are expected to 
grow their way out of the nonperforming loans problems after recapitalization 
before opening up to foreign competition in 2006. Such a strategy prompted an 
extreme pro-growth policy that created economic bubbles in various sectors. The 
state owned banks tried to grow out of their NPLs by lending generously and 
widely between 2002 and 2004, thus feeding speculation in property, auto, steel 
and other unprofitable industries. The lending by banks grew 18% per year 
between 2002 and 2004 (CBRC Annual Banking Report, 2004). This could be 
part of the reason why the ROA appear negative as banks were not selective of to 
whom they granted loans during this period of time. 
 
Secondly, as mentioned previously, the lack of a credit rating system and qualified 
and experienced bank staff means that technical credit scoring models are still 
being relied upon heavily to price credit properly and to distinguish desirable 
borrower from low quality ones. Under such practice, judgement is often 
inaccurate and this explains why many privately owned firms resort to informal 
loans and borrow at a higher interest rate. The state owned banks could also only 
possess knowledge in more state owned sector and therefore overlooking potential 




Thirdly, the negative correlation between profitability and level of debt in private 
firms can be caused by government agenda associated with loans. It is not unusual 
that the local government grant out bank loans based on conditionality that the 
privately owned firms do not wish to accept, such as intake of certain number of 
unemployed workers, or promise of a certain investment project that could 
promote the image of the local authority. 
 
Lastly, in China the stock of debt in no way represent an equilibrium picture for 
supply of debt because of China’s unique economic condition. And because 
bankruptcy still does not exist largely in China, the stock of debt could represent a 
large amount of loans that are accumulated throughout the years by firms with no 
ability of repayment. And that’s also why we see no effect of LnROA on flow of 
short term loan and long term debt. Also, profitable firms can resort to retained 
earnings or equity when the need of finance arises, therefore making them less 
likely to apply for finance due to the cost premium on issuing bank debt.  
 
In order to test the robustness of our findings so far, we run the estimation model 
again using the full 18873 observations using year dummies and slightly different 
independent variables4. Lagged values and flows of both short term and long term 
debt are no longer available as the firms cannot be matched up using our coding 
exercise and the whole dataset is utilized as a cross sectional sample. Therefore 
we only run regressions on total debt stock. Table 1.8 shows the results. The 




                                               
4 We also run a two stage least square test in order to control for the endogeneity in the variable 
revenue. The instruments used for this test are age and the interactive term of age and LnRoA. 




Table 1.8. Regression results using all data observations 
  
  LnTotalDebt  LnTotalDebt  LnTotalDebt  LnTotalDebt  
 
(LnROA) (LnROS) (LnROA with no  (LnROS with no  
     LnInvestment) LnInvestment) 
     Collectively-owned -0.018 -0.026 -0.020 -0.028 
 
(-0.61) (-0.91) (-0.70) (-0.99) 
Privately-owned -0.133*** -0.133*** -0.139*** -0.139*** 
 
(-6.09) (-6.09) (-6.45) (-6.45) 
Foreign-ventures -0.178*** -0.180*** -0.191*** -0.192*** 
 
(-5.67) (5.70) (-6.13) (-6.17) 
Share-holding and others -0.026 -0.024 -0.029 -0.027 
 


















LnRevenue 0.049*** 0.031** 0.049*** 0.031*** 
 
(5.43) (3.38) (5.44) (3.39) 
LnAsset 1.188*** 1.209*** 1.194*** 1.216*** 
 
(122.75) (126.92) (129.58) (134.18) 
     R2 0.765 0.7639 0.7649 0.7638 
F-Statistic 5172.15 5179.45 4970.29 4980.73 




We can see here that results on institutional ownership and profitability 
are consistent with previous results and significant. Ownership 
dummies are negative and mostly significant, especially for privately 
owned firms. LnROA variable has produced similar and consistent 
results as before. 
 
To further test the role of profitability and ownership in this regression, 
interactive variables are adopted, which are basically generated by 
multiplying the ownership dummies LnROA. Regressions with LnROS 
are run and similar results are obtained and therefore not shown here. 
We would expect no significant relationship between State-
ownership*LnROA but a positive coefficient for Privately-
owned*LnROA. As demonstrated in table 1.9, the ownership effects, 
after putting the interaction terms in, remain negative and significant, 
and the interaction terms are mostly negative as well for the ones that 
are significant (Privately-owned*LnROA). LnROA remains negative 
for results that are significant enough.   Results show most significance 
on the interactive variable of private ownership and profitability. This 
suggests that, other things hold equal, banks tend to select the privately 
owned firms that have lower return on assets, which are a bit puzzling 





Table 1.9. Regression results using interaction variables 
  
  LnShortLoan LnDebtFlow    LnTotalDebt LnTotalDebt  LnTotalDebt 
 
(2777 observations) (2777 observations) (2777 observations) (total observations   (total observations 
       and LnROA)  and LnROS) 
      Collectively-owned -0.226 -0.141* -0.159** -0.022 -0.034 
 
(-1.45) (-1.88) (-1.98) (-0.74) (-1.21) 
Privately-owned -0.293** -0.158*** -0.242*** -0.123*** -0.135*** 
 
(-2.21) (-3.00) (-4.28) (-5.57) (-6.15) 
Foreign_Ventures -0.388** -0.254*** -0.329*** -0.189*** -0.191*** 
 
(-2.35) (-3.27) (-3.98) (-5.84) (-6.07) 
ShareHolding and others -0.228* -0.077 -0.107** -0.026* -0.036* 
 
(-1.84) (-1. 62) (-2.07) (-1.29) (-1.78) 
LnROA -0.750 -0.460** -0.563** -0.283** 
 
 
(-0.80) (-2.51) (-2.44) (-2.01) 
 LnROS 
    
0.074 
     
(1.29) 
Coll*LnROA -0.121 0.515 0.557 -0.255 -0.436** 
 
(-0.09) (0.92) (0.97) (-1.17) (-2.46) 
Priv*LnROA -1.903* -0.656* -0.897** -0.471** -0.786*** 
 
(-1.86) (-1.74) (-2.11) (-2.50) (-5.01) 
Fore*LnROA -0.952* -0.490 0.106 -0.019 -0.169 
 
(-0.73) (-0.10) (0.21) (-0.10) (-1.42) 
Shar*LnROA -1.470 -0.631 -0.619 -0.315 -0.211*** 
 
(-1.25) (-1.16) (-1.01) (-1.61) (-2.86) 
      R2 0.3022 0.6469 0.7904 0.7652 0.7643 
F-Statistic 35.25 100.08 944.89 3966.38 3986.29 





Table 1.9 (continued). Regression results using interaction variables 
  LnShortLoan LnDebtFlow LnTotalDebt LnTotalDebt LnTotalDebt 
 
(2777 observations) (2777 observations) (2777 observations) (total observations   (total observations 
       and LnROA)  and LnROS) 
      LnRevenue 0.107** 0.044* 0.066** 0.050*** 0.033*** 
 
(2.55) (1.81) (2.50) (5.48) (3.63) 
LnDebt -0.688*** -0.735*** 
   
 
(-19.56) (-23.94) 
   LnGAssets 0.869*** 0.916*** 0.895*** 
  
 
(9.77) (28.62) (26.36) 
  LnAssets 0.604*** 0.740*** 1.024*** 1.186*** 1.206*** 
 
(10.06) (18.38) (41.83) (120.73) (126.38) 
      R2 0.3022 0.6469 0.7904 0.7652 0.7643 
F-Statistic 35.25 100.08 944.89 3966.38 3986.29 




Hypothesis H3: We then move on to empirical results on the impact of firm size on 
banks’ lending behaviour. LnRevenue proxies for firm size, and all coefficients are 
positive across all samples and mostly significant at 5% significance level. This 
indicates that firm size indeed has a positive influence on banks’ lending process and 
larger firms will have easier access to bank finance. 
 
This is partially because large firms can signal their quality through size and reduces 
information asymmetry. There is also the scale effect of loan, suggesting banks to allow 
large firms to have higher liability ratio because of their higher assumed credibility 
(Nagano, 2003). Large firms are also more likely to have borrowed previously and 
therefore may have established a long term stable relationship with the banks. It is also 
evident in past studies that large firms possess higher bargaining power when it comes 
to bank finance (Dennis and Sharpe, 2005). Large firms also are more likely to take out 
larger size loans in comparison to small firms, and it is preferred by the banks as such 
issuing costs of banks can be spread out and achieves a type of economy of scale. 
 
Hypothesis H4: We can observe that throughout the whole five sets of equations, 
LnDebt is always significant (at 1% significance level) and negative, this is consistent 
with the theoretical prediction of a negative sign on the supply side. There could be two 
reasons for this. First one will be that see higher level of debt as associated with higher 
default risk and lower probability of successful repayment. The second one will be that 
the firm itself is in financial distress and will not want more loans otherwise they will 
easily bankrupt. Study by Molnar and Tanaka (2007) also suggest that firms with past 
bank borrowing experience borrow more from the informal sector. 
 
Hypothesis H5: Growth of assets can be viewed as a proxy for future growth 
opportunity of firms. The coefficients are all positive and strongly significant at the 1% 
significance level. And this is consistent with the prediction as well, as the growth of 
assets can be seen as a proxy for the future outlook of a firm and banks will tend to lend 
to a firm with a healthy growth. 
 
Hypothesis H6: The results indicate strong and positive correlation between LnAssets 
and bank financing at 1% significance level. This is consistent with the prediction as 
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assets is utilized here as a proxy for fixed assets/collateral. Collateral can affect lending 
decisions as they can signal their performance and profitability by providing banks with 
collateral, and if the loan is secured against assets, the borrower is restricted to using 
debt for specific projects and improve guarantee of repayment for lenders, therefore 
significantly reducing the risks of firm underinvestment, assets substitution, or 
providing inadequate amount of effort. 
 
 
Control variables: The coefficient on LnInvestment variable is consistently positive and 
mostly significant throughout the entire estimation analysis, indicating that banks may 
lend more heavily to firms with good investment opportunities so to significantly lower 
the risk of moral hazard, underinvestment and agency problem.  
 
The industry effect isn’t significant for loan and become more significant as we move 
towards the debt. Industry two represents the manufacturing industry, and this positive 
effect might be caused by the high level of fixed assets such as machinery and buildings 
etc for such industry, and again similar story with collateral. 
 
 Finally, table 1.10 shows the comparison of theoretical predications, empirical findings, 
and our findings from this empirical study. For short term loan, we found that State-
owned firms definitely have advantages in obtaining bank loans compared to other 
firms, and that firm profitability, unlike what theories predict, have a negative 
relationship with short term loans. We confirmed a positive relationship between growth 
opportunity and loans, and found that stock of debt has a negative impact on loans. And 




Table 1.10. Comparison of empirical work and theoretical predictions 
Hypothesis Explanatory variable Independent Variable Predicted sign Actual sign Confirmation of Hypothesis
being tested being tested
H1 Ownership dummy Short term loan  - for non state  - for all non state owned yes
Flow of debt ownership dummies dummies for all three yes
Stock of debt independent variables yes
H2 Profitability (LnRoA, LnRoS) Short term loan  - not significant no
Flow of debt  -  - yes
Stock of debt  -  - yes
H3 Size (LnRevenue) Short term loan  +  + yes
Flow of debt  +  + yes
Stock of debt  +  + yes
H4 Credit history (LnDebt) Short term loan  -  - yes
Flow of debt  -  - yes
Stock of debt N/A N/A N/A
H5 Growth (LnAssetsGrowth) Short term loan  +  + yes
Flow of debt  +  + yes
Stock of debt  +  + yes
H6 Collateral (LnAssets) Short term loan  +  + yes
Flow of debt  +  + yes






1.5 Conclusion and Implications 
 
Utilizing panel and cross section time series data on financial information on over 
6,000 firms in Hubei province, we find that state ownership is highly correlated 
with banks’ lending decision and as privately owned firms are generally better 
performers in term of profitability in China (Bai, Lu, et al., 2006; Jefferson & Su, 
2006; X. Xu & Y. Wang, 1999),such a finding confirms the existence of the banks’ 
soft budget constraint. The results suggest that despite three decades of reform, 
ownership of firms still matters for bank lending. The results support the research 
hypothesis of discrimination towards privately owned firms in banks’ lending 
process in China. Banks lend heavily to state owned firms for reasons including 
guarantee of repayment, higher information transparency, local employment 
benefit, personal gain, as well as collusion and corruption between management of 
local banks and state owned firms. 
 
We also find that, despite ownership status, profitability is negatively correlated 
with firms’ accessibility to loans, indicating what would be irrational behaviour on 
the lender side in a capitalist economy. Credit history variable is also found to be 
negatively related to the level of debt, indicating banks view past borrowing as a 
risk on loan repayment.  In addition, results indicate that firm size, growth rate, and 
age all have positive impact on firms’ likelihood of obtaining bank loans. 
 
Such results are robust to alternative performance measures, lagged time periods 
and also sample periods. Our empirical results suggest that Chinese banks show 
favouritism towards state owned firms without regard for their profitability and 
growth outlook compared with other firms. 
 
The results show signs indicating the Chinese banks are more prudent in lending 
practice than they might seem to most of the Western opinions. The banks prefer 
firms with established credit history with good (or guaranteed) record of loan 






However these findings are not indicators of good practice as such behaviour does 
not promote healthy market competition and firms have no incentives to improve 
performance or efficiency. When banks tend to lend to a typical type of firms only, 
it could lead to a lower productivity of investment and a greater concentration of 
risk, leading to a greater risk of financial crisis (Perotti, 1993). It also does not 
promote sustainable growth and correct management style. 
 
The banks also lack in expertise in certain industrial sectors that many privately 
owned firms belong to, or the technology these firms adopt, which in turn results in 
higher rate of loan refusals for privately owned firms. Profitable privately owned 
firms face the risk of being crowded out of the market due to difficulty and high 
costs of external financing, and eventually may result in weaker and unstable 
economy. Studies by Tian and Estrin (2007) and Roland, Kornai and Maskin (2003) 
point out the facilitating role of soft budget constraints plays in the collapse of the 
banking sector of East Asian economies in the 1990s. 
 
Highly concentrated risk means that a deeper and more thorough reform is needed 
for the Chinese banking sector, mainly through the privatization of state owned 
banks. Diversification of loans to profitable firms with sustainable growth would 
permit greater financial stability. Government needs to cut policy lending and 


























Following the first chapter on determinants of bank lending in China, which finds 
evidence consistent with the existence of a soft budget constraint in the Big Four 
(Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction 
Bank, and Agricultural Bank of China) as well as a lending bias, it is suggested that 
Chinese banks disregard profitability and other measures of firm performance and 
growth prospect, and therefore cause privately owned firms to be deprived of bank 
loans in comparison to their state owned counterparts. In this chapter we go on to 
investigate whether such shortage of banks loans available to privately owned firms 
is in fact a demand side effect, caused by low investment opportunities. We 
examine and compare firms’ investment behaviour according to ownership type, in 
particular whether private firms are restricted in their access to bank loans or these 
firms have lower financing needs (i.e. higher cash flow or retained earnings).  
 
To be precise, we investigate the role of cash flow in determining investment 
implementation by firms, hoping to produce a clearer picture of the relationship as 
well as a plausible explanation for it. We also use regression analysis to examine a 
number of other factors which may impact on firms’ investment behaviour and 
investment to cash flow sensitivity, such as firm size, age, performance and 
institutional ownership. The chapter employs data collected and supplied by the 
GTA data service in China with financial information from over 1000 listed firms 
in China’s Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange. On this basis, we were able to 
establish empirically the impact of cash flow on firm investment as well as to test 





that retained earnings/cash flow has a strong positive impact on firms’ investment 
implementation, probably becauseit offers financing at the lowest cost. Also, as 
hypothesized, we find cash flow sensitivity to investment to be the highest and most 
significant for privately owned firms, indicating that these firms face higher costs 
of external finance and are financially constrained. This finding is consistent with 
the empirical findings in the first chapter and strongly suggests that lending bias is 
not caused by low demand on the firm side, but rather by banks’ favouritism in 
their lending practice. Additionally, we also find cash flow sensitivity to be higher 
for firms that are smaller in size and younger but do not identify a 







The existing literature does not yet provide an unambiguous picture of what drives 
investment in Western economies, and more specifically, on the role that cash flow 
plays in investment decisions. Once we move to the Chinese context, there are very 
few studies trying to model investment of Chinese firms despiteits unique nature, 
given the rapid growth of economy under such an institutional environment that is 
drastically different from the Western economy. We therefore feel that it is crucial 
conceptually and for policy purposes to provide a more fine-grained picture on 
what really influences firm investment in China. 
 
This chapter is a follow up from the first chapter where the determinants of bank 
lending are examined and results indicate that there is a lending bias favouring state 
owned firms. We aim to thoroughly investigate into the role of cash flow on 
investment behaviour of firms and what firm-specific features influences the 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow. The current literature states that it is not clear 
in western economies whether high sensitivity of investment to cash flow is a 
plausible indicator for firms being financially constrained. Here we hope to provide 





down the factors which influence the firms’ investment decision and by looking at 
the impact of cash flow on investment from State owned firms and privately owned 
firms separately, we are able to identify whether privately owned firms are in fact 
more deprived of external financing, especially in terms of bank loans, compared to 
their state owned counterparts. This allows us to identify whether the apparent state 
of “financial constrained-ness” of privately owned firms in China is caused by 
factors from the demand side.  
 
China has maintained very high capital accumulation levels and aggregate 
investment ratios(Bai, Hsieh, et al., 2006; Song, et al., 2001). At the same time, 
state-sector fixed investment, which accounts for a dominant share of gross fixed 
investment, has displayed conspicuous cyclical patterns in its annual growth rate. 
We believe that studying emerging market firm behaviour has been proven to be of 
great importance and can provide policy implications for future economic 
development(Hoskisson, et al., 2000), especially by guiding and motivating the 
improvement of  the capital market in China. 
 
 
For the analysis, we proceed in three steps. Firstly we explore the relationship 
between investment and a number of explanatory and control variables using all the 
data observations, in order to test for and estimate the relationship between cash 
flow and investment. We then utilise the fact that privately owned firms appear to 
be more deprived of external financing compared to their state owned counterparts 
as demonstrated in the first chapter and various studies (e.g., Shirai, 2002), and 
further divide the sample according to ownership type. By adopting such a method, 
investment to cash flow sensitivity can be estimated in two sub-samples to test for 
whether such sensitivity is higher for the financially constrained group. Finally 
based on the results of first two tests, we test for the level of significance of 
correlation between such sensitivity and other firm features. 
 
This chapter offers the following contributions: first, due to the overinvesting 
nature of Chinese firms, it is of great research interest to us to estimate the factors 
influencing investment decisions and investment to cash flow sensitivity in China 





companies in China to observe their investment behaviour in order to test what 
drives investment of these firms. There are few studies that have tested the cash 
flow to investment relationship and our results show strong significance and are in 
accordance to our theoretical predictions. Therefore the chapter extends 
investment– cash flow sensitivity theories to the Chinese context and further to the 
emerging market and developing economy. Secondly, we shed furtherlight on the 
uniqueownership effects on investment in Chinese firms. Lastly, we also provide a 
two sided argument that the fact that privately owned firms are deprived of bank 
financing is indeed a result of lending bias rather than a demand side effect. 
 
The chapter is organised in the following sections. The next section reviews the 
theoretical groundwork of investment models and what drives investment in firms 
in a perfect capital market. In this section we also look into the pioneering studies 
on investment –cash flow sensitivity and examine why “financial constrained-ness” 
could influence such sensitivity. On this basis, we develop the hypotheses and 
explain why cash flow is an important factor affecting investment behaviour of 
firms and why the effects may  vary for firms with different forms of ownership as 
well as other firm-specific features. Section three provides an overview of the 
dataset and estimation method used, and the measures of the explanatory variables. 
Section four reports empirical results and discusses the results in details. Finally in 
section five we proceed to conclude the chapter with findings and implications for 




2.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
There is a large financial and macroeconomic literature on firms’ financing 
constraints/condition and investment decisions. In theory, a firm’s financial status is 
irrelevant for real investment decisions in a world of perfect and complete capital 
markets, because external funds provide the perfect substitute for internal capital. 
Therefore firm’s investment decision would be independent of its financial 





demonstrating the irrelevance of financial structure and financial policy for real 
investment under certain conditions. So in perfect capital markets, a firm’s financial 
structure should not affect its market value, and real firm decisions are independent 
of financial factors such as internal liquidity, debt leverage or dividend payment 
(Merton & Modigliani, 1961). 
 
However, financial structure may be relevant to the investment decisions of 
companies facing uncertain prospects that operate in imperfect or incomplete 
capital markets where the cost of external capital exceeds that of internal funds 
(Modigliani & Merton, 1958). In reality, many factors such as transaction costs, 
asymmetric information, and agency problems all indicate that the real capital 
market does not satisfy the conditions of a perfect market. Investment will depend 
on financial factors such as the availability of internal capital, access to new debt or 
equity finance, or the functioning of particular credit markets. 
 
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) argue that if the “wedge” between internal 
and external financing (cost disadvantage) is insignificant, retention practice or the 
level of previously accumulated retained earnings/cash would have little influence 
on the firm’s investment decision as external financing would act as a near perfect 
substitute to internal funds. If such a disadvantage is large, firms who face high 
costs in obtaining external financing may need to rely solely on their retained cash 
for investment projects and therefore their investment should be driven by the 
fluctuation of the level of cash flow (Auerbach, 1979; Bennett, 2001; Bradford, 
1981). 
 
To provide a foundation for links between a firm’s financial structure and its real 
investment spending, one must identify why internal and external finance are not 
perfect substitutes in practice. Transaction costs, tax advantages, agency problems, 
costs of financial distress, and asymmetric information are the main reasons (King, 
1977; Auerbach, 1979; Bradford, 1981). When firms opt for external financing, the 
asymmetric information problem arises (Akerlof, 1970; Myers and Majluf , 1984; 
Greenwald , Stiglitz, and Weiss, 1984), which lead to lemon premiums ((Akerlof, 





thus laying down the ground basis of Pecking order or financing hierarchy view 
(Myers, 1984).  
 
To summarize, if the cost of capital differs by source of funds, the availability of 
finance will likely have an effect on the investment practices of some firms. In 
financing hierarchy models, the availability of internal funds allows firms to 
undertake desirable investment projects without resorting to high-cost external 
finance. In addition, to the extent that a firm seeks debt finance at the margin, 
greater internal cash flow enhances its balance sheet and net worth positions, 
lowering the cost of new debt. In studies ranging from the early work of Meyer and 
Kuh (1957) to the more recent work of Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), the 
literature emphasizes the fact that cash flow or other measures of internal funds is 
highly correlated with investment. This correlation arises in models of capital 
market imperfections, because either “investment is directly tied to available 
internal funds in the case of credit rationing”, or more plausibly in the Western 
economy, because “shocks to current earnings affect future net worth and therefore 
the terms of credit available to the firm” (Gilchrist andHimmelberg, 1995). 
 
Many studies have tested and confirmed the importance of cash flow/cash holdings 
on firms’ ability of carrying out future investment plans (DeAngelo&Masulis, 
1980; Frank &Goyal, 2003; Leland, 1998; Leland & Toft, 1996; Myers, 2001; 
Shyam-Sunder & C. Myers, 1999). Jorgenson & Siebert (1968) use data on 15 large 
manufacturing firms and found that the neoclassical theory is superior to the 
internal finance theory of investment. However, in the study by Elliot (Elliott, 
1973), the findings are completely reversed and the liquidity model was assigned 
the top ranking. 
 
There are few studies in existing literature that investigate the cash flow–
investment relationship based on data from the emerging market. In the Chinese 
context,Chen (2004) finds that the trade-off model has limited explanatory power in 
China in the sense that, for example, the effects costs of financial distress (earning 
volatility, bankruptcy costs) are not significant. It may bebecause the Chinese 
environment still retains some features of a centrally planned economy. The state is 





beneficiary of tax. If the state does not change its controlling behaviour towards 
corporatized SOEs, those firms are less likely to run into a financial crisis compared 
with their counterparts in private sectors, so the costs of financial distress is likely 
to have much less effect on firms’ capital structure and further influence firms’ 
investment behaviour.  
 
As we saw in the first chapter, firms’ profitability is negatively correlated with the 
level of debt. Intuitively, such a relationship seems to support the pecking order 
model. However, there may be other reasons for this negative relationship rather 
than those proposed by the pecking order hypothesis such as to avoid 
underinvestment problems and new projects being mispriced. As far as leverage is 
concerned, although banks are willing to provide long-term bank loans to the listed 
firms because of the influence of government-directed credit policy, their capital 
resources are very much stretched. The bond market is also underdeveloped. In 
addition, due to the corporate governance problems and the lack of enforcement of 
company laws, individual shareholders do not have adequate investment protection. 
Retained earnings is therefore probably the quickest and easiest source of finance 
for most companies in China, compared with new equity issuance, due to the 
transaction costs associated with share issuance and the restrictions on firms’ 
operating performance for applying for new equity issuance. Therefore, retained 
profit is the preferred primary method of raising additional capital. 
 
Here we propose our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: The level of cash flow in Chinese firms has a positive impact on the 
implementation of future investment plans.  
 
It is difficult to construct an appropriate proxy for investment opportunity for the 
firm and the standard approach in the previous literature has been to use Tobin’s q. 
By adding cash flow to a model in which Tobin’s q is (theoretically) a sufficient 
statistic for investment opportunities, the literature interprets residual sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow as evidence of financing constraints (Fazzari, Hubbard, and 
Petersen, 1988; Devereux and Schianterelli, 1989; Hoshi, Kashyap, &Scharfstein, 





1994;Gilchrist &Himmelberg, 1995; Hubbard 1996; Arslan, Florackis, &Ozkan, 
2006). 
 
Following the seminal study by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (FHP) (1988), many 
further studies have followed the same the methodology estimating the impact of 
financial constraints on the investment behaviour of firms (Chirinko and Schaller, 
1995; Hubbard et al. 1995; Calomiris and Hubbard, 1995; Pratap, 2003) and have 
found similar results. 
 
However, not all views on role of cash flow on firm investment behaviour are 
unified. More recent studies (Kaplan andZingales, 1995, 1997; Cleary, 1999, 2006) 
have arrived at the opposite results indicating that less financially constrained firms 
actually exhibit higher levels of investment to cash flow sensitivity.  Many other 
researcher have followed and attempted to examine the non-monotonicity between 
firms’ capital structure/financial constraints and their investment behaviour, as well 
as whether investment to cash flow sensitivity is sufficient to determine whether a 
firm is financially constrained (Moyen , 2004; PovelRaith, and Cleary, 2007; 
Almeida  and Campello, 2007; Hirth  and Uhrig-Homberg, 2010). 
 
The study by Kaplan and Zingales (1995) is among the most notable works which 
challenge the generality of the conclusions summarized by Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Petersen (1988). They investigates the sources of the correlation between corporate 
cash flow and investment by undertaking an analysis of the 49 low-dividend firms 
identified in the study by Fazzari et al. as having an unusually high investment-cash 
flow sensitivity. They find that cash flow sensitivity is higher for those firms that 
appear less financially constrained, and therefore, argue that a higher sensitivity 
cannot be interpreted as evidence that a firm is more financially constrained. They 
also suggest these results contradict Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen’s study (1988) 
and “capture general features of the relationship between corporate investment and 
cash flow”, and are “not specific to the sample or techniques utilised”. 
 
However, there are quite a few limitations to these studies (Schianterelli, 1995; 
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 2000). First of all, the sample is extremely small at 





of firms is appropriate. In China, the bond market is much more underdeveloped 
compared with the Western economy and firms have tendency to overinvest. 
Therefore to shed light on the extent to which the investment-cash flow sensitivity 
is linked to the imperfections in the supply of external funds in China, it is of great 
interest to us that we propose the second hypothesis: 
 
H2: Investment to cash flow sensitivity is higher for privately owned firms in 
China in relation to state owned firms, and privately owned firms are more 
sensitive to capital market pressure in the implementation of their investment 
plans.  
 
The rationale behind the second hypothesis is that, if the cost disadvantage of 
external finance is large, it should have the greatest impact on firms that retain most 
of their income. If the cost disadvantage is slight, then retention practices should 
reveal little about financing practices, q value, or investment behaviour. The idea is 
that, when a firm has good investment opportunities, observed retention practices 
provide a useful a priori criterion for identifying firms that are likely to face 
relatively high costs of external finance. InChina, as explained previously, private-
owned firms are more likely to face financial constraints due to discrimination from 
State-owned banks. FHP grouped firms in their dataset according to dividend 
behaviour; our approach is to divide the firms in terms of ownership status. 
 
Therefore, after controlling for other factors that might affect a firm’s position on 
the scale of “financially constrained-ness”, firms that are most financially 
constrained should show the highest cash flow to investment sensitivity, as those 
firms will have to exhaust their internal funds in order to finance an investment 
project because external finance is too costly or difficult to obtain. Consequently, 
with state-owned banks being the major source of bank loans (roughly 80% of all 
Chinese bank loans are granted by the state-owned banks (CBRC, 2006)and their 
preferential relationship with the state-owned firms, privately-owned firms will 
show greater cash flow to investment sensitivity, with the benchmark being state-
owned firms, and will therefore invest less when possessing same amount of cash 






Additionally, the level of cash stock holding may relate differently to the level of 
investment cash flow sensitivity in firms which are financially constrained 
compared to those that are not or less so. Boyle & Guthrie(2003) point out that the 
possibility to delay investment can reverse the relation between the availability of 
internal funds and investment. A financially constrained firm can purposely hold 
retained earnings and cash for a period of time in order to accumulate enough cash 
reserve to undertake an investment project which was being considered a while 
back. Therefore the level cash stock as well as its lagged value can be an indicator 
on firms’ investment decision based how financially constrained they are. As 
empirical evidence explained in chapter one indicates that privately owned firms in 
China are more financially constrained due to the presence of a lending bias, here 
we propose H2a: 
 
H2a: Investment to cash stock sensitivity is higher for privately owned firms than 
state owned firms. 
 
Investment to cash flow sensitivity is not affected by the level of restrictions on 
firms’ financing options alone, a number of other factors also contribute to the 
fluctuation of the ratio.  
 
Theoretically, the relationship between size and leverage is unclear. According to 
the trade-off model, large firms are expected to have a higher debt capacity and are 
able to be more highly leveraged. Large firms are likely to be more diversified, and 
thus less exposed to the risk of bankruptcy. They may also be able to reduce 
transaction costs associated with long-term debt issuance. For mature and sizable 
firms, their financial condition might well be independent from the firm’s 
investment decision as they can signal their projected profitability much more 
easily compared to their smaller and younger counterparts and gain access to more 
external finance at lower costs. However for less developed firms the case is very 
different as they have limited/costly access to external finance as most likely they 
have not established a solid relationship with banks. Another possibility is that 
larger firms may have a more diluted ownership, and thus have less control over 
individual managers. Managers may then issue debt to reduce the risk of personal 






Empirically, firm size has been regarded as an important determinant of financial 
constraints in studies of the credit channels within countries (Gertler and Gilchrist, 
1994; Olinerand Rudebusch, 1996; Vermeulen 2002) and may explain differences 
between countries. In addition,small firms are generally younger, with higher levels 
of firm-specific risk, and less collateral, making them less likely to attract external 
finance. Rajan andZingales (1995) and Wald (1999) suggested that size was 
positively correlated with debt based on the data from developed countries with 
Germany as an exception. Marsh’s (1982) survey of the literature concluded that 
large firms more often chose long-term debt while small firms chose short-term 
debt. As for China, the capital market is under-developed which further exacerbates 
the situation where external funds provide the firms with imperfect substitution for 
internal finance. Banks in China tend to grant loans on a long-term basis (People’s 
Bank of China, 2009) and smaller firms therefore are often left without a choice of 
a short-term debt that is smaller in size which suits their needs. On the other hand, 
as presented in the first chapter, the big four banks in China favour large state 
owned firms in their lending practice and therefore leave  smaller privately owned 
firms with little opportunity to obtain bank financing. 
 
Evidence also suggests that large firms are less sensitive to monetary policy 
tightening than smaller firms (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994). This is particularly true 
in the Chinese context, as the majority of large firms are state owned, and they are 
not strongly affected by most monetary policy changes or tightening, as the state 
owned banks will always make sure these firms have sufficient funds based on 
credit rationing. Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) confirm higher sensitivity for 
small firms, and those without a bond rating or commercial paper issue in their 
sample. According to Schaller (1993), small firms and those that do not belong to a 
corporate group in Canada are more sensitive to cash flow than others.  
 
In contrast,Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) point out that when they split 
samples according to size, small firms have relatively low cash flow coefficients. 
Also, Hu and Schiantarelli (1998) find that larger firms are more likely to be 
financially constrained and argue that firm size may be inversely related to 





of a formal framework that relates theory to empirical investment models,Chirinko 
(1997) argues that firm size and retention behaviour are not appropriate criteria for 
identifying financially constrained firms.  
 
Mizen and Vermeulen (2005) stress the need of being careful in projecting results 
as US firms are different from their European counterparts in terms of the different 
level of accessibility to bond markets and commercial paper market between small 
and large firms. Their study found no evidence that size is a determinant of 
investment to cash flow sensitivity. 
 
In the Chinese context, as shown in the first chapter, we find that size has a positive 
impact on firms’ level of leverage and that larger firms are more likely to be state 
owned and enjoy easier access to external financing. Hence we propose hypothesis 
H3: 
 
H3: Investment to cash flow sensitivity is higher for firms that are smaller in size, 
when other factors being held equal. 
 
Most empirical models of investment rely on the assumption that firms are able to 
respond to prices set in securities markets through the cost of capital or q. An 
alternative approach emphasizes the importance of cash flow as a determinant of 
investment spending, based on pecking order theory. The study by Meyer and Kuh 
(1957) is among the early studies that focused on the link between investment and 
liquidity and provides a base for many subsequent studies in relevant field. As we 
discussed above, by controlling for expectedprofitability using the forward looking 
information in Tobin’s q, it is feasible to examine whether liquidity and 
profitability drives investment. In most studies, liquidity is found to be significant 
despite the inclusion of q. Thus, Hu andSchiantarelli (1998) find that firms with 
weaker balance sheets are more likely to be constrained. Cleary  (1999) finds that 
profitability and sales growth are the two most important variables in a discriminant 
analysis used to select firms that increase or decrease dividends (which he interprets 
as reflecting the absence or presence of financing constraints). Mizen and 
Vermeulen (2005) argue that difference in investment to cash flow sensitivities by 





creditworthiness by firms. Their study examines whether there are some industries 
or some firm classes that are more sensitive to cash flow than others (even if they 
are the same industries in different countries) because their poor performance on 
these criteria makes them more reliant on internal finance for investment at the 
margin. Their results confirm the importance of creditworthiness of the firms on 
cash flow sensitivity. Therefore on the basis of above mentioned studies, we 
propose the fourth hypothesis: 
 
H4: Investment to cash flow sensitivity is lower for firms with lower profitability 
and lower market value.   
 
The previous literature has pointed out that older firms have an established 
reputation in the market, which facilitates their access to external finance mainly 
because their relationships with their creditors are settled within a longer time span 
(Berger andUdell, 1995). Therefore, younger firms are likely to face higher level of 
financial constrained-ness in comparison to older firms and hence show a higher 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow, and this may well also apply in the Chinese 
context. This leads us to propose, 
 









2.3.1 Data description 
We used firmlevel data from China Listed Firm’s Corporate Governance Research 
Database published by GTA Information Technology Company Limited. The dataset 
covers a wide range of variables which includes company balance sheet items, 
equity/debt information and corporate governance profile and changes. The firms in 
the data set are typically large and publicly listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange or 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange in China and the availability of information on firms with 
equity will allow us to test the hypotheses on firms which accord more closely with 
those analysed in the theory. 
 
Information is obtained for 1,7755 publicly listed firms in China, over the period of 
19 years (1990 to 2008). However, not all variables are available for all firm-years as 
most firms enter the capital market after 2000. In China, relatively standardized and 
internationalized financial regulations were introduced and enforced from 1997; 
therefore information after this year is considered more accurate. Here we separate 
the data into groups based on their institutional ownership. The data sample consists 
seven ownership categories which are collective-owned enterprise (0.97%)6, 
enterprise with funds from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macaw (0.14%), foreign-funded 
enterprise (0.84%), non-state-owned enterprise (0.01%), private enterprise 31.62%), 
sino-foreign joint venture enterprise (0.17%), and state-owned enterprise (66.25%). 
As results show in the first chapter, state-owned firms possess advantages in terms of 
obtaining loans from state-owned banks compared to non-state-owned firms. And 
therefore if the cost disadvantage of external finance is large, it should have the 
greatest effect on firms that are non-state-owned. As firms of certain ownership 
categories only make up less than 1% of the total number of firms, the seven 
categories are further grouped into state-owned enterprise7 (67.22%), privately-
owned enterprise8 (31.63%), and other enterprise9 (1.15%). 
                                               
5 Only data on 1,613 listed firms are used as the rest are national banks or financial institutes. 
6 The percentages are in terms of firm-years instead of number of firms 
7 State-owned enterprise group is made up of state-owned enterprise and collective-owned enterprise 








Due to the small number of firms as well as observations of the last ownership 
category in the data sample (only 77 observations in the first regression), we focus 
our estimation and analysis mainly on the state owned and privately owned 
categories. 
 
Several summary statistics for the firms in each group are presented in table 2.1. Due 
to the unbalanced nature of the panel data, we present number of firms as well as 



















                                                                                                                                     
9 Other enterprise group is made up of enterprise with funds from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macaw, 






Table 2.1: Summary statistics of the firms in different categories of 
ownership10 
      
Categories of 
firm     
Statistics State-owned Private-owned Other   
































































Median total assets (2008) in bn 
RMB 2.59     1.16   3.68 
 
Summary statistics for firms in each category are presented in table 1. The state-
owned category, which we hypothesize, is the least affected by financial constraints, 
retained on average 82.06% of their income and paid dividends in 56.88% of the 
years11. Surprisingly, private-owned firms share similar statistics and retained about 
83% of their income and paid out dividends in more than 51% of all years. In all 
                                               
10[1] The retention ratio is the percentage of earnings credited to retained earnings. In other words, the 
proportion of net income that is not paid out as dividends. 
 
11 Here denominator does not equal to all years in the dataset (i.e. 19 years per firm) but rather the 






three categories, the firms within the “other enterprise” category retain almost all of 
their earnings (96.47%) and paid out positive dividends in most of the years 
(62.50%).  
 
In terms of real sale growth, privately-owned firms experienced much more rapid 
growth compared to the other two categories. Many studies on Chinese firm 
performance have reported similar results (for example Lu et al. 2001; Shirai, 2002) 
as presented in the first chapter and argued that privately owned firms generally 
outperformed state-owned firms in terms of return on assets/return on equity (Kato & 
Long, 2004; Sun, et al., 2002; Z. Wei & Varela, 2003; X. N. Xu & Y. Wang, 1999). 
Thus the higher growth rate is not unexpected taken into consideration that most 
private-owned firms in China are still smaller in size and relatively younger in 
comparison to their state owned counterparts. Similarly, the low growth rate of firms 
in “other enterprise” category represents a more mature portion of all listed 
companies as foreign ownership often allows better managerial and financial practice 
being transferred from home country to firms in the host country. 
 
The investment to total assets ratio is similar across all three categories while the 
cash flow to total assets ratio is exceptionally low for foreign firms compared to the 
other two categories, especially considering how they seem to retain almost all of 
their income. However, foreign firms show the highest correlation between cash flow 
and investment by investing almost half of the cash (0.4432) made in the previous 
year. This result shows consistency with the empirical study by Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Petersen (1988) as they suggest that the firms which retained most of their income 
tend to have a higher sensitivity between cash flow and investment. State-owned 
firms showed a negative correlation between cash flow and investment made in the 











Table 2.2:  New Share Issues, Tobin’s q, and Debt Statistics of firms 
Item   State-owned Private-owned   Other 








with new share issues 






























to sum of interest 
payments 
       plus cash flows 








ratio and the change in 
total 
       debt-to-total assets ratio 
       (averaged over firms)        
 
 
Table 2.2 summarizes information on new share issues, Tobin’s q and other debt 
related statistics. Other things constant, one would expect privately-owned firms to 
rely more heavily on new share issues than firms from the other two categories as we 
hypothesize that such firms are more financially constrained. Consistent with their 
rapid growth, firms from the second category issue shares more frequently – 
approximately every second year – compared to other firms.  
 
Table 2.2 also reports Tobin’s q measures for all three categories of firms. In China, 
conventional Tobin’s q values are not readily available because there is rarely 
information on firms’ market or book value. Therefore we adopt an approachadopted 






of outstanding shares + total liabilities)/(book value of total assets) which equals to 
(outstanding shares x year end share prices + total liabilities)/(book value of total 
assets) (Chung and Pruitt, 1994; Demsetz and Villalonga , 2001;  La Porta et al., 
2002). The average q for private and foreign-owned firms is found in Table 2.2 to be 
significantly greater than the average for state-owned firms, even though foreign-
owned firms have shown a relatively smaller growth rate. As shown in table 2.2, 
privately-owned firms have the highest growth rate and one might argue that the high 
q values observed in this category is associated with high expected growth rates. 




2.3.2 Explanatory and control variables 
 
In Table 2.3 we report the explanatory variables used in the estimation models, 
together with brief descriptions of how they are calculated or selected. The 
dependent variable is investment, which, based on accounting practice, is defined as 




Table 2.3: Explanatory Variables and Descriptions 
Name of variable         Description            
            Cash stock cash and cash equivalent at time t 
       Cash flow the flow of cash at time t, estimated by calculating the difference in cash stock between two time periods 
Tobin’s q Tobin’s q, calculated using method presented in the data section 
    Age firm’s age, calculated as 2008 – year of establishment  
     
Number of employees 
 
the total number of employees in each firm, controlling for firm 
size 
    Return on assets measure of firm’s profitability/performance, calculated as the ratio of net profit over total assets 
 State dummy variable, equals one if firm is state-owned or collective-owned 
    Private dummy variable, equals one if firm is private-owned 
     Foreign dummy variable, equals one if firm is neither state or private owned,  
    
  




We also use a number of control variables in our estimating equations as listed 
below. 
 
Dividend payable is calculated as total dividend paid for by each firm in time t and it 
controls for whether the firm is cash-poor or financially constrained by identifying 
low dividend pay-outs. Tax payable is measured as total tax paid for by each firm in 
time t, which controls for sales. Total assets of each firm at time t-1 is used as control 
for firm size. Share dummy indicates whether the firm issues A share or B share on 
stock exchange, and Region dummy is a dummy variable which divides the dataset 
into various geographical regions (i.e. inland, costal)Similarly, Industry 
dummycontrols for industry effects and Year dummy controls for time effects. 
 








Hypothesis   Variable being tested Data sample Predicted sign 
        
H1   Cash flow Whole  + 
        
H2   Cash flow, cash stock Split sample + 
       
stronger 
coefficient 
       for private firms 
        
H3   Size  Split sample + 
   (number of employees)     
        
H4   Profitability  Split sample + 
   (Tobin's Q, RoA)     
        
        
H5   Age  Split sample + 






2.3.3 Estimation strategy 
 
To address the limitations of Tobin’s q as a sole measure, Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Petersen (1988, 2000) and subsequent studies have shown that the predictive power 
of cash flow is higher for financially constrained firms, where such a firm is 
identified by using a priori information such as size, dividend behaviour and capital 
structure. Therefore we will divide the sample into two, for state owned firms and 
privately owned firms respectively. 
 
The estimation model is; 
 
Iit = f(X)it + g(CF)it + dummyOWNERSHIP +uit 
 
 where Iit presents investment in plant and equipment for firm i during period t; X 
presents a vector of variables, possibly including lagged values, that have been 
emphasized as determinants of investment from a variety of theoretical 
perspectives; and u is an error term. The function g depends on the firm’s internal 
cash flow (CF); it represents the potential sensitivity of investment to fluctuations 
in available internal finance – after investment opportunities are controlled for 
through the variables in X. DummyOWNERSHIP is a dummy variable which 
divides the dataset into three categories: state-owned, private-owned and other 
enterprises which are mostly foreign owned or with finance from foreign countries 
or Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macaw. So we expect to see a greater coefficient for 
firms who are perceived as financially constrained, as well as a negative coefficient 
for the dummy which represents the private-owned firms with state-owned firms as 
benchmark. 
 
We then study differences in financing and investment in categories of firms with 
different characteristics, specifically, different ownership status. Our classification 
scheme divides firms by institutional ownership and examines the effect of each 






according to dividend pay-outs like the pioneering study by FHP and many follow-
up papers, as a result of China’s underdeveloped capital market as well as firms’ 
immaturity in terms of share issue/dividend pay-out practice. Dividend pay-out is 
used as one of the control variables nevertheless as, one reason being that firms 
might pay low dividend because they require investment finance that exceeds their 
internal cash flow and retain all of the low-cost internal funds they can generate. A 
second reason is that they have little or no income to distribute.  
 
The study by Sun  and Yamori (2009) finds that capital markets in China respond 
rationally to the potential impact of regional disparities on a firm’s performance and 
suggest that firms in inland regions rely more on their internal funds in terms of 
their investment activities than those in coastal regions and that the sensitivity gap 
between inland and coastal firms widened in the recent contractionary monetary 
policy period, it is also of our interest to look at regional disparities between firms 
i.e. whether firms rely more on internal funds in inland regions compared to coastal 
regions.  
 
When testing for impact of different explanatory variables on investment to cash 
flow sensitivity in sub samples of data based on ownership status, we adopt panel 





2.4 Results and Discussion 
 
We use the data sample both as a whole and as split samples due to the high level of 
correlation between individual institutional measures. The correlation matrix is 
reported in table 2.5. 
 
                                               
12 We originally plan to use interactive terms of cash flow and other explanatory variables in order to 
test what drives the cash flow sensitivity in firms. The results returned are not stable therefore 




Table 2.5: Correlation Matrix for All Institutional Measures Used in the Data Analysis 
 
NERI proper~n contra~t go~ption Enter~t Burea~n Dayst~s Confi~s Priva~n Expec~s Privat~n Age Number~ Unemp~t QUnemp~t
NERI 1
propertyri~n 0.0179 1
contracten~t -0.0003 -0.0742 1
govern~ption 0.008 -0.273 0.0109 1
Entertain~t 0.0019 -0.2597 0.0267 0.1876 1
Bureaucra~n 0.0151 0.015 -0.017 0.2299 0.2529 1
Daystocle~s -0.0049 -0.7166 -0.11 0.161 0.5494 0.2343 1
Confidenc~s -0.014 -0.2346 -0.0285 0.0729 -0.6904 -0.521 -0.2522 1
PrivateSM~n 0.0032 -0.2983 0.1572 0.1648 -0.4077 0.0117 0.1857 0.5223 1
Expectedi~s -0.0106 -0.5082 -0.0057 0.3741 0.3182 0.1592 0.5354 0.033 0.3543 1
Private_fo~n -0.0063 0.0066 0.0495 -0.0105 -0.0028 -0.1291 -0.0604 0.066 0.0078 -0.0097 1
Age -0.0146 0.0208 -0.009 -0.0761 -0.0107 -0.0897 -0.0856 0.0622 -0.1421 -0.0984 -0.0061 1
Numberofem~s -0.002 0.0889 -0.0136 0.0301 -0.002 0.0789 -0.0261 -0.069 0.0013 -0.0092 -0.0541 -0.0669 1
Unemploym~t -0.0238 -0.3897 0.0114 -0.2855 0.3866 -0.2027 0.39 -0.1312 -0.3397 -0.1444 0.0212 0.1816 -0.108 1





To test for H1, we have run the entire data sample on all explanatory and control 
variables except for the firm specific ones (ownership, industry and year dummies) 
using fixed effect panel estimation methods. The test result is significant with an R-
sq value of 0.6779, indicating considerable explanatory power. Detailed results are 
reported in Table 2.6. 
 
Cash flow, as predicted in H1, is significant at 1% level with a positive coefficient, 
which confirms that, despite the availability of external financing options, internal 
finance does have a positive and significant impact on firms’ investment behaviour, 
most likely due to its cost advantage. We discuss the correlation between cash 
holdings and investment fully later on in this section. 
 
We also look at the impact of other explanatory variables on investment on their 
aggregated sample level. 
 
The size variable estimated by using number of employees’ shows a strong negative 
correlation with investment, which contradicts our prediction. Neither the return on 
assets nor age showsany significant impact on investment; such effects will be 
discussed more in details later on in this section. Tobin’s q also shows no 
significance at all, a result which might be puzzling and surprising if found in the 
Western context. However as discussed before, such a result might be expected in 
China for several reasons. Firstly, Tobin’s q was not estimated based on the 
traditional market approach due to the lack of information available on market 
value of firms in China. Secondly, though we adopted alternative estimating 
method used by various studies,(Chung and Pruitt, 1994; (Demsetz & Villalonga, 
2001; La porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2002), nonetheless the 
variable deviates from the real q and does not explain investment in this estimation, 
thus resulting in insignificant coefficient. Most importantly, it is argued that 
Tobin’s q, albeit used commonly in estimating investment functions, does not have 
high explanatory power and that it yields implausibly high estimates of the 








In order to provide a better understanding of the results, we proceed to the next step 
of our estimation. We run panel regressions of the data using random effects 
estimation13, with inclusion of all listed variables, on three sub samples of the 
dataset which are divided based on firms’ ownership status. 
 
The results improved massively in terms of number of significant variables as well 
as the level of significance once the data sample was divided into different 
groups14. This indicates the differences in the effect of explanatory variables on 
cash flow sensitivity of investment in firms with different institutional ownerships. 
The entire regression analysis also appears to be very consistent and robust 
throughout. Detailed results are illustrated in Table 2.6. 
 
For state owned firms, cash flow unconventionally shows a negative coefficient at 
1% significance level, which contradicts our first hypothesis that cash flow has a 
positive impact on firms’ investment decisions. This indicates that the higher the 
level of cash flow within the firm, the lower the level of investment is being made. 
For private firms, however, the result is more conventional and cash flow showed a 
strong positive coefficient with significance at the 1% level. For firms under the 
“other enterprises” category, the results are insignificant, probably due to the low 
number of observations (with only 77 observations) and therefore we focus on 
results from the first two categories of data sampleshenceforth. 
 
One explanation for the negative coefficient shown in the sample representing state 
owned firms is the application of agency problem theory. Agency problem costs 
arise from the limited liability feature of debt contract that creates incentives for 
firms managers to act counter to the interests of creditors under some 
circumstances. Debt financing, in particular long term debt, creates agency 
problems. In the Chinese context, this is particularly true as the majority of loans 
granted by state owned banks are long term. Managers might forego investment 
                                               
13 We use random effect estimation method here to control for firms’ ownership, industry, and time 
effects. 







opportunities with positive net present values and favour the ones with negative net 
present values. They also have an incentive to issue new debt that raises the 
riskiness and lowers the value of existing debt without utilizing the internal funds 
first that are available to them. In these theories, firms’ managers are assumed to 
have full information about the value of the firm’s existing assets and the returns 
from new investment project and thus to the extent that managers control sufficient 
internal funds to finance all profitable investment projects, investment demand 
models based on a representative firms in a perfect capital market apply. In China, 
managers in state owned firms are mostly state officials who are well connected to 
the state owned banks, and due to the common ownership of banks and the firms, 
these managers can find themselves in a position where debt financing is readily 
available whenever needed. On the other hand, asymmetric information can also 
cause problems in the market for debt. It may increase the cost of new debt, or even 
result in credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) 
suggest that equilibrium credit rationing can arise from adverse selection. Bonds, 
bank loans and lines of credit, the typical source of finance for smaller industrial 
firms, restrict operating flexibility and require particular levels for certain financial 
operating ratios. When lenders cannot distinguish borrower quality, the market 
interest rate must rise, and loan size may be limited. When the cost is high and the 
availability is scarce, banks naturally prefer state owned firms in their lending 
practice either as directed by the local government to support employment in such 
firms or to take advantage of the guaranteed repayment by state owned firms as the 
government will bail them out should they face the possibility of bankruptcy. Also 
the low cost in maintaining long-term relationship is also attractive to banks who 
are seeking to reduce costs. 
 
Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) have argued also that when firms are particularly 
distressed and have negative cash flows, they cannot cut back investment beyond 
some point, and this may drive an estimated negative relationship between 
investment and cash flow. This would be true for Chinese state owned firms, as 
they have to make investments in the social-political interest that are inconsistent 







The negative coefficient on cash flow in the sample of state owned firms can also 
be a result of the high leverage level in these firms and higher repayment of debt 
will impact cash flow negatively.  
 
Therefore, as external financing will unlikely to be costly for state owned firms, 
managers’ rent seeking behaviour will cause investment to be low even when both 
external and internal funds are of abundance. 
 
Similarly, as privately owned firms do not enjoy the same easy access to bank loans 
as their state owned counterparts and equity financing also comes with its own cost 
disadvantage, the level of investment made by these firms are much more closely 
related to retained earnings/cash flow. This is consistent with the results of 
coefficients on cash flow for private firms.
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Table 2.6.Results on cash flow and cash stock with lagged period effects 
Explanatory Whole sample Split sample 1 Split sample 2 Split sample 3 Split sample 4 Split sample 5 Split sample 6 
Variables     state private state private state private state private state private state private 
                Cash flow 0.19406*** -0.24100*** 0.14039*** 





          Cash flow lag1 
          
-0.01400 0.03700 
  
            
(-0.44) (0.61) 
  Cash flow lag2 
            
0.30291*** 0.09614 
              
(7.44) (1.23) 
Cash stock 
    
-0.04819*** 0.25664*** 
       
      
(-3.00) (6.90) 
        Cash stock lag1 
      
0.10074*** 0.24216*** 
     
        
(5.12) (5.16) 
      Cash stock lag2 
        
-0.00691 0.29560*** 
    
          
(-0.24) (5.13) 



















(-16.82) (6.17) (-17.75) (6.32) (-18.61) (6.52) (-16.53) (6.00) (-16.50) (6.16) (-13.30) (6.00) 
Tobin's Q -4777.064 
 






















(2.93) (-0.74) (3.16) (0.42) (4.04) (0.27) (1.40) (0.10) (1.43) (0.82) (1.00) (-0.87) 
                R-sq   0.6779   0.7539 0.0332 0.7423 0.0487 0.7493 0.04 0.4831 0.0425 0.4831 0.0307 0.4865 0.0318 





The results on cash flow confirms H2 that predicts a higher investment to cash 
flow sensitivity for privately owned firms due to the fact that these firms are more 
financially constrained compared to state owned firms. This also confirms that 
financially constrained firms do exhibit a higher cash flow sensitivity compared to 
less constrained firms and the findings are consistent with the study of Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen (1988) in this sense. However, we have also found that cash 
flow influences investment behaviour in a different way in state owned and 
privately owned firms, which was not discovered by previous literature. 
 
As we have discussed in the first chapter, bank lending to state owned firms are 
often policy lending directed by the government which is associated with political 
agenda such as fixed investment plans or promise of employment. As a result, 
despite making little profit or even a loss, many state owned firms still invest 
heavily, which explains why cash flow can sometimes show little or negative 
correlation with investment. Also as discussed by Allayannis and Mozumdar 
(2002), when firms are in extremely bad financial shape, the firm no longer show 
high sensitivity to the fluctuation of internal funds but only makes the absolute 
amount of investment that is necessary, which also contributes to the non-positive 
correlation between cash flow and investment. 
 
To test for H2a the effect of cash stock on investment behaviour and essentially, 
whether investment to cash stock sensitivity is in accordance with cash flow 
sensitivity for firms with different level of financial constraints, we look at the 
results generated by regressing cash stock in replacement of cash flow in the 
previous model.We find that cash stock at the time of investment shows a 
negative and significant correlation with investment, at 1% significance level, for 
state owned firms. For privately owned firms, the result is also consistent and 
shows a positive and significant coefficient. This confirms H2a that investment to 
cash stock sensitivity is higher for privately owned firms. 
 
Cash provides a low-cost source of investment finance for firms that must pay a 
premium for external funds. The motivation for the next test takes into 
consideration precautionary saving. If managers know that they will have to pay a 
  
premium for external funds, they should accumulate a stock of liquid assets when 
cash flow is high and that stock of liquid assets will help smooth investment over 
downturns and spare firms the need to obtain potentially costly capital from 
external sources. It might also provide the necessary collateral to obtain new debt 
as suggested by some of the models considered earlier. 
 
Based on the study by Molnar and Tanaka (2007), some investment opportunities 
can be reviewed by firms now but undertaken in a few years’ time. Under these 
circumstances, firms with cost disadvantage to external financing will then make a 
conscious decision to retain as much earnings as possible in preparation for the 
future investment project. Therefore, cash stock in lagged period can also be of 
explanatory power on whether a firm depends heavily on internal finance. 
 
Thus we then generated two more cash stock variables based on their lagged value 
at t-1 and t-2. Interestingly for state owned firms, lagged cash stock at t-1 showed 
positive and significant impact on investment at 1% level, and no significant 
result is found for lagged cash stock at t-2. For privately owned firms, the results 
are consistent and all positive and significant at 1% level.  
 
Next we test for hypothesis H3 by looking at the size effect on investment to cash 
flow sensitivity. As discussed previously in this chapter, many studies find that 
size is an important determinant. Empirically, firm size has been regarded as an 
important determinant of financial constraints in studies of the credit channels 
within countries (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996; 
Vermeulen 2002). Evidence also suggests that large firms are less sensitive to 
monetary policy tightening than smaller firms (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994).  
 
The size of the firm is proxied by the number of employees(we use total assets as 
a control variable for the correlation between firms’ level of investment and 
assets). For state owned firms, we find the size variable to be largely significant 
(at 1% significance level) and negative, whilst for privately owned firms, the 
effect is the opposite (largely significant and positive at 1% level).This result is 
not puzzling in the Chinese context. State owned firms in China are notoriously 
known for their over hiring practice and overstaffed reality. These firms are 
  
ultimately owned by the state and behave based on guidance given by the 
government. The government often asks state owned firms to either absorb some 
local unemployment or hire people with good personal relationships in exchange 
for other benefits such as the promise of more government investment or writing 
off existing bank loan repayment. Consequently, state owned firms often have 
more employees compared to privately owned firms of similar sizes. Therefore 
the result estimated in the sample of privately owned firms are more accurate. As 
in this data sample size variable shows a positive coefficient, it supports H3 in 
confirming that investment to cash flow sensitivity is higher for smaller firms. 
 
Here we move on to hypothesis H4 and examine whether profitability affects 
investment to cash flow sensitivity differently in different ownership samples of 
data. Here the return on assets estimates the actual profitability of the firm while 
as previously Tobin’s q proxies the expected future profits. 
 
Tobin’s q displays a consistent negative coefficient at 10% significant level for 
state owned firms, whilst it shows no significance in most regressions estimated 
on the sample of privately owned firms (with one negative exception being when 
regressed together with lagged cash stock at t-1). As pointed out before, Tobin’s q 
in China is of low explanatory power both due to the way q is estimated as well as 
that it has low explanatory power (Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995). Precisely, 
Tobin’s q is not accurately measured in all contexts, and because capital markets 
are not always informationally efficient, the financing constraint literature also 
takes into account sales (or growth of sales) of firms (Bhaumik et al., 2012). This 
regression result therefore may be augmented, especially because the negative 
(and often insignificant) impact of Tobin’s q in table 2.6. 
 
Return on assets variable shows no significant results at all for either sample. 
Therefore we reject hypothesis H4 and find that in Chinese firms, profitability 
does not influence investment to cash flow sensitivity. 
 
Lastly, we examine the effect of age has on investment to cash flow sensitivity in 
different ownership categories. For the state owned firms, age showed a 
significantly positive coefficient at 1% significant level. No significant result was 
  
derived from the private side of the estimations. It is easy to understand the reason 
behind this result. State owned firms enjoy banks’ favourable lending practice and 
easy access to external financing. However, older state owned firms still enjoy 
preferential treatment in comparison to the younger ones as they have many more 
years of established relationship with banks. On the other hand, the majority of 
privately owned firms, regardless of age, face difficulty in obtaining bank loans 
and therefore show no significant age effect. 
 
We have also tested regional and industrial effects on investment. Two types of 
regional dummies are created; one divides the sample into municipalities15 and 
non-municipalities, while the other one divides the sample into inland and coastal 
region. The inland/coastal dummy showed no significance in any regressions 
whilst the municipalities dummy is persistently positive and significant for the 
state-owned category, indicating state-owned firms which are located in these four 
cities invested more heavily compared to state-owned firms located in other 
regions.  
 
This results, however, almost certainly understates the true effect because large, 
mature firms constitute a great proportion of our listed company data from GTA 
than they do of the aggregate economy, indicating the high probability that a large 
proportion of firms in China, particular privately owned firms, are deprived of 
external finance. 
 





                                               




Table 2.7. Hypothetic prediction and estimation results 
 
Hypothesis   Variable being tested Data sample Predicted sign Actual sign     
Confirmation of 
Hypothesis 
                H1 
  





    
yes 
 
                H2 
  
Cash flow, cash stock Split sample + 
 
 + for private firms 
   
yes 
 
       
stronger coefficient  - for state owned firms 
    
       
for private firms stronger effect on private firms 
   
                H3 
  
Size (number of employees) Split sample + 
 
 - for state owned firms 
  
yes for private firms 
         
 + for private  
firms 
   
no for state owned 
firms 
                H4 
  
Profitability (Tobin's Q, RoA) Split sample + 
 




         
insignificant for private firms 
    
         
RoA: insignificant 
     




Split sample + 
 
 + for state owned firms 
  
yes 
                   insignificant for private firms         
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2.5 Conclusion and Limitations 
 
This chapter investigates in details the relationship between cash flow and firms’ 
investment behaviour, with a particular focus on factors influencing the sensitivity 
of cash flow to investment in order to pin down what characterizes a firm that is 
financially constrained. 
 
Our results indicate that, although cash flow has an overall positive impact on 
Chinese firms’ implementation of investment projects, it affects privately owned 
firms and state owned firms in different ways. Such a finding has not been 
proposed by earlier studies. Results show that in the state sector, cash flow either 
has a negative impact on firm level investment, or the correlation is of no 
significance. This probably indicates the existence of an agency problem in state 
owned firms, which is further exacerbated by the role of debt (also reference to first 
chapter for details and empirical evidence). In contrast, private firms’ investment is 
positively correlated with cash flow with strong significance, implying the 
availability and level of internal finance is a major determinant in firms’ investment 
decision. This indicates that these firms are more financially constrained compared 
to their state owned counterparts and is consistent with the conclusion of lending 
bias from the first chapter. The positive correlation between cash stock at time t and 
lagged time t-1 and t-2 indicate that firms in the private sector stock up cash in 
preparation for future investment needs in order to overcome the financial hurdle. 
 
We also find the profitability, size and age of firm all affect the cash flow 
sensitivity of investment. For state owned firms, both size (measured by number of 
employees) and profitability (measured by Tobin’s q) shows a significant negative 
impact on cash flow sensitivity, contradicting the theoretical predictions. This is 
largely due to the unique nature of state owned firms in China, as they are mostly 
overstaffed, with high growth rate and low efficiency. The difficulty of measuring 
Tobin’s q in emerging markets also contributed to the counter-intuitive results. For 
privately owned firms, only size shows a positive effect on the sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow, indicating that in the private sector, larger firms are less 
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financially constrained. However, neither profitability nor age has a significant 
impact on such sensitivity. 
 
This chapter finds that privately owned firms exhibitsignificantly greater 
sensitivities of cash flow to investment than state owned firms. These higher 
sensitivities can probably be interpreted as evidence that firms are more financially 
constrained. The results also provideempirical evidence concerning the theories on 
investment behaviour and cash flow, and further extend the test for financial 
constraints to the Chinese context.  
 
Our findings highlight the urgent need for deeper banking reform in China to 
further commercialize the state owned banks as well as to reduce state intervention 
and direction in the form of policy lending. The results of this chapter supports the 
findings of the first chapter showing empirical evidence that privately owned firms 
in China face lending bias and are financially constrained. The limitation on data 
(consists of only listed firms in China) and measures for Tobin’s q, arguably 
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Chapter 3 
Provincial Institutions and Business Performance: 




Institutional development in the sense of enhancement of the effectiveness of 
markets as primary coordination mechanisms is widely viewed as the core to 
economic reform in transition economies. The expectation is that the more effective 
the market mechanism, the more productive will be the firms participating in the 
market. However, institutional frameworks are multifaceted, and how various 
aspects support or hinder the ability of businesses to operate efficiently is not well 
understood.  
By studying institutions at the provincial level, we are able to develop a more fine-
grained understanding of the effects of institutions. In particular, institutional 
change over the past two decades has varied across provinces in China, and this 
variation explains why firms in different provinces have reformed at different pace. 
Our base proposition is that institutional development enhances businesses’ total 
factor productivity (TFP), an indicator of how efficiently and intensively firms 
utilize input in production.  
Our empirical analysis confirms this proposition for aggregate indices, and we 
provide detailed analysis of various specific aspects of institutions. Moreover, we 
find private ownership to enhance firms effectiveness (an effect moderated by size 
and age of the firm), while unemployment reduces firm effectiveness.  
Keywords: sub-national institutions, institutional development, firm performance, 
total factor productivity, economic transition, China.  
                                               
16 Acknowledgements: We thank Xiaojing Li (St Andrews) for her help in 
procuring province level indices.  





Institutional development is widely held to be essential to induce Chinese 
businesses to improve their economic efficiency. Institutions, defined as formal and 
informal rules of doing business as well as market intermediaries, shape many cost 
factors, in particular costs of using the market, but also the costs of interacting with 
government authorities, labour markets, financial service intermediaries and courts 
(North, 1990, 2005; Ingram and Silverman, 2002, Meyer and Peng, 2005). 
Moreover, institutions shape the opportunities for knowledge creation and sharing, 
and thus for raising the level of technology in use in firms (Lundvall, Johnson, 
Andersen and Dalum, 2002; Mudambi, 2008). By impacting on both the value 
added created by firms, and the costs they incur in the process, they indirectly 
impact on corporate performance and economic growth.  
Research on institutions has traditionally focused on cross-national variations. 
However, the cross-national variations are often very large and correlated with 
other aspects of the respective economies (e.g. Easton and Walker, 1997; Bevan, 
Estrin and Meyer, 2004; Berggren and Jordahl, 2005). Therefore, researchers have 
recently began to exploit the intra-country variation in emerging economies such as 
China, Russia and Vietnam to study how institutions affect the strategies and 
performance of foreign investment firms (Meyer and Nguyen, 2005; Du, Lu and 
Tao, 2007) and of local firms (Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 2002; Cull and 
Xu, 2005; Hallward-Driemeier, Wallstein and Xu, 2006; Bruno, Bytchkova and 
Estrin, 2010).  This approach allows us to conduct a more fine-grained analysis of 
the impact of institutions on firm performance.  
The concept of firm performance is the core of many economic studies and several 
theories focus on the economic efficiency of firms. Pareto (1896) defines allocative 
efficiency as a situation where no one could be made better off without someone at 
least as worse off. Allocative efficiency is achieved when resources are allocated to 
the “right” decision unit and the price of output equals the cost of resources used to 
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produce the goods (price = marginal costs). Leibenstein argues that (1975) most 
empirical studies have illustrated results showing that by improving allocative 
efficiency or Pareto efficiency, output can only be increased by a very small 
fraction.  The concept of X-efficiency is related to yet in contrast with allocative 
efficiency with respect to labour and management; essentially X-inefficiency refers 
to the difference between maximal effectiveness of resource utilization and actual 
utilization of such resources in firms (Leibenstein, 1978). In the previous two 
chapters of the thesis, we mostly looked at how to improve firm performance by 
reallocating available resources, for instance, by making available funds more 
accessible to privately owned and more profitable firms rather than firms with state 
ownership but poor profitability. In this chapter, we look into how to improve firm 
performance from another perspective, which is the effectiveness (or X-efficiency) 
of firms, which can be measured by total factor productivity (TFP). 
We focus on TFP as a measure of corporate performance. TFP is the proportion of 
firms’ output that is not explained by the quantity of inputs in a production process 
(Comin et al., 2006; Mahadevan, 2004). It thus is a measure of how effectively a 
firm exploits its inputs of capital, labour and materials, hence in this chapter we at 
times refer to TFP as the firm effectiveness. Earlier studies identify TFP as a 
critical mediating variable that influences both corporate performance and 
economic growth (Bosworth and Collins, 2003; Felipe, 1999; Rodrik, 1998). In this 
study, we investigate the impact of institutional development on TFP with the dual 
aims to advance theory and generate policy advice. In particular, we put forward a 
more fine-grained analysis of institutions to analyse the prevailing question, which 
institutions really matter to firms? 
For our empirical analysis, we utilize the fact that some aspects of the institutions 
vary considerably across provinces in China to measure institutions at the level of 
provinces. Traditionally, many Chinese firms were adapted to the state-dominated 
economy, and were thus operating with relatively low efficiency, including most 
notably overstaffing. Market reforms since the 1980s have created new 
opportunities and incentives schemes, that have induced many, but not all, firms to 
substantially reform their operations, and to improve their productivity (Dollar, 
1990). In this study we aim to shed more light on the question how variations in 
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institutional change, in particular their variations across Chinese provinces, affect 
firm performance.  
Our analysis proceeds in three steps: First, we use an aggregate index of institutions 
that has been established in the literature (Fan, Wang and Zhu, 2007; Yue, 2010) to 
test the general effect of institutional development. Second, we separate different 
aspects of the institutional environment such as property rights protection, the 
degree of government intervention, and the capability of the state to implement 
regulation and intervention to test the impact of specific aspects of the institutional 
framework. Third, we test the proposition that compared to state-owned firms, 
foreign and privately owned firms react more positively to at least some aspects of 
institutional improvements because they have appropriate incentive structures and 
more flexible organizations. Finally, we investigate the effect of local 
unemployment and hence labour market supply, considering both linear and non-
linear effects. 
This chapter offers the following contributions. First, we provide more fine-grained 
understanding of institutional variations by examining the impact of institutional 
quality across regions within the same country. Many previous papers failed to 
identify statistically significant effects of institutional variables on firm 
performance, mostly using cross country datasets. We suggest that, in most cases, 
the differences in institutions across region within the same country may not be 
large enough to generate effects that can be found in cross-sectional analysis. In 
particular, variation across units of analysis (provinces in our study, countries in 
earlier studies) may be caused not by differences in institutions alone but also other 
factors specific to the province/country. Thus most cross sectional studies of 
country-level institutions and performance overlook causes of difference in firm 
performance that are country-specific other than institutions (e.g. population, 
culture, market size).  By measuring institutions at the province level across regions 
in China while controlling for other province-level effects, we can exploit 
variations across a large number of distinct entities, and hence able to compare the 
impact of institutional differences, which provide more accurate results. Very few 
earlier studies have provided analysis on data with such a low level of aggregation. 
Second, we test for a rich variety of institutional measures, thus providing a more 
fine-grained understanding which institutional arrangements matter for firm 
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effectiveness. Third, we investigate how state-ownership, an important institutional 
arrangement in transition economies, interacts with other characteristics of the firm 
and its institutional environment. Specifically, we found it to have a direct negative 
effect that is moderated by the firm’s age and size. However, it is not moderated by 
other province level institutional influences that we have tested. Fourth, we have 
constructed a unique firm level dataset that incorporates province level institutions 
that enables investigation of intra-country variations on firms’ strategies and 
performance. 
This chapter is structured as follows. The next section reviews the literature and 
introduces the key theoretical arguments as to why we expect institutions to 
positively influence firm performance in a transition environment. On this basis, 
section three develops our hypotheses, which stipulate why specific aspects of the 
institutional framework would impact on firm effectiveness, and why this impact 
may vary for firm in different forms of ownership. Section four introduces our 
dataset, the estimation technique, and the measures of the explanatory variables. 
Section five reports and discusses the results, and section six concludes findings 




3.2 Literature and Theoretical Foundations 
3.2.1 Institutional perspectives on economic performance 
Institutions have been defined by Douglass North (1990) as “the humanly devised 
constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction [and hence] 
create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange”. Also known as “rules of the 
game”, they define the available options for economic activity, and shape the costs 
of alternative transactions and production arrangements. Institutions thus play a 
critical role in facilitating or hindering economic performance of individuals, firms 
and nations.  
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The effects of institutions on transaction cost have been observed throughout 
economic history. The need for impersonal contract enforcement surfaced along 
with increasing labour diversification. Innovations of institutions that lowered 
transaction costs consisted of legal changes, instruments, and specific techniques 
and enforcement characteristics that lowered the costs of engaging in long distance 
exchange. Company laws enable a wide range of organizational forms and complex 
governance structures that limit the problems of agency in hierarchical 
organizations. In capital markets, secure property rights, which entail a polity and 
judicial system, lower the costs of contracting. In the integrated societies of the 21st 
century, specialization increases the number of inter-firm interfaces, and thus 
transactions between economic agents, making institutions particularly critical 
(North, 1990, 2005; Peng and Heath, 1996; Commander and Svejnar, 2007). 
Institutional development has come to the forefront of discourses in economics with 
the economic transition of formerly central plan economies (North, 2005, World 
Bank, 1996). Market economies allocate goods and services efficiently if the 
markets are working effectively. Such efficient market do however not evolve 
spontaneously, as assumed by classic economic theory, but they depend on market 
supporting institutions (North, 1991). This need for market-supporting institutions 
has become particular evident in transition economies in Central and Eastern 
Europe: after the collapse of the ‘old’ institutional system organized around the 
central plan, firms experienced widespread coordination failures rather than 
spontaneous and efficient markets (Blanchard and Kremer, 1997). Hence, after 
initial reforms focused on stabilization and liberalization, transition economies in 
Central and Eastern Europe focused on building institutions such as stock markets, 
corporate governance, accounting and auditing standards (Estrin, 2002).  
The nature of institutions shapes the strategies that firms pursue, and their 
performance, as explored in the strategic management and international business 
literatures. In consequence, institutions have been shown to explain how business 
strategies and operations vary across countries, and how they adapt to the changing 
institutions over time (Luo, 2003; Oliver 1997; Peng, 2003, Peng, Wang and Jiang, 
2008; Tan and Peng, 2003), and how multinational enterprises adapt their strategies 
to local context (Henisz, 2002, Meyer, 2001; Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik and Peng 
2009, Meyer and Peng, 2005). For example, Tan and Tan (2005) show the mutual 
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interactions of institutional reform in China with the strategic changes in Chinese 
State-owned Enterprises (SOEs). 
A key concept in the strategic management literature on emerging economies is 
“institutional voids”, the idea that the lack of specific market-supporting institutions 
creates additional costs for business in such countries (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). 
Business responds to institutional voids by avoiding the particular markets, i.e. by 
investing less, by adopting practices such as networking that enable to bypass 
institutional voids, or by developing intermediary businesses that are specifically 
designed to reduce the costs of transacting in a particular context, for example 
private credit or identity check services. Such strategies, however, raise the costs of 
operating, and can be expected to lead to less efficient factor utilization, and hence 
lower TFP. 
 
3.2.2 Institutional theory and provinces as level of analysis 
Institutional theory has been developed mainly by two types of work: First, 
longitudinal or historical studies explore in great detail how institutional 
frameworks and businesses evolve over time. This type of work leads to thick 
descriptions of economic systems that provide a comprehensive understanding on 
why a certain economy functions in a certain way (Carney &Gedajlovic, 2009; Hall 
& Soskice, 2002; Morgan, Whitley and Moen, 2006). However, this approach does 
not allow pinpointing the exact aspects of institutions that are critical for firms to 
enhance their performance. 
Second, cross-sectional work has mostly exploited the fact the nation states vary in 
their institutional make-up, and explored how cross-national variations of 
institutions impact on the strategies of foreign investors (Bevan, Estrin and Meyer, 
2004;  Globermann& Shapiro, 2003; Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik and Peng, 2009; 
Zhou, Delios and Yang, 2002), and entrepreneurial start-ups (Bruno, Bytchkova 
and Estrin 2008), on business performance (Scarpetta, Hemmings, Tressel and 
Woo, 2002), as well as economic variables such as economic growth (North, 1990; 
Rodrik 1998). However, such an approach is relatively crude in that variations 
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across countries tend to be large and correlated with many other features of the 
pertinent countries.  
A new opportunity to advance institutional theory has emerged with the opening up 
of emerging economies that are both large and internally diverse in their 
institutional set-up. Such studies proxy institutions at subnational units of analysis, 
such as provinces and cities. This allows for a more detailed analysis of the role of 
institutions in an economy because national characteristics are held constant in the 
study. In particular, institutional frameworks vary across regions or provinces 
within large transition economies, such as China, Russia and Vietnam, that have a 
federal structure of governance (Hallward-Driemeier, Wallstein and Xu, 2006; 
Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 2002; Li, Yue and Zhao, 2009). In these 
economies, market-oriented reforms have often been rolled out by central 
government authorities, yet their implementation in each province varies 
considerably. While formal changes may be initiated centrally, local 
implementation often depends on local informal institutions such as traditions and 
attitudes (Meyer and Nguyen, 2005).  
This variation of local institutions leads to variations in business strategies. 
Scholars have used such institutional variations across provinces in large but 
administratively fragmented countries to investigate the impact of institutions on a 
range of different aspects of firm activity and performance (see Appendix Table 1): 
1) The TFP of local firms (Bruno, Bytchkova and Estrin, 2010, Hallward-Driemeier 
et al., 2006); 2) Firms’ reinvestment (Johnson et al., 2002; Cull and Cu, 2005); 3) 
State-owned firms’ capital structure (Li et al., 2007); 4) The export performance of 
local firms (Shinkle and Kriauciunas, 2008). 
Of these studies, most relevant for our research are the studies by Bruno, 
Bytchkova and Estrin (2010) and Hallward-Driemeier, Wallsten and Xu (2006). 
Bruno and collaborators (2010) investigate the effects of institutional development 
on TFP of domestic and foreign firms across Russian provinces.  The paper 
analysed a micro-panel data set to investigate the effect of regional institutional 
environment on Russian TFP levels for foreign and domestic firms across time, 
industries and regions. They confirm the existence of a significant gap between 
TFP in domestic and foreign firms in Russia of 80% in the 2005 – 2006 period. 
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They conclude that foreign owned firms tend not to invest in areas in which the 
institutional quality is low, as it significantly negatively affects their performance in 
those regions. 
Hallward-Driemeier and collaborators (2006) investigate the impact of business 
climate on four aspects of firm performance in five Chinese cities. They measure 
investment climate based on data from the World Bank survey using city-industry 
averages (i.e. aggregating firms that were in the same industry and the same city). 
Their institutional measures included bank access, regulatory burden, corruption, 
non-permanent labour, transport/power disruption. None of these was significant 
when performance was measured by TFP; however regulatory burden was found to 
affect sales growth and employment growth, while corruption affects sales growth.  
Firms under private ownership performed better in terms of both TFP and 
investment rate. In addition, human capital measures significantly enhanced TFP.  
We reinvestigate their propositions, though with better measures of institutions that 
are both more detailed and archival, and as we detail below we find (contrary to 
their study) support for the direct impact of institutions on TFP. 
Institutional perspectives have also been applied extensively in the study of foreign 
investors in transition economies such as China. Foreign investors’ locational 
choice is driven by the economic attractiveness of local markets and resource 
endowments as well as various types of agglomeration effects (Head, Ries and 
Swenson, 1999; McCann and Folta, 2008; Tan and Meyer, 2011). These primary 
effects however are complemented by the conduciveness of the institutional 
environment for doing business in the locations. Early studies of these effects in 
China used simple dummies for provinces offering special economic zones of open 
coastal cities (Head and Ries, 1996; Wei et al., 1999; Cheung and Kwan, 2000; 
Zhou et al., 2002). More recently, in a study in Vietnam, Meyer and Nguyen (2005) 
show that the relative strength of state-owned firms in the province has a negative 
effect, while Du, Lu and Tao (2007) test for multiple institutional characteristics of 
provincial institutions in China and find that Intellectual Property Rights and 
contract enforcement have a positive effect, while government intervention and 
corruption have a negative effect. Only one study, to our knowledge, has looked at 
the performance impact of regional institutions on foreign invested firms (Chan, 
Makino and Isobe, 2010).  
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One obstacle to institutional research exploiting intra-country variation has been the 
availability of suitable measures. Scholars have so far struggled with the 
development of appropriate measures of institutions as well as control variables at 
the province level. In this study, we have collected suitable indices from a variety 
of studies and papers (Fan et al, 2007, Du, Lu and Tao, 2007, World Bank, 2006) to 
overcome the limitations of earlier research. 
 
3.2.3 Institutions and institutional change in China 
Chinese economic reform since the late 1970s has transformed a centrally 
coordinated economy into a dynamic capitalist economy (Lin, 2011). The economic 
reforms have taken a gradual approach with series of small steps involving 
liberalization of markets (in the sense of removing restrictions and direct 
interventions by governments) and development of new institutions that enhance 
the efficiency of markets, e.g. improving property rights protection and contract 
enforcement (Child and Yuan 1996; Nee, 1992; Boisot and Child 1996). The 
success of these reforms is usually attributed to the adoption of an export-oriented 
industrialisation strategy, as well as certain policies favouring the liberalisation and 
deregulation of foreign trade and investment.  
While these reforms have introduced elements of a market economy, and in many 
ways may be moving toward a Western-style market economy, various entities of 
the Chinese government continue to play an active role in the economy. These 
activities not only involve rule-setting and monitoring of regulatory agencies, but 
active engagement, for instance by providing guidance and selective support (Lin, 
2011; Luo et al., 2010). As tested and discussed in the previous chapters, despite 
the relative poor performance compared to private firms, state owned firms still 
enjoy many advantages ranging from policy lending, tax benefits, to industry 
protection. The critical question for institutional analysis in China thus is “not 
whether the government will remain involved, but, rather, what form the new 
‘regulatory state’ will take” (Pearson, 2005). In our study, we thus aim to push 
beyond measuring the degree to which the institutional framework resembles a 
market economy, and investigate the effects of different aspects of this “regulatory 
state” and the efficiency of its interactions with the business sector. In this we pay 
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particular attention to the role of ownership types. In contrast to Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE), in China state entities continue to hold substantial equity stakes in 
many firms, even if their shares are traded on the stock exchange. There continues 
to be concerns regarding the performance of these partially or fully state-owned 
firms, with some studies finding significant underperformance in terms of TFP 
(Kong, Marks and Wan, 1999). In this study, we view the ownership of firms as 
institutional arrangements due to its unique Chinese nature as well as the way and 
extent to which it affects firm performance (refer to the first two chapters of this 
thesis). 
The varying pace as well as different regional focuses of reforms in China have led 
to considerable variation within China with respect to the actual institutional 
framework at the level of provinces (Bai, Du, Tao and Tong, 2004; Cao, Qian and 
Weinstein, 1999; Fan et al. 2007; Yueh 2010).  For example, the Chinese 
authorities often authorized specific regions to conduct experiments with market 
reforms under special policy and regulations – such as the industrial zone in the 
1990s (Cartier, 2002). Even though the evolving formal institutional framework 
may be fairly similar across China, its implementation varies across provinces, such 
considerable variations could be observed in aspects such as corruption, contract 
enforcement, and intellectual property rights protection (Du et al., 2007). In 
contrast to Russia, China was never a fully centralised country, yet neither has it 
ever been quite decentralised (in terms of New China after 1945). The market 
economy has taken over the planned economy since the 1980s and the short period 
of government centralization in the 1960s/70s left very little impact on the 
country’s economic activities (Hu and Khan, 1997; Chai, 1998; Kambur and Zhang, 
2005). Furthermore, with the combination of loose specification and weak 
implementation of certain policy and regulations, provincial and local authorities in 
China have considerably higher degree of influence over economic activity than, 
for example, local authorities in the UK. This creates ideal conditions to examine 
institutional variations at the province level.  
In conclusion, institutions are generally considered as an important determinant of 
economic growth, with firms’ TFP acting as a key mediating variable. In China, 
institutions have changed over the past two decades, and this change is widely 
considered as a precondition for the spectacular economic growth the country has 
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experienced. However, both institutional change and economic prosperity have 
been unequal across the country. Moreover, China is not converging with the 
Western model of “free” market economy, but is developing its own version of 
capitalism in which government retains an important role. Therefore, we explore in 
the next section how and why specific aspects of the institutional framework that 
are varying across Chinese provinces can be expected to influence firms’ TFP 




3.3 Hypothesis Development 
 
The more effective firms are in this transformation process, the more competitive 
they become, and the better they become in converting scarce inputs into outputs 
thus reducing X-inefficiency and increase firm effectiveness. This productivity is 
sometimes approximated by labour productivity, or the ration of output over labour 
input, but this is a rather crude measure. Therefore, we focus on total factor 
productivity (TFP), a well-established measure that captures the portion of output 
that is not explained by the amount of input used in the production (Comin et al., 
2006). Comin and collaborators (2006) define it as the ratio between real product 
and real factor inputs, and has been found to be an important determinant of 
economic growth, and this argument is supported by many empirical studies (Chen, 
1997; Rodrick 1997). 
As we are interested in the environmental conditions that help firms enhance their 
effectiveness of factor utilization, we follow three lines of argument to develop 
hypotheses. First we explore the impact of different institutions on firm 
effectiveness or TFP (hypothesis 1 and its sub hypotheses), along with specific 
elements of the province-level institutional environment (hypothesis 2 and its sub 
hypotheses). Then we explore the effect of state-ownership on firm effectiveness 
(hypothesis 3), along with arguments on how this ownership effect may vary across 
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institutional environments (hypothesis 4) and for different firm characteristics 
(hypotheses 4a and 4b). Finally, we explore the effects of unemployment at the 
province-level which may take a linear or curvilinear form (hypotheses 5 and 5a).  
Figure 3.1 provides a roadmap illustrating how hypotheses are developed as well as 
how institutions interact with each other and impact on firm effectiveness.
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Figure 3.1. Roadmap of hypotheses development
FIRM EFFECTIVENESS 
TFP 
Ownership as institution: 




H5a. Local unemployment 
H5b. Quadratic term of 
unemployment 
Moderating effects 
H4. Private ownership 




H1. Institutional context 
H1a. Property rights protection 
H1b. Contract enforcement 
 
Specific Institutions 
H2a. Government intervention 
H2b. Government efficiency 
H2c. Law enforcement 
H2d. Financial intermediaries 





As we have argued above, institutions are essential for markets to function 
efficiently and effectively; the higher the quality of institutions the more efficient 
are the markets governed by these institutions. If firms are operating in markets 
that are more efficient, they are able to increase the effectiveness of the resources 
utilization because: first, more efficient markets enable buying factor of 
production to more precise specifications, and at lower costs; second, more 
efficient markets reduce the need to hoard resources as they can be bought if and 
when needed, thus reducing the warehousing and inventory costs; and third, more 
efficient markets reduce the resources to be spend for implementing transactions, 
for example monitoring and enforcing contracts. 
A good example of how higher quality of institutions results in benefits of an 
efficient market is the booming of small to medium sized businesses using 
internet as their exchange platform. Due to government’s decision to further 
decentralize and liberalize (to a certain extent) information on media, information 
asymmetry is reduced and thus provides firms and consumers with better 
knowledge of prices of goods and the ways of obtaining them (Zhao, Cai and 
Zhang, 2005). Fast and efficient supply and production chain also lessen the need 
to store inventories. 
As a consequence of these direct effects, firms can moreover enhance their 
operational flexibility, which further enables them to increase the effectiveness of 
their operations. This argument has received indicative support in cross-national 
studies. For example, Rodrik (1998) shows that institutional quality significantly 
explains variations between countries in East Asia in terms of total factor 
productivity growth, growth of output per worker, and capital accumulation. We 
extend this analysis to suggest that similar effects arise with the more subtle 
variations across provinces within a single country. Hence, we expect that under 
higher quality institutions, resources are to a larger extent used for a firm’s core 
activities rather than peripheral activities, which leads to more effective resource 
utilization:  
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H1: Firm effectiveness will be greater in a context in which institutions are 
stronger. 
Institutional quality, as we have defined it, is a very broad concept encompassing 
a number of different arrangements that enhance the effectiveness of markets. To 
provide less abstract explanations of institutional impact, and to develop specific 
suggestions regarding policy changes that might improve firms effectiveness, we 
need to disentangle the impact of institutions. Hence, we proceed to discuss a 
number of specific aspects of institutions.  
The foremost aspects of institutions discussed in the literature are property rights 
(Barzel 1997; Posner, 2003). A property right is the exclusive authority to 
determine how a resource is used, and whether that resource is owned by 
government or by individuals. All economic goods, including for example 
intellectual property, have property rights attributes, such as the right to use it, the 
right to rent it for use by others, or the right to sell it. Property rights depend on a 
clearly defined title, and mechanisms such as courts to enforce them.  
Clearly defined property rights are the basic preconditions for efficient 
functioning of markets (Coase, 1937), which in turn enhance the allocation of 
goods and services through markets rather than other organizational forms such as 
hierarchy (Williamson, 1985). Clearly defined property rights reduce transaction 
costs such as contract negotiation and enforcement costs, which directly reduce 
resources needed to implement transactions. Moreover, they enable firms to 
enhance their operations by increasing flexibility or making long-term 
commitments in the knowledge that others will respect their rights in an 
investment project. Hence, we predict that:  
H1a: Firm effectiveness will be greater when property rights are defined better. 
A key condition for firms to be able to engage in market transactions that are more 
complex than simple spot market transaction is the ability to draw up contracts, 
and expect that contracting partners actually fulfil the obligations that they have 
agreed upon in the contract. If courts work efficiently and unbiased and legal costs 
are reasonable, then businesses know that they have a fall-back option of taking a 
contract partner to court should the partner default on a contract. Even businesses 
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that do not take their business partners to court benefit from the knowledge that 
such action is feasible at reasonable costs because it reduces the efforts they need 
for designing and writing contracts that are self-enforceable, or in fact they may 
not feel comfortable to sign contracts that without enforcement options would not 
be feasible at all. However, courts are only one example of contract enforcement; 
some business partners agree on arbitrage proceedings under designated 
authorities, some societies have developed informal mechanisms such as peer 
pressure to ensure that members stick to what they have committed to in a 
contract. If on the other hand, legal enforcement is weak, firms rely more on 
relational contracting and less on formal contracts, it however leads to less 
efficient allocation of resources (Zhou and Poppo 2010). 
Effective contract enforcement mechanisms directly reduce some of the costs that 
firms incur when engaging in transactions with others, especially for transactions 
that are complex or have a long-term nature. For example, legal costs or 
monitoring costs are reduced, which means that resources that otherwise are 
dedicated to legal or monitoring tasks can be allocated to a firm’s core activities, 
which enhances the effectiveness of their resource usage. Therefore we suggest: 
H1b: Firm effectiveness will be greater when contracts are more enforceable.  
China is often known for its high level of corruption and is placed at 78 of 179 
countries in the Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International 
Organization Report, 2010). This is hardly surprising considernews report arise in 
2012 with information on the huge sum ($77m) embezzled on the Beijing-
Shanghai high-speed railway project alone (ChinaDaily, March 2012), with no 
clear figure on the direct or indirect damage to the market economy as a whole. 
Chongqing is the fourth direct-controlled municipalities in China and the first city 
to launch a thorough anti-corruption and “dahei” (combat triads) campaign17. In 
the year 2009, “the campaign has put the spotlight on organized crime and how it 
                                               
17 Recently scandal has arisen regarding to the Committee Secretary of Chongqing, Bo Xilai, who 
initiated the anti-corruption campaign as well as a series of pro-growth institutional changes. 
Despite the incidence, the impact of such institutional improvement in terms of reduced corruption 
has remained positive on the performance of local firms. 
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has infested local bureaucracy and businesses through bribery, extortion, 
blackmail and violence” (CNN, 2009). This indicates reduced firm effectiveness 
on aggregated level when the level of government corruption is high. The police 
operation started in June 2009 and led to the arrest of nearly 5,000 gangsters and 
related officials. The campaign has rebuilt public trust and reliance on central 
governance and also promoted healthier, faster growth of the city’s economy. In 
year 2011, Chongqing was the fastest growing city in terms of economic growth 
(11% annual GDP growth) in China (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
2012). 
It is noted that major challenge for many emerging economy firms (and not only 
them) is the extent of corruption, which causes addition costs and uncertainty to 
businesses (Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck and Eden, 2005; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; 
Smarzynska and Wei, 2000). Corruption cause direct costs as resources are re-
directed to appeasing those requesting favours or under-the-table payments, which 
reduces the effectiveness of resource usage in economic terms.  
Such corruption distorts economic activity in many indirect ways. For example, it 
may cause unfairness in competition, causing firms to lose out even when they are 
under an efficient management system and produces in-demand products that are 
reasonably priced. Moreover, firms may redesign their operation strategies in such 
a way that it reduces the exposure to corrupt practices, even though this implies a 
less effective resource usage. The pattern of corruption tend to be highly 
idiosyncratic to each context, and firms that are well embedded within a local 
context may have developed appropriate coping strategies – either paying but 
knowing when and who to pay to get most effective returns, or knowing how to 
bypass requests for corrupt payments. However, such adaptations would come at 
the expense of less effective resource usage:  
H1c: Firm effectiveness will be greater when the level of government corruption 
is lower. 
Neoclassical economics suggests that economies function most effectively if the 
rules of the game are clearly defined, but the state stays out of any direct 
intervention into the economy (Friedman, 1962). If governmental agencies direct 
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interfere in economic activity, they create costs to businesses, such as top 
management time spent dealing with regulatory issues, negotiating with 
government officials, paying higher taxes, or even paying off requests from 
government officials (as discussed under corruption above).  
Moreover, the objectives of the firms may be shifted away from optimizing 
resource usage and profitability to pleasing secondary objectives imposed by 
government intervention, such as provision of services to the local community, or 
securing high levels of employment (i.e. lowering the government’s costs arising 
with unemployment.). This distraction from the core objectives of the firm 
reduces the effectiveness of resource usage in economic terms. Hence:  
H2a: Firm effectiveness will be greater when government agencies interfere less 
in the economy.  
While the degree of government involvement is a distinguishing feature of 
economic systems (Hall and Soskice, 2001), not all economists would agree that 
government intervention necessarily harms the resource allocation, especially 
when the government does its interventions and regulatory activity effectively. 
Thus, Tipton (2009) argues that the appropriate way to classify economies is not 
only by the degree of state intervention but to add a second (almost) orthogonal 
dimension, namely the capability of the state to manage regulation and 
interventions. In a comparative study in South East Asian economies, he points to 
Singapore as an example of an economy that performed well because state 
interventions were managed by a competent administration, whereas other 
countries in the region suffer from less well qualified state bureaucracies 
intervening in the economy. Similar, he points to differences between Northern 
and Southern continental Europe that may be explained by this state capability 
rather than the extent of state intervention.  
China has chosen a path of institutional development that has been called ‘state-
led capitalism’ (Fligstein and Zhang, 2011; Lin, 2011), where government entities 
at multiple levels play an active role in supporting or discouraging different type 
of economic activity. The model of Singapore has influenced policy makers in 
China as they advanced their reform agenda. The effectiveness of this approach, 
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however, depends on the effectiveness of the government entities to such an active 
role (Tipton, 2009). Hence, in the Chinese context it is particularly important to 
test for the effectiveness (rather than just the extend) of governmental activities as 
a key aspect of the institutional framework:  
H2b:Firm effectiveness will be greater when governments are more effective in 
their regulatory activities. 
A critical aspect of the institutional framework for business is the legal system 
which encompasses both the legal code and the procedures of its enforcement 
(Armour, Deakin, Sarkar, Siems and Singh, 2009, Zweigert and Kötz, 1999). 
Clearly defined legal codes and their enforcement are important for both 
businesses obeying of the law of the country, and for the settlement of disputes 
between businesses. When legal codes are unclear, businesses may incur 
additional legal costs for example for obtaining advice on how to interpret new 
regulations, or for settling penalties imposed because they unwittingly broke the 
law.  
Legal codes however are not enough; businesses have to have confidence in the 
law enforcement, which is the degree to which firms have confidence that their 
legal and property rights will be protected. The effectiveness of law enforcement 
has been identified as a critical aspect of the business environment: For example, 
Bevan, Estrin and Meyer (2004) found that legal effectiveness (or law 
enforcement) has a detrimental effect on the attraction of foreign investment in 
Central and Eastern Europe, whereas the existence of appropriate laws as such had 
not effect. The lack of effective law enforcement directly raises transaction costs, 
and indirectly forces firms to adapt their strategies such to avoid activities or 
contract forms that depend on legal activity. Both the direct and the indirect effect 
reduce the effectiveness of resource allocation, such that we suggest  
H2c: Firm effectiveness will be greater when the law enforcement system is 
more effective. 
A pivotal aspect of the institutional framework is the presence of market 
intermediaries (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Peng, 2003). They are particularly 
important in markets characterized by high asymmetry of information or by the 
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need to aggregate or rebundle products and services, such as financial markets. 
However, access to financial markets is essential for virtually all businesses as 
they need to finance their operations. Where firms lack access to finance, in 
particular bank loans, this can inhibit their operations and their growth. 
In emerging economies this access to finance is often difficult for small firms 
because banks prefer to lend to large firms that a) represent lower risk, b) benefit 
from implicit government guarantees. Moreover, banks may lack the skills 
required to assess credit worthiness of small businesses. These biases can become 
a major obstacle to investment and growth in private firms (Johnson et al., 2002; 
Li et al., 2007). As results show in the previous chapters, in China, private firms 
are often deprived of outside financing as most bank loans are allocated to state-
owned firms, despite their often lower performance level in comparison to private 
firms. In addition, a large proportion of firms (regardless of ownership type) in 
China still operate in a traditional way and use retained earnings as sources of new 
investment and thus engage less with capital markets. However, these practices 
vary across Chinese provinces.  
The consequence of reduced access to financial markets is that firms cannot 
optimize their resource portfolio, and may have to operate at sub-optimal 
combinations of resources. This reduces the effectiveness of their resource usage, 
and thus we hypothesize:  
H2d: Firm effectiveness will be greater when financial intermediaries are more 
effective. 
The effectiveness of the banking system can be undermined if banks themselves 
are subject to corrupt practices. We have discussed above the detrimental effects 
of government corruption on the efficiency of markets, and hence on the 
effectiveness of resource utilization. If corruption affects the banking sector in 
form of side-payments to be paid by firms to bank managers in charge of their 
loan application, this not only generates an additional cost to firms applying for a 
bank loan, but also undermines the effectiveness of the allocation of loans and 
can, potentially, undermine the risk profile of banks themselves (notably if loans 
are given to projects that do not generate sufficient returns to repay the loan). Both 
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the increased transaction cost for firms, and the additional risks in the financial 
sector itself, reduce firm effectiveness:  
H2e: Firm effectiveness is greater when the level of corruption in the financial 
sector lower. 
To sum up, our core argument regarding institutions is that increases in the quality 
of institutions enhance the effectiveness of markets, and therefore enable firms to 
increase their effectiveness. We proposed a general hypothesis (H1), to be tested 
on an aggregate index of institutional quality, and three sub-hypotheses that state 
corresponding relationships for different aspects of the institutional framework 
(H1a to H1c). We also developed H2a to H2e in order to shed more light on the 
impact of specific elements of institutions on firm effectiveness. 
 
3.3.2 Ownership type as institution 
A key institution affecting firms is their own ownership structure, and in 
consequence their governance structure and the degree to which stakeholders such 
as government authorities can influence the strategies and operations of a firm 
(Boisot and Child, 1996; Chen 2007; Dollar and Wei, 2007; Nee, Opper and 
Wong, 2007; Xu and Wang, 1999). In particular, private firms face more powerful 
incentives to engage in profit maximization strategies, and thus to prioritize 
economic performance (Djankov and Murrel 2002; Estrin, Hanousek, Kocenda 
and Svejnar, 2008; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silvanes and Shleifer, 1999; World Bank 
1996). State-owned firms, on the other hand, are likely to be inhibited by political 
objectives interfering with economic objectives – for example securing high 
employment levels, and they are likely to have more complex and less transparent 
governance structures. These dual objectives and potentially less effective 
mechanisms of corporate governance inhibit the ability of state-owned firms to 
enhance their productivity. Moreover, state-owned firms tend to have better 
access to capital in form of loans from state-controlled banks or (implicit) 
government guarantees (see results from chapter one), which reduces the 
pressures to increase capital productivity (Li, Yue and Zhao, 2009).  
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There is ample evidence that state-owned firms underperform relative to private 
firms. For example, Kong Marks and Wan (1999) found that after ten years of 
reform, Chinese SOEs still performed unsatisfactorily in terms of TFP. They also 
conducted a test on the impact of technological innovation and efficiency on TFP 
level in SOEs and found very little evidence indicating a positive, if any, 
relationship. Hallward-Driemeier and collaborators (2005) included in their study 
of determinants of TFP in China an ownership variable and found it to be 
significant, suggesting the state-owned firms are less effective in their resource 
usage. 
We propose:  
H3: Firm effectiveness will be greater when firms are privately owned. 
The advantages of private firms over state firms, however, vary across contexts 
and with the firm’s own characteristics. Specifically, the effect of institutional 
development on firm performance is likely to vary as firms to different degrees 
experience misfit between the changing institutional environment and their own 
business strategies and structures. In particular, firms to varying degrees recognize 
business opportunities arising from institutional change, take risks, and reorganize 
themselves to take advantage of such opportunities.  
Some institutional environments may be more conducive to the operations of 
state-firms, while others are more conducive to the growth of private firms. 
Following up on our earlier arguments, we suggest that the quality of institutions, 
which we have defined in terms of their support for market mechanisms, is of 
particular importance to private firms. Private firms seek to optimize their 
economic performance in pursuing their owners’ interests, and they rely on 
efficient markets in this pursuit. On the other hand, state-owned firms tend to have 
a close association with numerous governmental authorities, and hence are more 
effective at dealing with non-market interfaces. They are better adjusted to 
interact with government authorities and network-based markets, which implies 
that they are less well positioned to enhance their performance in response to 
market incentives. 
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Moreover, state-owned firms in general operate under a preferential system that 
facilitate access to resources such as outside financing through state banks, yet at 
the same time they are often overstaffed due to over-hiring to reduce local 
unemployment rate per government’s request. As a result, state-owned firms tend 
to be less efficient and profitable compared to most privately owned firms. Some 
aspects of institutional change may, at least in the short run, have a negative effect 
on the productivity of state-owned firms because of a crowding out effect: they 
are slower to react to new opportunities and thus lose market share but cannot 
downsize their operations accordingly. On the other hand, government 
interference often comes with implicit guarantees, preferential supply of cheap 
materials, and easier access to key customers in the state sector. This, potentially, 
results in lower pressures to increase economic efficiency and effectiveness than 
the same institutional framework would create for private firms.   
Finally, state-owned firms often operate in a near monopolistic markets, for 
examples utilities, or have secure demand for their manufactured goods due to 
support from government. As a result they may be less capable to respond 
strategically to sudden increase of competition once the level of government 
interference drops, which explains the short run negative impact on their 
productivity should the government interferes less. All these arguments suggest 
that the impact of enhancing quality of institutions is stronger for private firms 
than for state-owned firms:  
H4: The effect of stronger institutional context on firm effectiveness is stronger 
for private firms.  
The ownership effect is also likely to vary with the organizations’ own 
characteristics. Organizations develop internal practices and routines that optimize 
their operations under the conditions of their external environment. Organization 
scholars thus speak of the fit between strategy and environment. These internal 
practices and routines over time become “institutionalized” as they become part of 
the fabric of the organization that helps to perform under given circumstances, but 
also become a source of inertia (Leonhard-Barton 1992).  
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During the period of central control, companies have evolved organizational 
structures that fitted the institutional environment at the time, which is they were 
subservient to the organs of the state and the Party. As economic reform 
progressed, firms had to change their organizational structure to cope with the 
new realities of a competitive market economy. This process is however subject to 
considerable inertial tendencies (Newman, 2000), because firms have to develop 
new sets of capabilities and transform their inherited ones (Uhlenbruck, Meyer 
and Hitt, 2003; Dixon, Meyer and Day, 2010). Therefore we suggest that 
companies that have been established for long carry more of a burden of 
inheritance than new firms that have been able to establish from dynamic 
organizational structures to form the outset. 
State-owned firms have in particular evolved organizational routines that “fit” not 
only the emergent market economy but the firm-government relationship. These 
routines are likely to emphasize economic efficiency to a lesser degree as they 
also have to accommodate possible political objectives of the organization, such 
as retention of higher levels of employment. Moreover, state owned firms likely 
have less flexible governance structure as private firms, leading to stronger 
inertial effects. Thus, while we expect that all firms potentially suffer from inertia, 
we expect this effect to be stronger for state owned firms.  
The older a firm is, the more it carries inherited routines from earlier economic 
regimes, and those routines have become ‘institutionalized’ within the 
organization (Nelson and Winter, 1982). However, the more routines are 
institutionalized, the more likely the firm’s adaptability to the volatilities of a 
market economy is inhibited by organizational rigidities. Hence, we propose:  
H4a: The effect of stronger institutional context on firm effectiveness is 
stronger for younger firms, more so for private firms.  
One of the most important means for firms to increase their effectiveness is to 
exploit economies of scale. Hence, larger firms generally are better able to exploit 
the factors of production at their disposal.  
However, the exploitation of scale economies requires effective management and 
focus on economic objectives rather than secondary objectives such as protection 
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of the workforce. In particular, private firms are able to implement cost saving 
measures such as reducing slack, laying off people, and performance-oriented pay 
more effectively than state-owned enterprises. Hence we suggest that:  
H4b: The effect of stronger institutional context on firm effectiveness is 
stronger for firms that are large in size, more so for private firms.  
 
3.3.3 Labour Markets 
Unemployment is a major social and economic challenge for policy makers 
(Blinder, 1988). Unemployment in China is dangerous and considered unhealthy 
even if the level is above a small percentage, as the base number is larger than 
those of most countries. one of the ways government can address (at least in the 
short term) the challenges of unemployment is to create informal pressures or 
financial incentives for firms to take on additional employees (Yin, 2001; Dong 
and Putterman, 2003) and such practice is not uncommon within the Chinese 
context in order to pump up the official employment figure. Such pressure is 
unlikely to be effective for private firms, but state-owned firms are likely to react 
to such pressures by aligning their strategies with the (local) government’s policy 
agenda. The wages for this type of imposed labour are usually low and thus very 
affordable for state-owned firms which enjoy quite loose budget constraint. They 
thus are likely to take on additional employees that do not add much to their 
productivity, and take advantages of the benefits (usually economically beneficial 
to individuals in higher management) and other conveniences in business 
perspective returned by the government. Hence: 
H5a: Higher unemployment in a province is associated with lower firm 
effectiveness.  
The ability to take on additional employees is however limited even for state-
owned forms as they have to deliver profits too. Therefore we expect a saturation 
effect and thus a curvilinear relationship between unemployment and TFP. 
Therefore we propose: 
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H5b: The relationship between unemployment and firm effectiveness is 






To our knowledge, our study is one of the first attempting to measure effect of 
institutions on firm performance – measured by TFP – in China. Although 
Hallward-Driemeier et al. (2006) did a similar study on 5 cities in China, our 
research covers a wider geographical area (all of 31 provinces and over 120 cities) 




We have obtained a panel dataset from GTA, a global provider of China financial 
markets data as well as industry and economic data. This is the same set of data 
we have utilized in testing for the relationship between capital structure and 
investment in Chinese firms in chapter two. As it is hard to get disaggregated 
unpublished data from the National Bureau of Statistics in China, we have chosen 
data provided by GTA as it is one of the few reliable large commercial data 
service companies in China. 
The GTA panel dataset includes information on all firms listed in the Chinese 
stock exchanges, namely the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange.18 The dataset thus provides information on over 1,000 Chinese listed 
firms. The variables cover the firms’ financial data as well as other information 
such as the location of firm, year of establishment, shareholder information etc. 
                                               
18thusexcluding Chinese firms that are exclusively listed in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange or any 
other foreign exchange such as the NYSE. 
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for the period of year 1990 to year 2008. Chinese financial markets are still 
relatively young due to the late start of westernized marketization of economy; its 
stock markets have only started to develop at the beginning of the 1990’s. As a 
result, the data set adopted in this paper is an unbalanced panel dataset with only a 
handful of firms registering in the stock market at the start of the 19 year span. We 
choose to use the unbalanced panel data because when we tried to balance the data 
we lose too many observations, thus the change in performance of many firms 
throughout the years are overlooked. Additionally, regression results using 
balanced panel data are not massively different from testing the sample as a 
whole. 
However this dataset does have its limitations as there are a number of calculative 
errors. We have corrected the detectable mistakes to our best knowledge but there 
might still be slight inaccuracy caused by undetectable data errors. 
 
3.4.2 Institutional measures 
We employ a number of indices to measure the quality of institutions at the level 
of Chinese provinces, an aggregate index available over time, and two sets of 
survey-based indices that are available for a particular point in time. We measure 
the strength of institutions (Hypothesis 1) by the ‘marketization index’ developed 
and published by the National Economic Research Institute (NERI) (Fan et al, 
2007). The index, henceforth called NERI, is an assessment system for relative 
progress in marketization for China’s provinces using a comparative method (Fan 
et al., 2007; Wang et al., 2007). Marketization is assessed in five fields by a total 
of 23 basic indicators and the index is available for years from 1997 to 2005. The 
five fields of which data the index is constructed based upon are government and 
market relations, development of the non-state enterprise sector, development of 
the commodity market, development of factor market, and market intermediaries 
and the legal environment for the market. 
The marketization index has been extensively used in prior scholarly research. Li, 
Yue and Zhao’s (2009) studies firms’ capital structure and research by (C. Lin, 
Lin, & Zou, 2012) examines the effect of property rights security on corporate risk 
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management decisions. Nee and Opper (2010) show that political capital is more 
relevant to firms in areas where governments are more interventionist. (G. Chen, 
Firth, Gao, & Rui, 2006) examines whether ownership structure and boardroom 
characteristics have an effect on corporate financial fraud in China.  
Although the NERI index is constructed to measure the level of marketization in 
different regions (provinces) in China, the index itself is actually a measure of 
regional institutional policy/quality for local market and hence indicating the level 
of marketization, therefore here we adopt it as a measure of institutions.  
There are five components contributing to the final construction of the NERI 
index. Each of the indicators was normalised into a basic index with a zero-10 
relative score system at the base year. The best and worst performing province 
then receive scores of 1- and zero, respectively, in each indicator.  
Government and Market Relations: the paper measures the level of resource 
allocation by governments and the market by looking at the share of government 
budgetary expenses in GDP.19 
Development of the Non-State Enterprise Sector: the non-state enterprise sector 
consists of private/foreign-funded/share-holding companies as well as 
collectively-owned enterprises.20 
Development of the Commodity Market: the NERI index uses enterprise survey 
data to measure the level of reduction in local trade protection.  
Development of the Factor Market: data from a few sectors was measured to 
construct this sub index: i) Labour market development21 ii) Financial market iii) 
Development in technology market. 
                                               
19Although such measures are not accurately related to marketisation – especially after the 
transition period the share of government budgetary expenses will tend to stabilize – but for now, 
it is nevertheless still a good indicator for market oriented institutional reforms based on previous 
trend. 
20 In our paper, specifically in data regression, the sub-category of collectively owned firms are 
grouped under state ownership rather than non-state ownership as traditionally they are under state 
guidance and control. As a result, there could be slight inaccuracy in reported results relevant to 
this institutional measure. 
21 Data from this sector shows that there is an increase in labour mobility and reduction in 
institutional barriers in the labour market. This result could be understated due to incomplete data. 
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Market Intermediaries and the Legal Environment for the Market: The share of 
independent accountants and lawyers in the total population reflects current 
market development and was taken into consideration while measuring this 
indicator.22 
We employ two different sources to obtain more differentiated indicators of 
institutional development to test respectively Hypotheses H1a to H1d and H2a to 
H2e. The first set has been developed by Du et al. (2007) for a study of FDI 
location choice, and covers intellectual property rights protection, contract 
enforcement and government corruption. These institutional measures were 
designed to measure the impact of institutions on FDI location choice using 
evidence from US multinationals in China.  
The first of these indices measures property right protection (Hypothesis 1a) by 
measuring the logarithm of the number of approved patents per capita (available 
in China statistical Yearbook, various issues) for, the year 1992 to 2000. Although 
patents approved per capita is generally treated as a measure of technology and 
the number of patents could be an outcome of technology as well as human capital 
endowment and other factors in various regions, property rights protection 
provided by regional government no doubt plays an important role.  
From the “Survey of China’s Private Enterprises”, the indictor of government 
corruption (Hypothesis 1b) is constructed by measuring the proportion of private 
enterprises answering “yes” to the question “is it necessary to have stricter 
policies against government corruption in your region?”. As a result, this is a 
highly subjective survey-based index on entrepreneurs’ perception of the severity 
of corruption. 
Contract enforcement (Hypothesis 1c) hinges on legal institutions and law 
enforcement. From the “Survey of Private Enterprises”, the variable contract 
enforcement was constructed by measuring the proportion of private entrepreneurs 
                                               
22 The number of consultants, chambers of commerce, and other professionals was not available. 
The legal environment is measured by using data on 4000 company leaders’ judgement collected 
from enterprises surveys and the protection of intellectual property rights was measured by using 
the only available information of patent applications and grants per technical personnel. 
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answering affirmatively to the question “will you use courts to resolve business 
disputes?”. 
A number of Institutional Measures developed by the World Bank are adopted to 
test hypotheses 2a to 2e. The World Bank (2006) reports the competitiveness 
enhancements for 120 cities in China. The paper shows that city-level investment 
climate varies widely across regions by examining the data from a survey of 120 
cities (and 12,400 firms) in China. Apart from regional level data on city 
environment, policies etc, 200 firms were selected from each of the four mega-
cities  (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing) and 100 firms from the each of the 
rest of the cities to participate in the survey (Tibet region was not included in this 
survey). Of these, 8% are registered as majority state-owned, 28% as foreign-
invested, and 64% as domestic non-state. 
The 120 cities account for 70-80% of the total GDP and can represent China well 
on most of the institutional measures included in the documentation. The data was 
collected on a city level and then was divided into 5 regions in the World Bank 
report. In this chapter we examine the impact of institutional measures on a 
provincial level, therefore we have divided the 120 cities into 30 groups, each 
group with cities from the same province (Tibet not included so 30 provinces 
instead of 31). The average value of the data from each city within the same 
province was taken as the measure for this province. The data was only available 
for one single year, therefore here we use it as a cross-sectional measure without 
any time variance. 
 
3.4.3 Explanatory Variables 
The ownership in the data set is categorised into three ownership dummies, state-
owned, private-owned, as well as foreign-owned (inclusive of firms with owners 
from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan).  Due to the small number in foreign 
ownership, we grouped foreign and privately-owned firms together, and compared 
them to state-owned firms. We also adopted the following variables from the 
report. 
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Entertainment costs: measured by the proportion of output used on business 
entertainment. It measures the level of government interference together with 
Bureaucratic Intervention variable. The data report states that such costs are 
higher where local government provides poorer service or where the tax burden is 
higher. Cai, Fung and Xu (2005) find that higher entertainment and travel 
expenditure tend to be associated with poorer firm performance due to extra 
financial burden and that the quality of such costs is correlated with corporate 
governance. 
Bureaucratic interaction: measures the hours spent dealing with government 
officials and is one of the two variables testing for government interference. Out 
of all regions, state owned firms face the highest demands for bureaucratic 
interaction. 
Days to clear import/export: measured by the number of days required for 
import/export clearance and is an indicator of government effectiveness in 
regulatory activities. 
Confidence in court/law enforcement: the survey asks about the likelihood that the 
responding firms’ property and contract rights would be protected and enforced. 
And the variable confidence in law enforcement is measured by taking the 
average of these answers in the same province. This measures how effective is the 
law enforcement system in the economy. 
Private SMEs with bank loans: measured by the share of private SMEs with bank 
loans in all private SMEs and proxies for the effectiveness of financial 
intermediaries. 
Expected informal payment for loans: measured by the percentage of firms 
responding affirmatively to the question “is there a need for informal payments to 
bank staff in order to obtain loans”. Among all surveyed firms, about 5-10% 
answered “yes”. This variable is utilized to test for the level of corruption in the 
financial industry. 
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Unemployment: measured by the share of unemployed individuals in the 
workforce. This variable was entered in the analysis both in a linear and in a 
quadratic form, in order to test for the labour market effect on firms’ TFP. 
 
3.4.4 Moderating Variables 
Two variables enter the analysis as moderating variables to examine under which 
conditions the difference between state and private ownership matters more 
(Hypotheses 4a and 4b). First, firm age has been calculated by subtracting the 
firms’ years of establishment from the current year. It measures how long the firm 
has been established rather than how long it has been listed. Second, we measure 
size by the number of employees in the firm. There could be certain bias in using 
number of employees as size control as state-owned firms in China are often over-
staffed. We chose not to use assets as a proxy as it is often correlated with other 
explanatory variables; moreover, state-owned firms normally have higher level of 
assets. 
 
3.4.5 Control Variables 
We also employ a number of control variables. First we have Size of Local 
Market which is the log of city population is used here as a measure for size 
instead of the level of city population due to the log distribution of data points. 
Then we use Level of Local Income, which is the annual average wage of the 
province of which the firm is located, as a control variable. Rodrik (1998) found 
that institutional quality increases with income and education and decreases with 
ethno-linguistic fragmentation, which indicates the importance of including 
average of city wage etc as control variable in the econometric analysis. We also 
introduce Industry, a dummy variable to control for different features in various 
industries. There are over 100 different industry categories in the dataset. A 
dummy variable is generated for each category then further grouped into more 
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aggregated industry dummies. The final industry dummies23 used in the 
regressions are namely primary industry (includes agriculture, fishing, forestry, 
mining etc), light industry (includes food and beverage production, light 
manufacturing, processing etc) , heavy industry (includes energy and utility, 
machinery and equipment manufacturing etc) , and service industry (includes rail 
and air transportation support service, computer and telecommunication, 
hospitality etc). The two control variables adopted in the regression analysis are 
Log of City Population and Average Annual Wage, which measures the local 




Our dependent variable is total factor productivity (TFP), which is the portion of 
output not explained by the amount of inputs used in production (Comin, 2006; 
Mahadevan 2004). The level of TFP is therefore determined by how efficiently 
and intensely the inputs are utilized in production. 
There are several established methods in the past literature used for estimation of 
productivity of firms, notably the Olley and Pakes method (1996), Levinsohn and 
Petrin method (2004), and the Cobb-Douglas production function. We have 
neglected the first two methods as they both assume investment to be constantly 
positive. The widely used Cobb-Douglas production function is frequently 
estimated in percentage changes, with the growth in output regressed directly on 
the percentage growth in labor and capital and with the rate of growth of TFP 
obtained from the intercept term (Martin and Mitra, 2001). This specification is 
undesirable given our interest in the long-run structural relationship between TFP 
and other variables rather than the response of output to changes in inputs. Thus, 
we preferred to write the Cobb-Douglas production function for manufacturing as 
a log-linear function in the levels as follows. We start by estimating the TFP for 
                                               
23 The industry codes are of China’s own practice according to the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China. 
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each firm as a residual in a value-added production function, where the value 
added is: 
 
Log[Yit – Mit] = Log(VA)it 
Log[Yit – Mit] = β1Log(K)it + β2Log(L)it + ℓit 
Log(VA)it = β1Log(K)it + β2Log(L)it + ℓit 
TFPit = Log(VA)it – 𝜷�1Log(K)it – 𝜷�2Log(L)it 
 
𝜷�1 and 𝜷�2 are the estimated factor elasticities. By conducting econometric 
regressions using available panel data on above mentioned variables, the value of 
α and β can be easily obtained and thus TFP can then be calculated based on the 
function. 
Results of TFP specification show that in China, labour was only explaining 20% 
of the changes in dependent variable,  as opposed to the standard level for 
transition economies of about 60%, which means that the curve is not  taken out 
of the lnVA and the linearity is nottaken out of the residual/error term.24 Such 
result also indicates the low wages in China in contrast to high level of capital 
investment. 
Hypotheses H4a and H4c are stipulating differences of effect size between state-
owned and private firms, and thus require an additional test. According to 
Paternoster et al (1998), the test statistic is  
                                               
24 Therefore we also attempted to construct TFP with translog approach. The translog production 
function is a generalization of the Cobb–Douglas production function. The name translog stands 
for 'transcendental logarithmic'. 
The three factor translog production function is: 
Ln(q) = ln(A) + αLln(L) + αKln(K) + αMln(M) + βLLln(L)ln(L) + βKKln(K)ln(K) + βMMln(M)ln(M) 
+ βLKln(L)ln(K) + βLMln(L)ln(M) + βKMln(K)ln(M) = ƒ(L, K, M) 
 
And lnVA can be written in a function as follows: 
lnVA = αo + α1lnL + α2lnK + α3(lnL)2 + α4(lnK)2 + α5(lnLlnK) + e 
where L = labor, K = capital, M = materials and supplies, and q = product, VA = value added. 
However, regressing TFP values estimated using this approach returned worse-off results in 
comparison to the TFP estimated using the standard Cobb-Douglas approach, and therefore we 
adopt the former TFP, albeit limitations. 
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z = (βSOE – βPE ) / √( SEβSOE2 – SEβPE2)  
where according to βSOE and βPE are the coefficient estimates for the pertinent 
variable in the regression on the subsamples of respectively SOE and PE, and 
SEβSOE and SEβPEare the respective standard errors).   
The data are then regressed in whole using GLS method with random effects in 
order to examine the impact of independent variables on TFP in all firms. The 
sample is then split into subsamples according to firms’ ownership type to further 
investigate how variables affected TFP differently in state owned and privately 
owned firms. Table 3.1 shows the explanatory variables estimated for each 
hypothesis test and the predicted sign of variable coefficients. 
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Table 3.1: Hypothetic predictions 
  Variable being  Predictive sign 
  tested   of coefficient 
      
H1  NERI index   + 
H1a  Property rights   + 
H1b  Contract enforcement  + 
H1c  Corruption   - 
      
H2a  Entertainment costs  - 
  Bureaucratic interaction  - 
H2b  Days to clear import/export  - 
H2c  Confidence in court  + 
H2d  Private SMEs with  + 
  bank loans    
H2e  Expected informal payment  - 
  for loan    
      
H3  Private_foreign ownership  + 
      
H4a  Age   - 
H4b  Number of employees  + 
      
H5a  Local unemployment  - 
H5b  Squared term of local  + 
  unemployment   for U-shaped 
upward curve 
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3.5 Results and Discussion 
 
We utilize firm level data from over 1,000 listed companies in China together with 
data on regional institutions to test for the impact of institutions on firms’ TFP, 
which measures firms’ effectiveness in utilizing allocated resources. We regress the 
variables on the data sample as a whole to test for effect of general and specific 
institutions on effectiveness of all firms, before moving onto testing institutional 
impact on firms with different ownership by splitting the sample into two sub-
samples covering state owned firms and non-state owned firms (privately and 
foreign owned). 
Overall, our empirical analysis supports the widely held view that market 
supporting institutions are important for firm performance, here proxied by 
effectiveness measured as TFP. The results can be found in Table 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4. 
The support for our main hypothesis H1 may not be that surprising in light of the 
literature. The NERI variable is positive and significant at 10% significance level. 
However, we find important support for some of the key underpinning arguments in 
institutional theory.  
In testing hypothesis H1a to H1c we add a set of four measures of institutions that 
has been proposed by Du et al. (2008). Out of the four institutional measures, we 
found Government Intervention in Business Operations highly correlated with a 
few other explanatory variables. On the other hand, government intervention can be 
explained by two other variables, Entertainment Costs and Bureaucratic 
Intervention. Therefore we drop this variable in testing the hypotheses also aiming 
to get stronger results from the other three explanatory variables developed by the 
same study. They are regressed as a group and these variables allow us to 
simultaneously test for hypotheses H1a to H1c.  
The results clearly indicate the pivotal role of property rights (H1a) which is 
positive at 5% significance level, in contrast, we did not find support for either 
government corruption (H1b) or contract enforcement (H1c) after controlling for 
the effects of property rights.  
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This is surprising as China’s development did not come without a rampant 
corruption over the past three decades. State control and extensive intervention, 
lack of democracy and freedom of media, together with weak rule of law and 
enforcement all lead to severe corruption problems in modern China. However the 
regression results do not suggest significant impact of corruption on firms’ TFP 
level. The other variable Contract Enforcement is not significant either in the full 
sample. This result is interesting in view that according to the World Bank –IFC 
study on “Doing Business” China ranks 79th for the ease of doing business – an 
average score across many indices – but ranks 15th on the item on contract 
enforcement. In other words, while businesses report considerable problems to 
doing business in China, contract enforcement does not seem to be one of them. 
Our results however indicate that the variation on this issue still is of concern, and 
perhaps the World Bank study covered primarily areas that have opened up to 
foreign investment, and in other areas of China issues of enforcement of contracts 
and property rights is still a major issue.  
However, it is understood that in China, contracts are often not enforced by legally 
binding terms but rather by the informal social structure and norms. As such norms 
or the Chinese culture of guanxi (relationship) makes up a big part of institutional 
environment in which the firms operate, it can be problematic for firms with little 
of insufficient local knowledge and hence making the market more opaque in 
nature as well as reducing the attractiveness of local market. 
The significant and positive effect of Property Rights Protection in the aggregate 
model suggests that property rights take a central role in theorizing in economics. In 
contrast, recent work on institutional theory literature in the management literature 
(e.g. Kostova et al., 2008) has paid only scant attention to property rights. This 
suggests that, perhaps, management scholars may want to incorporate work on the 
economics of property rights, and the various aspects of their definitions and 
enforcement, in their theories. Until fairly recently, China maintained the level of 
private properties by implementing various regulations and rules due to a lack of 
formal property rights protection. Therefore the measure of property rights 
protection in this chapter intensely reflects the de facto property rights protection 
across all the regions. 
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Table 3.2. Regression results on hypothesis H1, H1a, H1b, H1c, H2a, H2b, H2c, H2d and H2e
      H1 H1a,b,c H2a H2b H2c H2d,e 
         
         
         
         NERI 
  
0.01803* 
     
   
(1.93) 
     PropertyRightsProtection 
 
0.14491** 
    
    
(2.15) 
    GovernmentCurruption 
 
0.00239 
    
    
(0.01) 
    ContractEnforcement 
 
-0.14073 
    
    
(-0.31) 
    EntertainmentCosts 
   
-0.27203*** 
   
     
(-3.57) 
   BureaucraticInteraction 
  
0.00268 
   
     
(1.44) 
   DaysToClearImport/Export 
   
-0.02245*** 
  
      
(-3.22) 
  FinancialIntermediaries 
     
0.00252 
        
(1.38) 
FinancialCorruption 
     
-0.00087 
        
(-0.09) 
ConfidenceInCourt 
     
0.00649*** 
 




-0.07691 0.06211 0.08571** 0.07715* 0.07421* 0.08406** 
   
(-1.40) (1.42) (2.07) (1.87) (1.79) (2.03) 
Age 
  
-0.05806*** -0.06064*** -0.05831*** -0.05973*** -0.05814*** -0.05753*** 
   
(-7.69) (-9.80) (-9.94) (-10.18) (-9.90) (-9.65) 
NumberOfEmployees 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 
   
(5.45) (12.71) (12.88) (13.12) (13.05) (12.86) 
         Number of Observations 7151 11062 11845 11845 11845 11845 
         Wald chi2 
 
131.91 382.56 409.28 406.74 405.01 396.42 
         R2 (overall)   0.0559 0.0786 0.0788 0.0787 0.0782 0.0738 
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Table 3.3. Regression results on hypothesis H3, H4a and H4b 
 
      Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
   
state private state private state private state private state private state private 
               NERI 
  
0.01827* 0.02088 
          
   
(1.70) (1.07) 
          PropertyRightsProtection 
  
0.15492* 0.19404* 
        
     
(1.81) (1.72) 
        GovernmentCurruption 
  
-0.13729 0.21702 
        
     
(-0.46) (0.54) 
        ContractEnforcement 
  
-0.21872 0.34542 
        
     
(-0.39) (0.43) 
        EntertainmentCosts 
     
-0.2803*** -0.2700** 
      
       
(-2.73) (-2.28) 
      BureaucraticInteraction 
    
0.00125 0.00255 
      
       
(0.55) (0.76) 
      DaysToClearImportExport 
      
-0.0249*** -0.02713** 
   
         
(-2.83) (-2.24) 
    FinancialIntermediaries 
        
0.00142 0.00460* 
  
           
(0.58) (1.67) 
  FinancialCorruption 
        
-0.00169 -0.00804 
  
           
(-0.14) (-0.48) 
  ConfidenceInCourt 
           
0.00673** 0.00877** 




-0.063*** -0.040*** -0.0702*** -0.046*** -0.0673*** -0.0459*** -0.0687*** -0.0466*** -0.0652*** -0.0449*** -0.0671*** -0.0444*** 
   
(-6.74) (-3.07) (-8.00) (-5.08) (-8.04) (-5.42) (-8.19) (-5.56) (-7.72) (-5.22) (-8.04) (-5.23) 
NumberOfEmployees 0.00001*** 3.73E-06 0.00001*** 0.00003*** 0.00001*** 0.00003*** 0.00001*** 0.00003*** 0.00001*** 0.00003*** 0.00001*** 0.00003*** 
   
(5.30) (0.36) (11.06) (4.30) (11.23) (4.20) (11.42) (4.22) (11.23) (4.23) (11.33) (4.27) 
               Number of Observations 5432 1695 8046 2968 8554 3243 8554 3243 8554 3243 8554 3243 
               Wald chi2 
 
112.19 17.80 303.26 59.33 314.51 68.70 315.44 68.59 305.93 66.24 312.42 69.82 
               R2 (overall)   0.0643 0.0237 0.0962 0.0400 0.0956 0.0447 0.0956 0.0445 0.0920 0.0417 0.0942 0.0472 
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Table 3.4. Regression results for hypothesis H5a and H5b 
 
        H5a   H5b 
       










   
0.04962* 
      
(1.82) 
Age 


























       Number of Observations   11845 
 
11845 










We here made a distinction of between property rights and private ownership, 
which is a unique practice, as in the view of most literatures they are synonymous, 
but they may not be so in China. Our results confirm that there are indeed 
differences between these two measures.  
In table 3.2, when we include both property rights and a private ownership 
dummy in the specification, only the property rights variable has a significant 
coefficient. Once this variable is dropped from the specification and other 
measures of institutional quality are added, the coefficient of the private 
ownership dummy becomes significant. In Table 3.3, the coefficient of the 
property rights variable is significant for the private firms. In other words, it is the 
property rights aspect of private ownership that matters more than other aspects of 
private ownership that are captured by the dummy. Property rights aspect also 
shows higher impact on privately owned firms compared to state owned firms. 
The employment factor could also contribute to this difference as the quality of 
employment in the private sector is higher than in the state sector due to the 
common problem such as overstaffing and policy employment in the state owned 
firms. 
In testing H2a to H2e we adopt institutional measures developed by the World 
Bank (2006). Data from a survey of 120 cities (and 12,400 firms) in China was 
examined. As we aim to examine provincial level impact of institutions, we 
further group the 120 cities into 30 provinces and take the average value as the 
provincial institutional measure. As Tibet was not included in the survey, we only 
generate institutional measures for 30 provinces instead of 31 and hence some 
missing values are present in the dataset. On another note, most of the selected 
firms in the survey are non-state owned (only 8% registered as majority state-
owned), which does not coincide with base data (66.25%), hence the regressions 
are likely to generate weaker results.  
Moving on to hypothesis 2a, which is tested by explanatory variables 
Entertainment Costs and Bureaucratic Interaction. Entertainment costs variable is 
measured by the proportion of output used on business entertainment. We found 
that Entertainment Costs have a strong negative effect at 1% significance level, 
suggesting substantive side effect of businesses having to allocate top 
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management time and other resources to building networks. However, it is not 
specified whether this cost is only for bureaucratic agencies or also inclusive of 
costs on entertaining other businesses hence cannot be concluded that government 
intervention is the major obstacle for firm efficiency. Bureaucratic Interaction 
variable shows no significant impact on TFP. 
We also found that Days to Clear Imports/Exports has a significant and negative 
effect on TFP at 1% significance level, indicating that delays and costs that are 
associated with authority inefficiencies are major problems for companies in 
China. 
We have also tested for the impact on supporting institutions in terms of the legal 
systems (H2c) and the financial system (H2d and H2e). We found significant 
support for the effect of the legal system, which reinforces our theme of property 
rights, because a pivotal role of the legal system is to ensure the protection of 
property rights. With respect to the legal system, which was measured by the 
variable Confidence in Courts, we find that it indeed has a highly significant 
positive effect on TFP at 1% significance level. This highly significant effect 
applies to both state and privately owned firms in the whole sample and supports 
our hypothesis H1c. 
With respect to the financial system, Private SMEs with Bank Loans variable 
reflects the effectiveness of financial intermediaries as well as the accessibility of 
loans to private firms. The variable Expected Informal Payment for Loans 
measures the expected amount of payment needed to guarantee a loan from banks, 
which indicates the level of corruption in the financial sector. Financial 
intermediaries can affect firms’ effectiveness by determining the accessibility of 
external finance. When the costs of obtaining external finance is high, firms resort 
to their internal cash reserve for investment implementation, thus are constrained 
of liquidity. Such constraints lower the spending on technology and labour 
efficiency improvement such as new accounting software or staff training 
programs. Such limitation on improvement then leads to lower effectiveness of 
the utilization of allocated resources, causing x-inefficiency. When the financial 
sector is highly corrupted, informal payment or other forms of benefits are often 
given to bank managers by firms applying for funding; the extra costs of both 
 151 
money and labour will then lower firms’ effectiveness. Both variables show no 
signs of significance, hence H2d and H2e are not supported by our regression 
results. Our additional test on private firms only shows that indeed the financial 
system accessibility has more of an effect on private sector development, but 
state-owned firms are less affected, which coincides with our findings in previous 
chapters, which argues state-owned firms have preferential treatment in terms of 
bank lending. 
Our third hypothesis proposes that the institutional impact on private firms’ 
effectiveness in the form of TFP is greater compared to state owned firms when 
the institutional context is stronger.  Before testing for hypothesis 3, we run a 
baseline regression without any explanatory variables to highlight the impact of 
ownership dummies on firms’ TFP level. We found that, consistent with majority 
of results obtained from other regressions while other explanatory variables were 
present in the model, the result shows a strong positive correlation between 
private_foreign ownership and firms’ TFP level (at 5% significance level), 
consistent with our argument in the previous chapters that state owned firms are 
poorer performers compared to private firms. 
However, the evidence on hypothesis H3 is mixed in the sense that coefficients 
are not always pointing at the right direction. For instance the NERI variable 
shows that state owned firms benefits more in term of TFP when quality of such 
institution increases. But for more specific institutional measures such as Property 
Rights Protection, private firms show a stronger improvement in TFP in 
comparison with the state owned firms. This suggests that private firms in 
domestic or foreign ownership are not necessarily more effective in utilising 
factors, under the same institutional conditions at all times. The results hence 
cannot confirm that privately owned firms achieve higher firm effectiveness than 
state-owned firms (H3) when the institutional context is stronger. 
As for hypothesis 4a, after some mathematical exercises, we found the moderating 
effect is present on this moderating variable. The results show strong negative 
coefficient for Age variable at 1% significance level, and the Z-stats is also 
significant for the difference in Age coefficients between private and state owned 
firms at 10% significance level and hence supports H4a. This shows the 
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institutionalization of routines and the embeddedness in the old system are a 
greater obstacle to effectiveness in state owned firms than privately owned firms. 
However even private firms do experience an inertia as they age, that is that they 
are less flexible in reacting to new opportunities in a rapid changing environment.  
In terms of hypothesis 4b, apparently economy of scale and better network 
relationships of larger firms increase TFP, and larger firms are more efficient in 
utilising the inputs of the production (i.e. labour and capital). The positive 
coefficient also indicates that the firms are not operating at diminishing rate of 
return on scale i.e. double input ≠ double output. The coefficients for the Size 
variable is also statistically different for private and state owned firms, at 1% 
significance level. 
The results indicate that some larger firms in China have higher productivity and 
firm effectiveness. Higher TFP (which isn’t explained by factors such as labour or 
capital) means that (together with the size being very significant) larger firms are 
more inefficient in utilising the factors (due to overstaffing of state owned firms, 
for example) but more efficient in other aspects i.e. organisational structure etc. 
This could also be because those bigger firms have better connections, more 
exports, better price from suppliers etc. 
We did not find any other variables with strong enough coefficient difference 
between state owned and private firms. One reason behind this could be the small 
sample size on private firms. 
With respect to the labour market, Unemployment in the province has a negative 
effect on TFP. The quadratic effect is also significant, suggesting a U shaped 
relationship. Together these results indicate that there is a negative effect for most 
of range of the variable, and a positive effect for very high level of 
unemployment. The fact that we have significance without the quadratic term 
indicates that most likely the upward curve falls outside the range of the 
unemployment. Figure 3.2 illustrates the asymmetrical nature of the U-shaped 
marginal effects of unemployment on TFP. 
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Figure 3.2: Marginal Effect of Unemployment on Firm Effectiveness 
 
(The turning point for the curve is when unemployment is at 4.52%) 
 
 
Unemployment measures the level of unemployment of the region at a given time, 
and indicates the level of movement in workforce. Unemployment rate can affect 
firms’ TFP in different ways. The higher unemployment rate, the higher the 
bargaining power of companies as there is excess supply of labour. On the other 
hand, higher unemployment puts pressure on state owned firms as overstaffing 
issue can become prominent. 
Chinese firms operate under a political system, which means that when 
unemployment in a region is high, government tends to intervene in various ways. 
In region where unemployment rate is high, there could be more support/incentive 
from government to encourage local firms to hire more people, which leads to rent 
seeking behaviour of firms rather than profit and efficiency maximization, which 
reduces TFP level. On the other hand, high unemployment in a region could also 
be caused by the low level of education or skills possessed by local workforce, 
therefore local firms have lower TFP due to the largely unskilled workers. There 
could also be a threshold effect. With all regions government might adopt an 
equal policy on unemployment and therefore the negative impact of state 
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intervention on TFP is at a constant level, therefore places with higher 
unemployment would have crowded out the effect. 
 
3.5.1 Limitations 
One of the main determinants of TFP identified in the literature is the firms’ 
endowment with technology. For example, Comin (2006) argues that change in 
TFP is largely related to technology and innovation thus the importance of R&D 
was highlighted. He also points out that cross-country difference in TFP can be 
due to differences in the physical technology used by those countries or in the 
efficiency with which technologies are used. Many papers attempted to measure 
the technological impact on TFP change but seldom linked TFP to institutional 
measures on the regional level. In our study, there is a lack of appropriate control 
for technology endowment at the level of province. However, we argue that 
technology is endogenous to institutional development because more market 
oriented institutions also enhance firms’ ability to create, transfer and accumulate 
technology based assets. 
TFP, by definition, can be accurately measured by Solow residual only if three 
conditions are satisfied: 1) a neoclassical production function 2) there is perfect 
competition in the capital markets 3) the growth rates of the inputs are measured 
accurately. Another limitation of the study also links to measurement issues. The 
variable “Intellectual Rights Protection” that we adopted and tested (results not 
shown) from Du et al. 2008 is measured by the “number of approved patents per 
capita”. One could argue that this variable captures the intensity of research 
activity, rather than the institutional framework governing such activity. While 
these two variables are closely associated, there is a possibility of a measurement 
error here, which may explain why this variable remains insignificant in our 
regression analysis.  
Future researches and studies could focus on a wider range of firms with more 
diversity in characteristics (i.e. small to medium sized firms that are not listed in 
the stock market). By including more firms with private ownership in the study 
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could also test more accurately whether there is a significant difference between 
the impact of institutions on state-owned firms and private-owned firms. 
The summary of regression analysis are reported in three panels in table 6 (panel 
A to E), summarizing the actual effects on firm TFP or effectiveness in 
comparison to the hypothetic predictions. Panel A to Panel D are all tested based 
on full size sample of the data as well as sub samples divided according to 
institutional ownership category. Panel E represents results tested from the 
aggregated sample only. We tested all variables to rule out high correlation, and a 
sample bias test was also done to ensure the selected sample represents the whole 
population to the best. 
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Table 3.5 (continued). Hypothetic predictions and actual results 
 
 
Panel C   Variable being   Predictive sign Actual sign Hypothesis 
    tested   of coefficient of efficient being supported 
         
H3   Private_foreign ownership  +    mixed   no 
         
Panel D   Variable being   Predictive sign Actual sign Hypothesis 
    tested   of coefficient of efficient being supported 
         
H4a  Age   -   -***  yes 
H4b   Number of employees    +    +***   yes 
         
Panel E   Variable being   Predictive sign Actual sign Hypothesis 
    tested   of coefficient of efficient being supported 
         
H5a  Local unemployment   -   -**  yes 
H5b  Squared term of local   +   +*  yes 






Institutional development is widely viewed as the core to economic reform in 
transition economies. And in the Chinese context, it is also considered as crucial to 
improving firms’ efficiency. By studying local institutional impact on firm 
performance, measured by TFP, we are able to have a clearer picture on how such 
market mechanism can affect firms’ effectiveness in China and which aspects of 
institutions should we draw particular attention to. 
The chapter provides more accurate findings compared to similar studies for a 
number of reasons. First, we constructed a unique data set which comprises of three 
sets of provincial level institutional data, which has been widely adopted and used 
separately. We then modelled them with a rich variety of carefully selected control 
variables. 
Secondly, most studies on institutional impacts usually focus on inter-country 
variation of institutional change and how such differences affect local businesses. 
However, the difference in firms’ performance these studies witness could largely 
be caused by difference in other factors unrelated to institutions, for instance, local 
market size, population and purchasing power. Due to the unique nature of China, 
we are able to compare across region within the same country, thus controlling for a 
lot of country specific and region specific effects, which avoids the 
misinterpretation of results and improves accuracy. 
The findings of this study suggest that institutions quality indeed has an impact on 
business performance, measured by TFP here, and that improving institutions to 
facilitate business operations is crucial for firms to achieve higher efficiency and 
sustainable growth. Property rights protection and law enforcement both enhances 
firms’ TFP while corruption, government inefficiency as well as financial sector 
collusion all hinders the firms’ effectivenss. Such results indicate the great need for 
further reform in the institution context in China. Particularly, the improvement of 
financial intermediaries, as discussed in the previous chapters, will reduce costs for 
firms needing external finance and facilitate the implementation of profitable 
investment projects, thus reducing transaction costs and increasing firm 
effectiveness. Regulations and policies need to be strengthened and tightened 
encourage transparency in doing business as well as government activities to reduce 
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the chance of collusion as well as corruption. The results also state that both the 
size and age of firm has a moderating effect on firms’ TFP and such effects differ 
by the firm’s institutional ownership. Finally, we find negative correlation between 
regional unemployment and firm’s TFP level, which implies the overstaffing 
practice of local government reduces firm effectiveness. In order for firm to achieve 
higher level of TFP, government needs to promote a free market economy where 































The thesis consists of three standalone essays which are interlinked within the 
Chinese economic context. The privatization of state owned firms and banks as 
well as economic reform in the sense of institutional changes enables us to test for 
the determinants of an array of corporate finance related variables on large variety 
of firm specific explanatory variables, with institutional ownership as our focus.  
 
In the first chapter on bank financing, we utilize data on financial information of 
over 6,000 firms in Hubei province and find that state ownership is highly 
correlated with banks’ lending decision. The results suggest that despite three 
decades of reform, ownership of firms still matters for bank lending. The results 
support the research hypothesis of discrimination towards privately owned firms in 
banks’ lending process in China. Banks lend heavily to state owned firms for 
reasons including a better guarantee of repayment, higher information transparency, 
local employment benefit, personal gain, as well as collusion and corruption 
between management of local banks and state owned firms. 
 
We also find that, regardless of firms’ ownership, profitability is negatively 
correlated with firms’ accessibility to loans, indicating what might be considered 
irrational behaviour on the lender side if the Chinese economy were a conventional 
market one. As privately owned firms are generally better performers in term of 
profitability in China (Kato & Long, 2004; Sun, et al., 2002; Z. Wei & Varela, 
2003; X. Xu & Y. Wang, 1999), such a finding confirms the existence of the banks’ 
soft budget constraint. Studies by Tian and Estrin (2007) and Roland, Kornai and 
Maskin (2003) point out the facilitating role of soft budget constraints plays in the 
collapse of the banking sector of East Asian economies in the 1990s. 
 
In addition, our results indicate that firm size, growth rate, and the ability to secure 
debt against collateral all have significant positive impact on firms’ likelihood of 
obtaining bank loans. The exception is credit history, which is negatively correlated 
with the level of debt, indicating that banks view past borrowing as a risk on loan 
repayment and a sign of financial distress. We also note the facilitating role of debt 





Our results are robust with respect to alternative performance measures, lagged 
time periods and also sample periods. Our empirical results confirm that 
banksdisplay favouritism in their lending behaviour towards state owned firms, 
perhaps as a result of guaranteed loan repayment and low default risk, disregarding 
the profitability and growth outlook of other firms. 
 
The presence of such lending bias could be caused by several factors. Firstly, due to 
the long standing relationship between state owned banks and state owned firms, it 
is relatively easy for banks to lend to previous borrowers as both the costs of 
transaction and information asymmetry is low. It is expected that State-owned firms 
use established past relationship to gain easy access to loans from State-owned 
banks. Relationship (guanxi) lending can also be a major factor explaining banks’ 
behaviour. In the Chinese banking market, state owned banks either assume the role 
to minimize market failure, or respond to political pressure by lending to firms with 
long established relationship, which are mostly state owned. When banks do not 
have easy access to transparent “soft” information on firms, they prefer allocating 
credit to firms with established borrowing history and repayment record. As the 
banks in China are still in the middle of the stage to convert themselves from 
lending heavily to state owned firms under government guidance to market 
oriented, profit maximizing agents, the level of knowledge in certain industries 
which are made up by mainly privately owned firms is low, which promotes 
relationship lending to state owned firms by banks due to the lack of information on 
these firms. It is then of state owned firms’ incentive to focus on maintaining a 
good relationship with the banks to ensure future flow of external finance, thus 
productivity can be overlooked. 
 
Secondly, the risk associated with lending to private firms are much higher in 
comparison, as when state owned firms are making losses and repayment cannot be 
guaranteed, the government steps in and writes it off or simply order the bank to 
lend more to the struggling firm. There is hardly any default risk involving state 
owned firms as the government will always bail them out financially. 
 
Thirdly, it is common for Chinese government to require banks to provide “policy 
loans” to state owned firms that are not profitable, either due to their own political 
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agenda of consolidating political powers, or because personal favours have been 
promised. Banks often face considerable pressure from (local) government to lend 
on a non-commercial basis. Bank managers usually have to comprise with the local 
government as the managers need local support, or they could benefit from some 
sort of personal gain from it. Therefore, collusion and corruption are major causes 
for such lending bias too. It is also of the government’s interest to protect the state 
owned firms as most of them are large in size and over-stuffed. If a large state 
owned firm goes bankrupt, it will cause a heavy burden on local unemployment and 
thus costs for the government. The networks between State owned banks and State 
owned firms means that it is almost a historical “tradition” to lend more to State-
owned firms. 
 
Lastly, it is not uncommon that bank managers authorise a loan to privately owned 
firms at a higher interest rate, but register it under policy lending to state owned 
firms to profit from the difference in interest rate. The double counting problem 
means that the lending bias could be exaggerated in our model. 
 
The results show signs indicating the Chinese banks are more prudent in lending 
practice than they might seem to most of the Western opinions. The banks prefer 
firms with established credit history with good (or guaranteed) record of loan 
repayment, thus minimizing their risks of default loans.  
 
However these findings are not indicators of good practice as such behaviour does 
not promote healthy market competition and firms have no incentives to improve 
performance or efficiency. When banks tend to lend to a typical type of firms only, 
it could lead to a lower productivity of investment and a greater concentration of 
risk, leading to a greater risk of financial crisis (Perotti, 1993). It also does not 
promote sustainable growth and correct management style. 
 
The banks also lack in expertise in certain industrial sectors that many privately 
owned firms belong to, or the technology these firms adopt, which in turn results in 
higher rate of loan refusals for privately owned firms. Profitable privately owned 
firms face the risk of being crowded out of the market due to difficulty and high 
costs of external financing, and eventually may result in weaker and unstable 
economy. Studies by Tian and Estrin (2007) and Roland, Kornai and Maskin(2003) 
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point out the facilitating role of soft budget constraints plays in the collapse of the 
banking sector of East Asian economies in the 1990s. 
 
Direct state ownership of the banks also mean that the loans granted are often 
associated with political purposes. State owned firms are notoriously known for 
their overstaffing and low productivity as a partial result. The government can 
guarantee an unprofitable firm of low cost of bank loans in return for promises of 
employment to either ease local unemployment figure or for personal favours. 
Profitable privately owned firms may be reluctant in applying for bank financing 
and opt for internal cash reserves when the need arises, in order to avoid taking on 
political agendas.  
 
Therefore such bank practice does not promote healthy market competition and 
firms have no incentives to improve performance or efficiency. Also when banks 
have a tendency to lend to a typical type of firms only, it could lead to a lower 
productivity of investment and a greater concentration of risk, leading to a greater 
risk of financial crisis (Perotti, 1993). Profitable privately owned firms face the risk 
of being crowded out of the market due to the difficulty and high costs of external 
financing, and this eventually may result in a weaker and more unstable economy.  
 
Highly concentrated risks mean that a deeper and more thorough reform will be 
needed for the Chinese banking sector, mainly through the privatization and 
commercialization of state owned banks. Diversification of loans to profitable firms 
with sustainable growth would permit greater financial stability. The government 
needs to change the policy towards lending and promote more efficient, mature, and 
transparent bank management.  
 
The relationship between firm financing constraints and investment – cash flow 
sensitivity has been an important topic of academic debate in recent years. Both 
FHP and KZ/Cleary studies show weakness in explanatory power in certain areas 
and the second chapter aims to pin down the relationship by using a large sample in 
a unique transitional economy like China.  
 
The second chapter finds that privately owned firms exhibits significantly greater 
sensitivity to their financial status than state owned firms. It employs data on over 
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1,700 listed firms in China. Higher sensitivities can be interpreted as evidence that 
firms are more financially constrained and that there is no strong theoretical reason 
to expect a monotonic relationship.Our results reconcile with the findings from 
earlier studies by FHP and KZ/Cleary. However the findings indicate that, although 
cash flow has an overall positive impact on firms’ implementation of investment 
projects, it affects privately owned firms and state owned firms in drastically 
different ways. Such a finding has not been proposed by earlier studies. The results 
show that in the state sector, cash flow either has a negative impact on firm level 
investment, or the correlation is of no significance. This indicates the agency 
problem in state owned firms, which is further facilitated by the role of debt (also 
reference to first chapter for details and empirical evidence). Furthermore, as we 
have discussed in the first chapter, bank lending to state owned firms is often 
associated with political agenda of the local government, and compulsory 
investment can be a major purpose for credit allocation. As a result, many state 
owned firms may still make investment of high monetary value even though they 
are making very low level of profit or even a loss. Allayannis and Mozumdar 
(2002) also argue that, when in extremely bad financial shape, the firm no longer 
responds greatly to the fluctuation of internal funds but only makes the essential 
investment, hence resulting in insignificant or even negative correlation between 
investment and cash flow. 
 
 In contrast, private firms’ investment is positively correlated with cash flow with 
strong significance, implying the availability and level of internal finance is a major 
determinant in firms’ investment decision. This confirms that such firms are more 
financially constrained compared to their state owned counterparts and supports the 
conclusion of a presence of lending bias in the first chapter. The positive correlation 
between cash stock at time t and lagged time t-1 and t-2 indicate that firms in the 
private sector stock up cash in preparation for future investment needs in order to 
overcome the financial hurdle. 
 
As we have discussed in the first chapter, bank lending to state owned firms are 
often policy lending directed by the government which is associated with political 
agenda such as fixed investment plans or promise of employment. As a result, 
despite making little profit or even a loss, many state owned firms still invest 
heavily, which explains why cash flow can sometimes show little or negative 
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correlation with investment. Also as discussed by Allayannis and Mozumdar 
(2002), when firms are in extremely bad financial shape, the firm no longer show 
high sensitivity to the fluctuation of internal funds but only makes the absolute 
amount of investment that is necessary, which also contributes to the non-positive 
correlation between cash flow and investment. 
 
We also find that the profitability, size and age of firms affect the cash flow 
sensitivity of investment. For state owned firms, both size (measured by number of 
employees) and profitability (measured by Tobin’s q) shows a significant negative 
impact on cash flow sensitivity, contradicting the predictions from economic 
theory. This can be attributed to the unique nature of state owned firms in China, as 
they are mostly overstaffed,with high growth rate and low efficiency. The 
inaccurate measurement of Tobin’s q in the Chinese context (where valuations are 
not necessarily free market determined) also contributed to the puzzling results. For 
privately owned firms, only size shows a positive effect on the sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow, indicating that in the private sector, larger firms are less 
financially constrained.However, neither profitability nor age has a significant 
impact on such sensitivity. As discussed in the previous paragragh, very profitable 
privately owned firms will choose internal finance over bank loans even when they 
are easily obtainable to avoid taking on unnecessary employment or making 
undesirable investment. 
 
The chapter therefore finds that privately owned firms exhibits significantly greater 
sensitivities than state owned firms. Thus the results suggest that higher sensitivities 
can be interpreted as evidence that firms are more financially constrained and that 
there is no strong theoretical reason to expect a monotonic relationship. The results 
also provide empirical evidence in favour of our theories on investment behaviour 
and cash flow, and further extend the existing tests in the literature for financial 
constraints in firms to the Chinese context. This highlights the urgent needs for 
deeper banking reform to further commercialize the state owned banks as well as to 
reduce state intervention and direction in the form of policy lending. The results of 
this chapter are also consistent with the findings of the first chapter showing that 
privately owned firms in China face lending bias and are indeed financially 
constrained. The limitation on data (consists of only listed firms in China) and 
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measures for Tobin’s q arguably reduce the explanatory power of our model, which 
can be of interest for future researchers.  
 
Institutional development is widely viewed as the core to economic reform in 
transition economies. And in the Chinese context, it is also considered as crucial to 
improving firms’ efficiency. Such development is closely tied to economic growth, 
development of financial market and legal environment, improvement of business 
process, and attraction of foreign direct investment.  By studying local institutional 
impact on firm performance, measured by TFP, we are able to have a clearer 
picture on how such market mechanism can affect firms’ effectiveness in China and 
which to aspects of institutions should particular attention be drawn. 
 
Our research in the third chapter provides more accurate findings compared to 
similar studies for a number of reasons. First, we constructed a unique data set 
which comprises of three sets of provincial level institutional data, which has been 
widely adopted and used separately. We then modelled them with a rich variety of 
carefully selected control variables. 
 
Secondly, most studies on institutional impacts usually focus on inter-country 
variation of institutional change and how such differences affect local businesses. 
However, the difference in firms’ performance these studies witness could largely 
be caused by difference in other factors unrelated to institutions, for instance, local 
market size, population and purchasing power. Due to the unique nature of China, 
we are able to compare across region within the same country, thus controlling for a 
lot of country specific and region specific effects, which avoids the 
misinterpretation of results and improves accuracy. 
 
The findings of this chapter suggest that institutions quality indeed has an impact 
on business performance, measured by TFP, and that improving institutions to 
facilitate business operations is crucial for firms to achieve higher efficiency and 
sustainable growth.Overall, our empirical analysis supports the widely held view 
that market supporting institutions are important for firm performance, here proxied 
by effectiveness measured as TFP. We also find important support for some of the 
key underpinning arguments in institutional theory.  
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We found Government Intervention in Business Operations highly correlated with a 
few other explanatory variables. On the other hand, government intervention can be 
explained by two other variables, Entertainment Costs and Bureaucratic 
Intervention. The results clearly indicate the pivotal role of property rights, in 
contrast, we did not find support for either government corruption or contract 
enforcement after controlling for the effects of property rights.  
This is surprising as China’s development did not come without a rampant 
corruption over the past three decades. State control and extensive intervention, 
lack of democracy and freedom of media, together with weak rule of law and 
enforcement all lead to severe corruption problems in modern China. However the 
regression results do not suggest significant impact of corruption on firms’ TFP 
level. The other variable Contract Enforcement is not significant either in the full 
sample. This result is interesting in view that according to the World Bank –IFC 
study on “Doing Business” China ranks 79th for the ease of doing business – an 
average score across many indices – but ranks 15th on the item on contract 
enforcement. In other words, while businesses report considerable problems to 
doing business in China, contract enforcement does not seem to be one of them. 
Our results however indicate that the variation on this issue still is of concern, and 
perhaps the World Bank study covered primarily areas that have opened up to 
foreign investment, and in other areas of China issues of enforcement of contracts 
and property rights is still a major issue.  
However, it is understood that in China, contracts are often not enforced by legally 
binding terms but rather by the informal social structure and norms. As such norms 
or the Chinese culture of guanxi (relationship) makes up a big part of institutional 
environment in which the firms operate, it can be problematic for firms with little 
of insufficient local knowledge and hence making the market more opaque in 
nature as well as reducing the attractiveness of local market. 
The significant and positive effect of Property Rights Protection in the aggregate 
model suggests that property rights take a central role in theorizing in economics. In 
contrast, recent work on institutional theory literature in the management literature 
(e.g. Kostova et al., 2008) has paid only scant attention to property rights. This 
suggests that, perhaps, management scholars may want to incorporate work on the 
economics of property rights, and the various aspects of their definitions and 
enforcement, in their theories. Until fairly recently, China maintained the level of 
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private properties by implementing various regulations and rules due to a lack of 
formal property rights protection. Therefore the measure of property rights 
protection in this chapter intensely reflects the de facto property rights protection 
across all the regions. 
We also made a distinction of between property rights and private ownership, 
which is a unique practice, as in the view of most literatures they are synonymous, 
but they may not be so in China. Our results confirm that there are indeed 
differences between these two measures. It is also indicated that the property rights 
aspect of private ownership that matters more than other aspects of private 
ownership that are captured by the dummy. Property rights aspect also shows 
higher impact on privately owned firms compared to state owned firms. The 
employment factor could also contribute to this difference as the quality of 
employment in the private sector is higher than in the state sector due to the 
common problem such as overstaffing and policy employment in the state owned 
firms. 
 
The thesis aims to shed light on the Chinese economic reform and implications of 
mutual state ownership of banks and firms as well as the recent development in 
institutional environment on firm productivity. The state owned banks, as predicted, 
heavily lend to state owned firms for reasons including established long term 
relationship, loan repayment guarantee, and implementation of tasks initiated by the 
government for various political purposes. As a result, bank finance is often given 
to firms which are unprofitable, unproductive and require possible further funding 
to sustain. Profitable firms either have difficult access to external finance or prefer 
to fund their investment project with cash reserves to avoid political agenda 
pushing associated with the loan, thus limiting their choice of investment level and 
increasing transaction costs. When external financing is necessary, both state 
owned firms and privately owned firms need to allocate resources on bureaucratic 
interaction in order to ensure the loan, therefore reducing productivity level. 
 
Reform in the state sector is urgently required in order to break the pattern of 
paternalistic behaviour of state owned banks and their bailout act whenever the 
state owned firms are in financial trouble. The state owned firms need to adopt 
more structured organization and management instead of relying on old fashioned 
 169 
 
bureaucratic managerial style. The role of state/government needs to be minimized 
in standard business procedures to allow for efficient resource allocation for all 
firms. Banks should also improve their knowledge on all industries, particularly the 
ones within the private sector, to enable more thorough and accurate appraisal of 
loan applications from new and technology driven industries.  
 
Institutional environment in China varies across different regions, which facilitates 
our research of the intra country variation in productivity of firms caused by such 
difference in institutions. We find that institutional framework to influence firms’ 
productivity greatly and improvement in institutional environment can impact 
positively on firm effectiveness in terms of TFP. We find that contract enforcement, 
surprisingly, does not impact firm TFP in a significant way. However, given the 
Chinese culture of guanxi (relationship) and the importance of informal social 
structure and norms, it is understood that contracts are often constructed and 
enforced in the socially acceptable way rather than by legal binding terms. As such 
informal social norms make up a big part of institutional environment where firms 
have to operate in, it can be problematic for firms with insufficient local 
knowledge, which affect the local market attractiveness negatively. 
 
In conclusion, all the chapters in this thesis confirms the need for future banking 
reform to be deepened in terms of commercialization and privatization of the banks, 
facilitation of external finance availability for high quality firms, introduction of 
more sophisticated procedure and guidance for assessment of loan applicants and 
more qualified personnel with specific skills required in the relevant field. In recent 
years, the state owned banks in China have indeed made more effort moving 
towards more commercialized and westernized practices in terms of both firm level 
lending as well as management. The entry to WTO has also marked the transition 
of the banks into a new era, with the immediate lift of ban on foreign financial 
institutions to provide currency and other commercial services to Chinese 
enterprises and individuals. People’s Bank of China also released statement on 
further banking deregulation aiming to strengthen reform and management 
transparency. Such practice has seen improvement in balance sheets of banks and 
reduction in NPLs, and is also believed to have eased the financing problems of the 




Special attention also needs to be paid to further improve institutional quality in 
China in order to reduce transaction costs and information asymmetry problems for 
firms. The authorities should also aim to reduce the regional disparities in 
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